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John & N. Williams

ABRIDGMENT

Jurgen

OF

Mr. *LOCKE's*

ESSAY

CONCERNING

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

A NEW EDITION, with ADDITIONS

CAREFULLY REVISED and CORRECTED.

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M. DCC. LXXXII.

TO THE MUCH ESTEEMED

Mr. JOHN LOCKE.

HONOURED SIR,

I SEND you this imperfect draught of your excellent *Essay* concerning *Human Understanding*; which, I must confess, falls as much short of the perfection, as it does of the length of the original. Nevertheless, as I lately intimated to you, (and you were pleased to think, that what I proposed in reference to this Design, would not be wholly lost Labour,) I am not without Hopes, that it may in this contracted *Form*, prove in some Measure serviceable to that noble End, which you have so successfully aimed at in it, viz. *The Advancement of real and useful Knowledge.* The inducement which moved me to think of abridging it, was a Consideration purely extrinsical to the Work itself; and in Effect no other than this; that it would be better suited to the Ease and Convenience of some sort of Readers, when reduced into this narrow Compass. In order to this, I thought the *First Book*, which is employed in refuting the common Opinion of *Innate Notions* and *Ideas*, might be best spared in

this Abridgment; especially, since the Reader may be convinced by what he shall find here, that such a Supposition is at least needless, in regard he may attain to all the Knowledge he has, or finds himself capable of, without the help of any such *Innate Ideas*. Besides this, I have retrenched most of the larger Explications; and some useful Hints, and instructive Theories, I have wholly omitted; not because they are less considerable in themselves, but because they seemed not so necessary to be insisted on in this *Abridgment*, considered as a previous Instrument, and preparatory Help, to guide and conduct the Mind in its *Search after Truth and Knowledge*. I did particularly pass by that accurate Discourse, concerning the Freedom and Determination of the *Will*, contained in *Chap.* 21. *L.* 2. because I found it too long to be inserted here at large, and too weighty and momentous to be but slightly and imperfectly represented. This, I hope, will prove no prejudice to the *Essay* itself, since none, I presume, will think it reasonable to form a Judgment of the whole Work from this Abridgment of it: And I persuade myself, that few *Readers* will be content with this *Epitome*, who can conveniently furnish themselves with the *Essay* at large. However, I am apt to think, that this alone will serve to make the Way to Knowledge somewhat more plain and easy; and afford such Helps for the Improvement of Reason, as are perhaps in vain sought after in those Books, which profess to teach the *Art*

of

of Reasoning. But nevertheless, whether you shall think fit to let it come abroad under the Disadvantages that attend it in this *Form*, I must leave you to judge. I shall only add, that I think my own Pains abundantly recompensed by the agreeable, as well as instructive Entertainment, which this nearer View, and closer Inspection into your *Essay*, afforded me: And I am not a little pleased, that it has given me this Opportunity of expressing the just Value and Esteem I have for it, as well as the Honour and Respect I have for its Author. I am,

Honoured SIR,

Your very humble,

Oxon. Ap. 17. 1695.

and obliged Servant,

JOHN WYNNE.

THE

THE INTRODUCTION.

1 SINCE it is the *Understanding* that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its noblenes, worth the enquiring into.

2. My purpose therefore is to enquire into the *Original, Certainty*, and *Extent* of human knowledge; together with the grounds and degrees of *Belief, Opinion*, and *Assent*, which I shall do in the following method.

3. *First*, I shall enquire into the *Original* of those *Ideas* or notions, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind, and the *Ways* whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, what *Knowledge* the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

Thirdly, I shall make some enquiry into the nature and grounds of *Faith* and *Opinion*.

4. If by this enquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof *how far* they reach, and where they fail us, it may be of

use

wife to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension, to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether, and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should then perhaps be so forward, out of an affectation of *Universal Knowledge*, to perplex ourselves with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions; or whereof, (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all: But should learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state.

5. For though the *Comprehension* of our understanding comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things; yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful *Author* of our being, for that portion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us so far above all the rest of the Inhabitants of this our mansion. Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he has given them (as St. Peter says, πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν) whatsoever is necessary for the conveniencies of *Life*, and information of *Virtue*; and has put within the reach of their discovery, the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better.

How

How ſhort ſoever their knowledge may come of an univerſal, or perfect comprehenſion of whatſoever is, it yet ſecures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their *Maker*, and the ſight of their own *duties*. Men may find matter ſufficient to buſy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and ſatisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own conſtitution, and throw away the bleſſings their hands are filled with, becauſe they are not big enough to graſp every thing. We ſhall not have much reaſon to complain of the narrowneſs of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of uſe to us; for of that they are very capable: And it will be an unpardonable, as well as childiſh peeviſhneſs, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, becauſe there are ſome things that are ſet out of the reach of it. It will be no excuſe to an idle and untoward ſervant, who would not attend his buſineſs by candle light, to plead that he had not broad ſun ſhine. The candle that is ſet up in us, ſhines bright enough for all our purpoſes. The diſcoveries we can make with this, ought to ſatisfy us. And we ſhall then uſe our underſtandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion, that they are ſuited to our faculties; and upon thoſe grounds they are capable of being propoſed to us;

and

and not peremptorily or intemperately require *demonſtration*, and demand *certainty*, where *probability* only is to be had, and which is ſufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will diſbelieve every thing, becauſe we cannot certainly know all things; we ſhall do ſomewhat as wiſely as he who would not uſe his legs, but ſit ſtill and periſh becauſe he had no wings to fly.

6. When we know our own *ſtrength*, we ſhall the better know what to undertake with hopes of ſucceſs. And when we have well ſurveyed the *powers* of our own minds, we ſhall not be inclined either to ſit ſtill, and not ſet our thoughts on work at all in deſpair of knowing any thing; nor, on the other ſide, queſtion every thing, and diſclaim all knowledge, becauſe ſome things are not to be underſtood. Our *Buſineſs* here, is not to know all things, but thoſe things which concern our conduct. If we can find out thoſe meaſures whereby a *rational creature*, put into that ſtate which man is in, in this world, may and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled that ſome other things eſcape our knowledge.

7. This was that which gave the firſt *riſe* to this *eſſay* concerning the underſtanding. For I thought that the firſt ſtep towards ſatisfying ſeveral enquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a ſurvey of our *underſtandings*, examine our

own *powers*, and see to what things they are adapted. 'Till that was done, I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and secure possession of truths that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts in the vast *ocean* of being, as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possessions of our understandings; wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escaped its comprehension. Thus men, extending their enquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing, it is no wonder that they raise *questions* and multiply *disputes*, which, never coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect *scepticism*. Whereas were the capacities of our understandings well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the *horizon* found, which sets bounds between the enlightned and dark parts of things, between what is, and what is not comprehensible by us, men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowing ignorance of the *one*, and employ their thoughts and discourse, with more advantage and satisfaction, in the *other*.

N. B. Several IMPROVEMENTS are made to this Edition, which the Reader will observe are marked (thus ') with an inverted comma.

AN

AN ABRIDGMENT OF LOCKE's ESSAY.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of Ideas in General, and their Original.

§. 1.

BY the term *idea*, I mean *whatever it the object of the underſtanding, when a man thinks*; or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking.

§. 2. I preſume it will be eaſily granted me, that there are ſuch *ideas* in mens minds: Every one is conſcious of them in himſelf; and mens words and actions will ſatisfy him that they are in others. Our *firſt inquiry* then ſhall be, how they come into the mind.

§. 3. It is an eſtabliſhed opinion among ſome men, that there are in the underſtanding certain *innate principles*, ſome primary notions, (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι) *characters*, as it were ſtampt upon the mind of man, which the ſoul receives in its very firſt being, and brings into the world with it.

§. 4. This opinion is accurately discussed, and refuted in the *first* book of this *essay*, to which I shall refer the reader, that desires satisfaction in this particular.

§. 5. It shall be sufficient here to shew, how men, barely by the use of their *natural faculties*, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any *innate* impressions; and may arrive at certainty without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine, any one will easily grant, that it would be impertinent to suppose the *ideas* of *colours* innate in a creature to whom God hath given *sight*, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects, I shall shew by what ways and degrees all other *ideas* come into the mind; for which I shall appeal to every one's own experience and observation.

§. 6. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, *white paper*, void of all characters, without any *ideas*: How comes it to be furnished? whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *experience* and *observation*. This, *when employed about external sensible objects, we may call* sensation: By this we have the *ideas* of *bitter, sweet, yellow, hard*, &c. which are commonly called *sensible qualities*, because conveyed into the mind by the *senses*. The same *experience, when employed about the internal operations of the mind perceived, and reflected on by us, we may call Reflection*.

tion. Hence we have the *ideas of perception, thinking, doubting, willing, reasoning,* &c.

§. 7. These two, *viz. external material things,* as the objects of sensation; and the *operations of our own mind,* as the objects of reflection, are to me the only *originals* from whence all our *ideas* take their beginnings. The understanding seems not to have the least glimmering of *ideas,* which it doth not receive from one of these two *sources.* These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several *modes* and compositions, we shall find to contain our whole stock of *ideas*; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways.

§ 8. 'He that attentively considers the state of a 'child, at his first coming into the world, will have 'little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas, 'that are to be the matter of his future knowledge. 'Tis by degrees children come to be furnished with 'them from the objects they are conversant with.' They are so surrounded with bodies that perpetually and diversely affect them, that some *ideas* will (whether they will or no) be imprinted on their minds. *Light* and *colours, sounds* and *tangible* qualities, do continually solicite their proper *senses,* and force an entrance into the mind. 'Tis late commonly before *children* come to have *ideas* of the operation of their minds; and some men have not any very clear or perfect

perfect *ideas* of the greatest part of them all their lives. Because, though they pass there continually; yet, like floating visions, they make not impressions deep enough to leave in the mind clear and lasting *ideas*, till the understanding turns inward upon itself, and *reflects* on its own operations, and makes them the objects of its own contemplation.

§. 9. When a man *first perceives*, then he may be said to *have ideas*; having *ideas*, and perception, signifying the same thing. It is an opinion maintained by some, that the *soul always thinks*, and that it always has the actual perception of *ideas* as long as it exists: And that *actual thinking* is as inseparable from the soul, as *actual extension* is from the body. But whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent, 'to, or coeval with, or some time after the first ru-'diments or organization, or the beginnings of life in 'the body, I leave to be disputed by those, who have 'better thought of that matter. I confess myself to 'have one of those dull souls, that doth not perceive 'itself always to contemplate *ideas*:' Nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to *think*, than for the body always to *move*: The perception of *ideas* being (as I conceive) to the soul, what motion is to the body, not its *essence*, but one of its *operations*: And therefore, though thinking be never so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose, that it should always think,

always

always be in action. That perhaps is the privilege of the infinite *author* and preserver of all things, *who never slumbers nor sleeps*; but is not competent to any *finite* being. We know certainly by experience, that we sometimes think; and thence draw this infallible consequence, that there is something in us that has a power to think, but whether that substance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no farther assured than experience informs us.

§. 10. I would be glad to learn from those men, who so confidently pronounce, that the human soul always thinks, how they come to know it: Nay, how they come to know that they themselves think, when they themselves do not perceive it. 'Can a man think, 'and *not be conscious of it?* If they say, the man thinks 'always, but is not always conscious of it; they may 'as well say his body is extended without having 'parts. For 'tis altogether as intelligible to say, that 'a body is extended without parts, as that any thing '*thinks without being conscious of it*, or perceiving that 'it does so. They who talk thus, may, with as 'much reason, if it be necessary to their hypothesis, 'say, that a man is always hungry, but that he does 'not always feel it: Whereas, hunger consists in that 'very sensation, as thinking consists in being con-'scious that one thinks.'

§. 11. The most that can be said of it, is, that 'tis possible the soul may always think; *but not always retain*

retain it in memory: And, I say, it is as possible the soul may not always think; and much more probable that it should sometimes not think, than that it should often think, and that a long while together, and not be conscious to itself the next moment after that it had thought. 'And it is hardly to be conceived, that our 'infinitely wise Creator, should make so admirable a 'faculty, as the power of thinking, to be so idly and 'uselessly employed, at least one fourth part of its 'time here, as to think constantly, without remem-'bering any one of those thoughts whatever.'

§. 12. I see no reason therefore to believe, that *the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on*; and as those are increased and retained, so it comes by exercise to improve its faculty of thinking in the several parts of it; as well as afterwards by *compounding* those *ideas*, and *reflecting* on its own operations, it increases its *stock*, as well as facility in remembering, imagining, reasoning, and other *modes* of thinking.

§. 13. 'If it shall be demanded then, *when a man 'begins to have any ideas?* I think the true answer is, 'when he first has any *sensation*. For since there 'appear not to be any ideas in the mind, before the 'senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas 'in the understanding are coeval with *sensation*, which 'is *such an impression or motion made in some part of the 'body, as produces some perception in the understanding.*

'§. 14.

'§. 14. In this part the *understanding* is merely 'passive; and whether or no it will have these begin-'nings, and as it were materials of knowledge, is 'not in it's own power. For the objects of our senses 'do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas 'upon our minds whether we will or no; and the 'operations of our minds will not let us be without, 'at least some obscure notions of them.'

CHAP. II.

Of Simple Ideas.

§. 1.

OF ideas some are *simple*, others *complex*. A *simple idea*, is *one uniform appearance* or conception in the mind, which is not distinguishable into different *ideas*. Such are the *ideas* of *sensible qualities*, which though they are in the things themselves so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet the ideas they produce in the mind, enter by the senses simple and unmixed. Thus, though the hand feels *softness* and *warmth* in the same piece of *wax*; yet the *simple ideas* thus united in the same subject, are as perfectly *distinct* as those that come in by different senses.

§. 2. These *simple ideas* are suggested no other way than from the two ways above-mentioned, *viz. sensation* and *reflection*.

§. 3. The mind being once stored with the *simple ideas*, has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them to an infinite variety: And so can make at pleasure new *complex ideas*. But the most enlarged understanding cannot *frame one new simple idea*; nor by any force destroy them that are there.

CHAP. III.

Of Ideas of one Sense.

§. 1.

IDEAS, with reference to the different ways wherein they approach the mind, are of *four sorts*.

First, There are some which come into our minds by *one sense* only.

Secondly, There are others conveyed into the mind by *more senses than one*.

Thirdly, Others that are had from *reflection* only.

Fourthly, There are some suggested to the mind by all the ways of *sensation* and *reflection*.

§. 2. *First*, Some enter into the mind only by one sense peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus *colours*, *sounds*, *smells*, &c. come in only by the *eyes*, *ears*, and *nose*. And if these organs are any of them so disor-

disordered as not to perform their functions, they have no postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves in view, and be perceived by the understanding. It will be needless to enumerate all the particular *simple ideas* belonging to each *sense*; *nor* indeed is it possible; there being a great many more than we have *names* for.

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

§. 1.

I SHALL here mention one which we receive by our *touch*, because it is one of the chief ingredients in many of our complex ideas; and that is the idea of *solidity*: It arises *from the resistance, one body makes to the entrance of another body into the place it possesses, till it has left it.* There is no idea which we more constantly receive from *sensation* than this. In whatever posture we are, we feel somewhat that supports us, and hinders us from sinking downwards: And the bodies we daily handle, make us perceive, that while they remain between them, they do, by an unsurmountable force, hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them. This idea is commonly called *impenetrability*. I conceive *solidity* is more

proper to expreſs it, becauſe this carries ſomething more of *poſitive* in it than *impenetrability*, which is *negative*, and is perhaps more a conſequence of ſolidity, than ſolidity itſelf. This ſeems to be the moſt *eſſential* property of body, and that whereby we conceive it to fill ſpace: The idea of which is, that where we imagine any ſpace taken up by a ſolid ſubſtance, we conceive it ſo to poſſeſs it, that it excludes all other ſolid ſubſtances. This reſiſtance is ſo great, that no force can ſurmount it. All the bodies in the world preſſing a *drop of water* on all ſides, will never be able to overcome the reſiſtance it makes to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their way.

§. 2. *The idea of ſolidity is diſtinguiſhed from that of pure ſpace*, in as much as this *latter* is neither capable of reſiſtance, nor motion: 'Tis *diſtinguiſhed from hardneſs*, in as much as hardneſs is a firm coheſion of the ſolid parts of matter making up maſſes of a ſenſible bulk, ſo that the whole doth not eaſily change its figure. Indeed *hard* and *ſoft*, as commonly apprehended by us, are but *relative* to the conſtitutions of our bodies: That being called *hard* which will put us to pain ſooner than change its figure, by the preſſure of any part of our bodies; and that *ſoft*, which changes the ſituation of its parts upon an eaſy and unpainful touch.

§. 3. This difficulty of changing ſituation amongſt the parts, gives no more *ſolidity* to the hardeſt body, than

than to the softest; nor is an *adamant* one jot more solid than *water*: He that shall fill a yielding soft body well with *air* or *water*, will quickly find its resistance. By this way we may distinguish the idea of the extension of *body*, from the idea of the extension of *space*: That of *body*, is the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, and moveable parts; that of *space*, the continuity of unsolid, inseparable, and immoveable parts. *Upon the solidity of bodies depends their mutual impulse, resistance, and protrusion.* Of *pure space* and *solidity* there are several (among which I confess myself one) who persuade themselves they have clear and distinct ideas: And that they can think on *space* without any thing in it that resists, or is protruded by body, as well as on something *that fills space*, that can be protruded by the impulse of other bodies, or resist their motion; the idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a concave surface, being equally clear without, as with the idea of any solid parts between. If any one ask *what this solidity is*, I send him to his senses to inform him: Let him put a *flint* or *foot ball* between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of Simple Ideas of divers Senses.

SOME ideas we get into the mind by *more than one sense*, as *space, extension, figure, rest* and *motion*. These are perceivable by the eyes and touch.

CHAP. VI.

Of Simple Ideas of Reflection.

SOME are had from *reflection*, only: Such are the ideas we have of the *operations* of our minds: Of which the two principal are *perception* or *thinking*; and *volition* or *willing*. The powers of producing these operations are called *faculties*, which are the *understanding* and *will*, the several *modes* of thinking, &c. belong to this head.

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection.

§. 1.

THERE are some simple ideas conveyed into the mind by all the ways of *sensation* and *reflection*; such are *pleasure, pain, power, existence, unity, succession*. Pleasure or delight, pain or uneasiness accompany

company almoſt every impreſſion on our ſenſes, and every action or thought of the *mind*. By *pleaſure* or *pain* we mean whatever delights or moleſts us, whether it ariſes from the thoughts of our minds, or any thing operating on our bodies. Satisfaction, delight, pleaſure, happineſs, and uneaſineſs, trouble, torment, miſery, &c. are but different degrees, the one of pleaſure, the other of pain.

§. 2. The author of our beings having given us a power over ſeveral parts of our bodies to move or keep them at reſt as we think fit; and alſo by their motion to move ourſelves and other contiguous bodies; having alſo given a power to our minds in ſeveral inſtances, to chuſe amongſt its ideas which it will think on: To excite us to theſe actions of *thinking* and *motion* he has joined to ſeveral thoughts and ſenſations a perception of *delight*: Without this we ſhould have no reaſon to prefer one thought or action to another, or motion to reſt. In which ſtate; man, however furniſhed with the faculties of underſtanding and will, would be a very idle unactive creature, and paſs his time only in a lazy lethargic dream.

§. 3. *Pain* has the ſame efficacy to ſet us on work that pleaſure has; ſince we are as ready to avoid that, as to purſue this. This is worth our conſideration, that *pain is often produced by the ſame objects and ideas that produce pleaſure* in us. This their near conjunction gives us new occaſion of admiring the wiſdom and good-

goodneſs of our *Maker*, who deſigning the preſervation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm they will do us, and as advices to withdraw us from them. But he not deſigning our preſervation barely, but the preſervation of every part and organ in its perfection, hath in many caſes annexed pain to thoſe very ideas which delight us. Thus *heat* that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increaſe of it, proves no ordinary torment: Which is wiſely ordered by *nature*, that when any object does by the vehemence of its operation diſorder the inſtruments of ſenſation, whoſe ſtructures cannot but be very delicate, we might by the pain be warned to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order. That this is the *end of pain*, appears from this conſideration; that though great light is inſufferable to the eyes; yet the higheſt degree of *darkneſs* does not at all diſeaſe them: Becauſe *that* cauſes no diſorderly motion in that curious organ the eye. But exceſs of *cold* as well as *heat* pains us; becauſe it is equally deſtructive to the temper which is neceſſary to the preſervation of life.

§. 4. Another reaſon why God hath annexed *ſeveral degrees of pleaſure and pain to all the things that environ and affect us*, and blended them together in all things that our thoughts and ſenſes have to do with, is, that we finding imperfection and diſatisfaction,

tion, and want of compleat happineſs in all the enjoyments of the creatures, might be led to ſeek it in the enjoyment of him *with whom is fulneſs of joy, and at whoſe right hand are pleaſures for evermore.* Though what is here ſaid concerning *pleaſure* and *pain* may not perhaps make thoſe ideas clearer to us, than our own experience does, yet it may ſerve to give us due ſentiments of the wiſdom and goodneſs of the *ſovereign* diſpoſer of all things, which is not unſuitable to the main end of theſe enquiries: The knowledge and veneration of him being the *chief end* of all our thoughts, and the proper buſineſs of all underſtandings.

§. 5. *Exiſtence* and *unity* are two other ideas ſuggeſted by every object without, and every idea within: When ideas are in our minds, we conſider them as being actually there, as well as we conſider things to be actually without us; which is, that they *exiſt*, or have exiſtence: And whatever we conſider as *one thing*, whether a *real being* or *idea*, ſuggeſts the idea of *unity*.

§. 6. Power is another idea derived from theſe ſources: For finding in ourſelves that we can *think* and *move* ſeveral parts of our bodies at pleaſure; and obſerving the *effects* that natural bodies produce in one another: By both theſe ways we get the idea of *power*.

§. 7. *Succeſſion* is another idea ſuggeſted by our ſenſes, and by reflection on what paſſes in our minds. For if we look into ourſelves, we ſhall find our *ideas* always whilſt we are awake, or have any thought, paſſing in train, one going and another coming without intermiſſion.

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Conſiderations concerning Simple Ideas.

§. 1.

WHATSOEVER is able by affecting our ſenſes to cauſe any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the underſtanding a *ſimple idea*; which, whatſoever be the cauſe of it, is looked upon as a *real poſitive idea* in the underſtanding. Thus the ideas of *heat* and *cold*, *light* and *darkneſs*, *motion* and *reſt*, &c. are equally poſitive in the mind, though ſome of their cauſes may be mere *privations*. An inquiry into their cauſes concerns not the ideas as in the underſtanding; but the nature of the things exiſting without us. Thus a *painter* has diſtinct ideas of white and black, as well as the philoſopher, who tells us what kind of particles, and how ranged in the ſurface, occaſioned thoſe colours.

§. 2.

§. 2. That a *privative cauſe may produce a poſitive* idea, appears from ſhadows; which (though nothing but the abſence of light) are diſcernible; and cauſe clear and poſitive ideas. The natural reaſon of which may be this, viz. that ſince ſenſation is produced only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal ſpirits, variouſly agitated by external objects; the abatement of any former motion muſt as neceſſarily produce a new ſenſation as the increaſe and variation of it; and thereby introduce a new idea. We have indeed ſome *negative* names which ſtand not directly for poſitive ideas, but for their abſence; ſuch as *inſipid, ſilence*, which denote poſitive ideas, *viz. taſte* and *ſound*, with a ſignification of their abſence.

§. 3. It will be uſeful to diſtinguiſh *ideas as they are perceptions in our minds*, from what *they are in the bodies*, that cauſe ſuch perceptions in us: For we are not to think the former exact images and reſemblances of ſomething inherent in the ſubject, moſt of thoſe of *ſenſation* being in the mind, no more the likeneſs of ſomething exiſting without us, than the names that ſtand for them are the likeneſs of our ideas, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.

§. 4. Whatſoever the *mind perceives in itſelf*, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or underſtanding, that I call an *idea*: And the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call the *quality of the ſubject* wherein that power is: Thus a *ſnow ball* having

ing the power to produce in us the ideas of *white, cold,* and *round,* thoſe *powers* as they are in the ſnow-ball, I call *qualities*; and as they are *ſenſations or perceptions* in our underſtandings, I call them *ideas:* Which ideas if I ſpeak of ſometimes, as in the things themſelves, I would be underſtood to mean thoſe *qualities* in the objects which produce them in us.

§. 5. Theſe *qualities* are *of two ſorts,* firſt, *original,* or primary, ſuch are *ſolidity, extenſion, motion* or *reſt, number* and *figure.* Theſe are inſeparable from body, and ſuch as it conſtantly keeps in all its changes and alterations: Thus take a grain of *wheat,* divide it into two parts, each part has ſtill *ſolidity, extenſion, figure, mobility:* Divide it again, and it ſtill retains the ſame qualities, and will do ſtill, though you divide it on till the parts become inſenſible. Secondly, *ſecondary qualities,* ſuch as *colours, ſmells, taſtes, ſounds,* &c. which, whatever reality we by miſtake may attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themſelves, but *powers to produce various ſenſations in us*; and depend on the qualities before-mentioned.

§. 6. 'The next thing to be conſidered is, how 'bodies produce *ideas* in us, and that is manifeſtly by 'impulſe, the only way which we can conceive bodies 'operate in. If then external objects be not united 'to our minds when they produce *ideas* in it; and yet 'we perceive *theſe original qualities* in ſuch of them 'as ſingly fall under our ſenſes, it is evident, that

'ſome

'some motion must be thence continued by our nerves, 'or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to 'the brain, or the seat of sensation, there to *produce* '*in our minds the particular ideas we have of them.*'

§. 7. 'After the same manner that the *ideas* of these '*original qualities* are produced in us, we may con- 'ceive, that the *ideas of secondary qualities* are also '*produced*, viz. *by the operation of insensible particles on* '*our senses*. For it being manifest that there is good 'store of bodies, each whereof is so small, that we 'cannot, by any of our senses, discover either their 'bulk, figure, or motion; we may suppose, that the 'different motions and figures, bulk and number of 'such particles, affecting the several organs of our 'senses, produce in us those different sensations, 'which we have from these bodies. It being no 'more impossible to conceive, that God should annex 'such ideas to such motions, with which they have 'no similitude, than that he should annex the idea of 'pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our 'flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance.'

§. 8. The *ideas* of *primary* qualities of bodies *are resemblances of them*; and their patterns really exist in bodies themselves: But the ideas produced in us by *secondary* qualities, *have no resemblance of them at all*: And what is *sweet*, *blue*, or *warm* in the idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves, which we call so.

§. 9.

§. 9. Thus we see that fire at one distance produces in us the sensation of *warmth*, which at a nearer approach causes the sensation of *pain*. Now what reason have we to say that the idea of *warmth* is actually in the fire, but that of pain not in the fire, which the same fire produces in us the same way? The bulk, number, figure and motion of the parts of fire, are really in it, whether we perceive them or no; and therefore may be called *real* qualities, because they really exist in that body. But *light and heat are no more really in it, than sickness or pain:* Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ear hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, and all *colours, tastes, odours, and sounds*, as they are such particular ideas vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes (that is) bulk, motion, figure, &c. of parts.

§. 10. These *secondary* qualities are of two sorts, first *immediately perceivable*, which by immediately operating on our bodies, produce several different ideas in us. Secondly, *mediately perceivable*, which by operating on other bodies, change their primary qualities, so as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what they did before. These last are powers in bodies which proceed from the particular constitution of those primary and original qualities, to make such a change in the *bulk, figure, texture*, &c. of another body, as to make it operate

operate on our senses different from what it did before; as in fire to make lead fluid: These two last being nothing but powers relating to other bodies, and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities, are yet otherwise thought of; *the former being esteemed real qualities*; *but the latter barely powers*: The reason of this mistake seems to be this; that our ideas of sensible qualities containing nothing in them of bulk, figure, &c. we cannot think them the effect of those primary qualities which appear not to our senses to operate in their productions, and with which they have not any apparent congruity, or conceivable connexion: Nor can reason show how bodies by their bulk, figure, &c. should produce in the mind the ideas of *warm, yellow,* &c. but, in the other case, when bodies operate upon one another, we plainly see that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it, and therefore we look upon it as the effect of power: But our senses not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us, and the quality of the object producing it, we imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of the primary qualities, with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance.

§. 11. This little excursion into natural philosophy was necessary in our present enquiry, to distinguish the

primary

primary and real qualities of bodies which are always in them, from those *secondary* and imputed qualities, which are but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones, when they operate without being distinctly discerned; whereby we learn to know what ideas are, and what are not resemblances of something really existing in the bodies we denominate from them.

CHAP. IX.

Of Perception.

§. 1.

PERCEPTION is the first we receive from reflection: It is by some called *thinking* in general: Though *thinking*, in the propriety of the *English* tongue, signifies that sort of operation of the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active; where it considers any thing with some degree of voluntary attention: For in bare *perception* the mind is for the most part only *passive*; and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving. What this is, we cannot otherwise know, than by reflecting on what passes in our minds when we *see, feel, hear,* &c.

§. 2. Impressions made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, cause no *perception*: As we see in those whose minds are intently

busied

bufied in the contemplation of certain objects. A ſufficient impulſe there may be upon the organs of ſenſation: But if it reach not the obſervation of the mind, there follows no perception: So that *wherever there is ſenſe or perception, there ſome idea is actually produced and preſent in the underſtanding.*

§. 3. We may obſerve that the ideas *we receive from ſenſation, are often* in grown people *altered by the judgment*, without our taking notice of it. Thus a globe of any uniform colour (as of gold or jet,) being ſet before our eyes, the idea thereby imprinted is of a flat circle variouſly ſhadowed. But being accuſtomed to perceive what kind of appearances convex bodies are wont to make in us; the judgment alters the appearances into their cauſes; and from that variety of ſhadow or colour, frames to itſelf the perception of a convex figure of one uniform colour. 'To which purpoſe I ſhall here inſert 'a problem of the learned and worthy Mr. Molineux, 'and it is this:' "Suppoſe a man born blind, and "now adult, and taught by his touch to diſtinguiſh "between a cube and a ſphere of the ſame metal, and "nighly of the ſame bigneſs, ſo as to tell, when he felt "the one and the other, which is the cube, which the "ſphere. Suppoſe then the cube and ſphere placed "on a table, and the blind man to be made to ſee: "Quere, whether by his ſight, before he touched them, "he could now diſtinguiſh and tell, which is the

" globe, which the cube." To which the acute and ju-
" dicious propoſer anſwer, Not." " For though he
" has obtained the experience of, how a globe, how
" a cube affects his touch; yet he has not yet attained
" the experience, that what affects his touch ſo or ſo,
" muſt affect his ſight ſo or ſo: Or that a protuberant
" angle in the cube, that preſſed his hand unequally,
" ſhall appear to his eye, as it does in the cube."
' I intirely agree with this thinking gentleman in his
' anſwer to this his problem.

§. 4. This in many caſes by a ſettled habit is performed ſo readily, that we take that for the perception of our ſenſation, which is but an idea formed by the judgment: So that one ſerves only to excite the other, and is ſcarce taken notice of itſelf. As a man who reads or hears with attention, takes little notice of the characters or ſounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them. Thus habits come at laſt to produce actions in us, which often eſcape our obſervation.

§. 5. The faculty of *perception* ſeems to be that *which puts the diſtinction between the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature:* Since vegetables many of them have ſome degrees of motion, and upon the different application of other bodies to them, do very briſkly alter their figures and motions, and thence have obtained the name of *ſenſitive plants:* which yet is, I ſuppoſe, but bare *mechaniſm*, and no otherways produced, than the ſhortening of a rope by the affuſion

fion of water. But *perception*, I believe, *is in ſome degree in all ſorts of animals*: Though I think we may from the make of an *Oyſter* or *Cockle*, reaſonably conclude that it has not ſo many nor ſo quick ſenſes as a man, or ſeveral other animals.

§. 6. Perception *is alſo the firſt ſtep and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it*: So that the fewer ſenſes any man has, and the duller the impreſſions that are made by them are, the more remote he is from that knowledge which is to be found in other men.

CHAP. X.

Of Retention.

§. 1.

THE next faculty of the mind whereby it makes a farther progreſs towards knowledge, I call *Retention*; which is the keeping of thoſe ideas it has received: Which is done two ways.

§. 2. Firſt, *By keeping the idea which is brought into the mind for ſome time actually in view*, which is called *Contemplation*.

§. 3. Secondly, *By reviving thoſe ideas in our minds, which have diſappeared*, and have been, as it were, laid out of ſight: And this is *memory*, which is as it were the ſtorehouſe of our ideas; for the narrow

mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view at once, it was neceſſary to have a repoſitory to lay up thoſe ideas which at another time it may have uſe for. But our *ideas* being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which ceaſe to be any thing when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our *ideas* in the repoſitory of the memory ſignifies no more but this, *that the mind has a power in many caſes to revive perceptions it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before.* And it is by the aſſiſtance of this faculty, that we are ſaid to have all thoſe ideas in our underſtandings, which we can bring in ſight, and make the objects of our thoughts, without the help of thoſe ſenſible qualities which firſt imprinted them there.

§. 4. *Attention* and *repetition help much to the fixing ideas in our memories:* But thoſe which make the deepeſt and moſt laſting impreſſions, are thoſe which are accompanied with *pleaſure* or *pain*. *Ideas* but once taken in, and never again repeated, are ſoon loſt; as thoſe of colours in ſuch as loſt their ſight when very young.

§. 5. The memory in ſome men is tenacious, even to a miracle: But yet there ſeems to be a conſtant decay of all our *ideas*, even of thoſe which are ſtruck deepeſt; and in minds the moſt retentive: So that if they be not ſometimes renewed, the print wears out, and at laſt there remains nothing to be ſeen. Thoſe

ideas

ideas that are often refreſhed by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them, *fix themſelves beſt in the memory, and remain longeſt there:* Such are the *original qualities of bodies*, viz. Solidity, Extenſion, Figure, Motion, &c. and *thoſe that almoſt conſtantly affect us*, as heat and cold: And thoſe that are the *affections of all kinds of beings*, as Exiſtence, Duration, Number: Theſe and the like are ſeldom quite loſt while the mind retains any *ideas* at all.

§. 6. In memory *the mind is oftentimes more than barely paſſive*; for it often ſets itſelf on work to ſearch ſome hidden *ideas:* Sometimes they ſtart of their own accord; and ſometimes turbulent and tempeſtuous paſſions tumble them out of their cells.

§. 7. The defects of the memory are *two*.

Firſt, That it loſes the *idea* quite, and ſo far it produces perfect *ignorance*.

Secondly, That it moves ſlowly, and *retrieves* not the ideas *laid up in ſtore quick enough to ſerve the mind upon occaſions*. This, if it be to a great degree, is *ſtupidity*. In the having *ideas* ready at hand on all occaſions, conſiſts what we call *Invention*, *Fancy* and *quickneſs of parts*.

§. 8. This faculty *other* animals *ſeem to have to a great degree*, as well as *Man*, as appears by birds learning of tunes, and their endeavour to hit the notes right. For it ſeems impoſſible that they ſhould endeavour to conform their voices (as 'tis plain they do) to notes whereof they have no *ideas*.

CHAP. XI.

Of Discerning, and other Operations of the Mind.

§. 1.

ANOTHER faculty of the mind is, that of *discerning between its ideas:* On this depends the evidence, and certainty of several even general propositions, which pass for *innate truths:* Whereas indeed they depend on this clear discerning faculty of the mind, whereby it perceives two *ideas* to be the same or different. In being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another, *where there is the least difference*, consists in a great measure that *exactness of judgment* and *clearness of reason*, which is to be observed in one man above another; which is quite opposite to *wit*, which consists most in the assemblage of *ideas*, and *putting those together with quickness and variety, which have the least resemblance, to form agreeable visions:* Whereas judgment seperates carefully those *ideas*, wherein can be found the least difference to prevent error and delusion.

§. 2. To the well distinguishing our *ideas*, it chiefly contributes that they be *clear and determinate*; and when they are so, *it will not breed any confusion* or mistake about them, though the senses should convey them from the same object differently on different occasions.

§. 3.

§. 3. The *comparing* of our *ideas* one with another in reſpect of *Extent*, *Degree*, *Time*, *Place*, or any other circumſtances, is another operation of the mind about its *ideas*, which is the ground of *Relations*. Brutes ſeem not to have this faculty in any great degree. They have probably ſeveral *ideas* diſtinct enough; but cannot compare them farther than ſome ſenſible circumſtances annexed to the objects themſelves. The power of comparing general *ideas* which we may obſerve in Men, we may probably conjecture *Beaſts* have none at all.

§. 4. *Compoſition* is another operation of the mind, whereby it combines ſeveral of its ſimple *ideas* into *complex* ones: Under which operation we may reckon that of *Enlarging*, wherein we put ſeveral *ideas* together of the ſame kind, as ſeveral units to make a *dozen*. In this alſo I ſuppoſe brutes come far ſhort of Man, for though they take in and retain together ſeveral combinations of ſimple *ideas*, as poſſibly a dog does the *ſhape*, *ſmell*, and *voice* of his Maſter; yet theſe are rather ſo many diſtinct marks, whereby he knows him, that one *complex idea* made out of theſe ſeveral ſimple ones.

§. 5. 'When children have, by repeated ſenſations, got *ideas* fixed in their memories, they begin, 'by degrees, to learn the uſe of ſigns: And when 'they have got the ſkill to apply the organs of 'ſpeech to the framing of articulate ſounds, they

begin

'begin to make *use of words* to signify their *ideas* to 'others.'

§. 6. *Abstraction* is another operation of the mind, whereby the mind forms general *ideas* from such as it received from particular objects, which it does by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from the circumstances of real existence, as *Time*, *Place*, &c. These become general *representatives* of all of the same kind, and their names applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract *ideas*. Thus the colour which I receive from *Chalk*, *Snow*, and *Milk*, is made a representative of all of that kind: and has a name given it *(Whiteness)* which signifies the same quality, wherever to be found or imagined. 'Again, the general *idea* of a *tri-* 'angle, must be *neither oblique*, *nor rectangle*, *neither* 'equilateral, *equicrural*, *nor scalenon*; but all and none 'of these at once. In effect, it is something imper- 'fect, that cannot exist; an *idea* wherein some parts 'of several different and inconsistent *ideas* are put to- 'gether.' * And thus *Universals*, both *ideas* and *terms*, are made.

§. 7. This puts the great difference between Man and Brutes: They seem to reason about particular objects, and *ideas*, but there appear no footsteps of *Abstraction* in them, or of making *general ideas*.

'And

* Book iv. ch. vii. §. 9.

'And therefore, I think, we may ſuppoſe, that it is 'in this, that the ſpecies of Brutes are diſcriminated 'from Man; and it is that proper difference wherein 'they are wholly ſeparated, and which at laſt widens 'to ſo vaſt a diſtance. For if they have any *ideas* at 'all, and are not bare machines (as ſome would have 'them) we cannot deny them to have ſome reaſon. 'It ſeems as evident to me, that they do ſome of them 'in certain inſtances reaſon, as that they have ſenſe; 'but it is only in particular *ideas*, juſt as they received 'them from their ſenſes.

§. 8. 'How far *idiots* are concerned in the want 'or weakneſs of any, or all of the foregoing facul-'ties, an exact obſervation of their ſeveral ways of 'faltering would no doubt diſcover. The defect in '*idiots* ſeems to proceed from want of quickneſs, 'activity, and motion in the intellectual faculties, 'whereby they are deprived of reaſon: Whereas '*madmen*, on the other ſide, ſeem to ſuffer by the 'other extreme. For they do not appear to me to 'have loſt the faculty of reaſoning; but having 'joined together ſome *ideas* very rongly, they miſ-'take them for truths; and they err as men do that 'argue right from rong principles. In ſhort, herein 'ſeems to lie the difference between idiots and mad-'men, that madmen put wrong *ideas* together, and 'ſo make wrong propoſitions, but argue and reaſon 'right

'right from them: But idiots make very few or no 'propositions, and reason scarce at all.'

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

§. 1.

IN the reception of simple ideas the Mind is only *passive*, having no power to frame any one to itself, nor have any idea which does not wholly consist of them. But about these simple ideas it exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of them, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the other are framed: The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these three: First, it combines several simple ideas into one compound one, and thus all *complex ideas* are made. Secondly, it brings two ideas whether *simple* or *complex* together, and sets them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. Thirdly, it separates them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence. And thus all its *general ideas* are made. I shall here begin with the first of these, and come to the other two in their due places. As *simple ideas* are observed to exist in several combinations united together, so the mind may

may consider them as united, not only as they are really united in external objects, but as itself has joined them. *Ideas* thus made up of several ones put together, I call *complex*, as *Man*, *Army*, *Beauty*, *Gratitude*, &c. By this faculty of repeating and joining together its *ideas*, the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts. But it is still confined to those simple *ideas* which it received from the two sources of *sensation* and *reflection*. It can have no other *ideas* of sensible qualities, than what come from without by the senses, nor any other *ideas* of the operations of a thinking substance, than what it finds in itself: But having once got these simple *ideas*, it can by its own power put them together, and make new *complex ones*, which it never received so united.

§. 2. Complex *ideas* however compounded, and de-compounded, though their number be infinite, and their variety endless, may all be reduced under these three heads, first *Modes*, secondly *Substances*, thirdly *Relations*.

§. 3. *Modes*, I call such complex *ideas* which contain not the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, and affections of substances, as *Triangle*, *Gratitude*, *Murder*, &c. These modes are of two sorts, first *Simple*, which are combinations of the same simple *idea*, as a *Dozen*, *Score*, &c. which are but the *ideas* of so many distinct

units put together. Secondly, *Mixed*, which are compounded of ſimple *ideas* of ſeveral kinds, as *Beauty*, which conſiſts in a certain compoſition of colour and figure, cauſing delight in the beholder. *Theft*, which is the concealed change of the poſſeſſion of any thing without the conſent of the proprietor. *Theſe* viſibly contain a combination of *ideas*, of ſeveral kinds.

§. 4. Secondly, *Subſtances*, the *ideas* of ſubſtances are only ſuch combinations of ſimple *ideas* as are taken to repreſent diſtinct particular things ſubſiſting by themſelves; in which the confuſed *idea* of ſubſtance is always the chief. Thus a combination of the *ideas* of a certain figure, with the powers of Motion, Thought, and Reaſoning joined to ſubſtance, make the ordinary *idea* of Man.

§. 5. *Theſe again* are either of *ſingle ſubſtances*, as *Man*, *Stone*; or of *collective*, or ſeveral put together, as *Army*, *Heap*: *Ideas* of ſeveral ſubſtances thus put together, are as much each of them one ſingle *idea*, as that of a *Man*, or an *Unit*.

§. 6. Thirdly, *Relations* which conſiſt in the conſideration and comparing one *idea* with another. Of theſe ſeveral kinds we ſhall treat in their order.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and firſt of the Simple Modes of Space.

§. 1.

CONCERNING *Simple Modes* we may obſerve *the modifications of any ſimple Ideas, are as perfectly different and diſtinct ideas in the mind, as thoſe of the greateſt diſtance or contrariety*; thus *Two* is as diſtinct from *Three*, as *Blueneſs* from Heat. Under this head I ſhall firſt conſider the modes of *Space*.

§. 2. *Space* is a ſimple idea which we get both by our ſight and touch. When we conſider it barely in length between two bodies, 'tis called *Diſtance*; when in length, breadth and thickneſs, it may be called *Capacity*. When conſidered between the extremities of matter, which fills the capacity of ſpace with ſomething ſolid, tangible and moveable, it is called *Extenſion*; and thus *Extenſion* will be an *idea* belonging to body: But *Space* may be conceived without it.

§. 3. Each different *diſtance* is a different modification of ſpace; *and each idea of any different ſpace is a ſimple Mode of this idea.* Such are an *Inch, Foot, Yard,* &c. which are the *ideas* of certain ſtated lengths which men ſettle in their minds for the uſe, and by the cuſtom of meaſuring. When theſe *ideas* are made familiar to mens thoughts, they can in

are

their minds repeat them as often as they will, without joining to them the *idea* of body, and frame to themselves the *ideas* of Feet, Yards, or Fathoms beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies, and by adding these still one to another, enlarge their *idea* of space as much as they please. From this power of repeating any *idea* of Distance, *without being ever able to come to an end*, we come by the *idea* of immensity.

§. 4. Another modification of *Space* is taken from the *Relation* of the parts of the termination of Extention or circumscribed space amongst themselves: And this is what we call *Figure*. This the *Touch* discovers in sensible bodies, whose extremities come within our reach: And the *Eye* takes both from bodies and colours, whose boundaries are within its view; were observing how the extremities terminate either in straight lines, which meet at discernible angles; or in crooked lines, wherein no angles can be perceived; by considering these as they relate to one another in all parts of the extremities of any body or space, it has that idea we call *Figure*; which affords to the mind infinite variety.

§. 5. Another *Mode* belonging to this head, is that of *Place*. Our idea of *Place* is nothing but the relative position of any thing with reference to its distance from some fixed and certain points. Whence we say, that a thing has or has not changed *Place*, when its distance

distance either is or is not altered with respect to those bodies with which we have occasion to compare it. That this is so, we may easily gather from hence; that we can have no idea of the place of the *Universe*, though we can of all its parts. To say that the world is *somewhere*, means no more, than that it does *exist*. The word *Place* is sometimes taken to signify that *Space*, which any body takes up; and so the Universe may be conceived in a Place.

§. 6. 'Body and *extention* are two distinct *ideas*. 'For, first, *extention* includes no solidity nor resistance 'to the motion of *body* as body does. Secondly, the 'parts of pure space are inseparable one from the 'other; so that the continuity cannot be separated, 'neither really, nor mentally. Thirdly, the parts of 'pure *space* are immoveable, which follows from their 'inseparability; *motion* being nothing but change of 'distance between any two things: But this cannot be 'between parts that are inseparable; which there-'fore must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst 'another.'

§. 7. 'If it be demanded, (as usually it is), whe-'ther this *space*, void of *body*, be *substance* or *acci-'dent*? I shall readily answer, I know not: Nor 'shall be ashamed to own my ignorance, till they 'that ask shew me a clear distinct *idea* of substance.'

§. 8. 'They who first ran into the notion of *acci-'dents*, as a sort of real beings, that needed some-'thing

'thing to inhere in, were forced to find out the 'word *ſubſtance*, to ſupport them. Had the poor 'Indian philoſopher, (who imagined that the earth 'alſo wanted ſomething to bear it up) but thought of 'this word *ſubſtance*, he needed not to have been at 'the trouble to find an elephant to ſupport it, and a 'tortoiſe to ſupport his elephant. The word *ſubſtance* 'would have done it effectually.

§. 9. 'But the queſtion being here. Whether the 'idea of *ſpace* or *extenſion* be the *ſame with the idea* 'of *body*, it is not neceſſary to prove the real exiſt-'ence of a *vacuum*, but the *idea* of it; which it is 'plain men have, when they enquire and diſpute whe-'ther there be a *vacuum* or no? For if they had not 'the *idea* of ſpace without body, they could not make 'a queſtion about its exiſtence. Whatever men ſhall 'think concerning the exiſtence of a *vacuum*, this is 'plain to me, that we have as clear an *idea of ſpace* 'diſtinct *from ſolidity*, as we have of ſolidity diſtinct 'from motion, or motion from ſpace. We have not 'any two more diſtinct *ideas*, and we can as eaſily 'conceive ſpace without ſolidity, as we can conceive 'body or ſpace without motion, though it be never 'ſo certain, that neither body nor motion can exiſt 'without ſpace.'

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration and its Simple Modes.

§. 1.

THERE is another sort of *Distance*, the *idea* of which we get from the fleeting, and perpetually perishing parts of succession, which we call *Duration*. The Simple Modes of it are any different lengths of it, whereof we have distinct *ideas*, as *Hours*, *Days*, *Years*, &c. *Time* and *Eternity*.

§. 2. The *idea* of *Succession is got by reflecting on that train of ideas which constantly follow one another in our minds as long as we are awake.* The distance between any parts of this *Succession* is what we call *Duration*: And the continuation of the existence of ourselves, or any thing else *commensurate* to the succession of any *ideas* in our minds, is what we call our *own Duration*, or *that* of another thing co-existing with our thinking. That this is so, appears from hence, that we have no perception of succession or duration, when that succession of our *ideas* ceases, as in *Sleep*: The moment that we sleep, and awake, how distant soever, seems to be joined and connected. And possibly it would be so to a waking man, could he fix upon one *idea* without variation, and the succession of others. And we see that they whose thoughts are

very intent upon one thing, let ſlip out of their account a good part of that *Duration*, and think that time ſhorter than it is. But if a man during his ſleep *dream*, and variety of *ideas* make themſelves perceptible in his mind one after another, he hath then, during ſuch dreaming, a ſenſe of duration and of the length of it.

§. 3. A man having once got this *idea* of duration can apply it to things which exiſt while he does not think: and thus we meaſure the time of our ſleep, as well as that wherein we are awake.

§. 4. Thoſe who think we get the *idea* of *ſucceſſion* from our obſervation of motion, by our ſenſes, will be of our opinion, when they conſider that motion produces in the mind an *idea* of ſucceſſion, no otherways than as it produces there a continued train of diſtinguiſhable *ideas*. A man that looks upon a body really moving perceives no motion, unleſs that motion produces a conſtant *train of ſucceſſive ideas*. But wherever a man is, though all things be at reſt about him, if he thinks, he will be *conſcious* of *Succeſſion* without perceiving any motion. *Hence motions very ſlow are not perceived by us*; becauſe the change of diſtance is ſo ſlow, that it cauſes no new *ideas* in us, but after a long interval. The ſame happens in *things that move very ſwift*, which not affecting the ſenſe with ſeveral diſtinguiſhable diſtances of their motion,

motion, cauſe not any train of *ideas* in our minds, and conſequently *are not perceived*. Thus any thing that moves round in a circle in leſs time than our *ideas* are wont to ſucceed one another in our minds, is not perceived to move, but ſeems to be a perfect intire circle of that matter which is in motion. Such a part of duration *as takes up the time of only one idea in our minds*, wherein we perceive no ſucceſſion, we call an *Inſtant*. 'Hence I leave it to others to judge, whether it be not probable, that our *ideas* do ſucceed one another in our minds at certain diſtances, ſometimes faſter, and ſometimes ſlower; but there ſeems to be *certain bounds to the quickneſs and ſlowneſs of the ſucceſſion of* thoſe *ideas* one to another in our minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor haſten.'

§. 5. *Duration, as marked by certain periods and meaſures*, is what we moſt properly call *Time*: which we *meaſure by the diurnal and annual revolutions of the Sun*, as being conſtant, regular, and univerſally obſervable by all mankind, and ſuppoſed equal to one another.

§. 6. It is not neceſſary that time ſhould be *meaſured by motion*: Any conſtant periodical appearance in ſeemingly equidiſtant ſpaces, may as well diſtinguiſh the intervals of *Time* as what we make uſe of. For ſuppoſing the ſun to be lighted, and then extinguiſhed every day: And that in the ſpace of an annual

nual revolution, it ſhould ſenſibly encreaſe in brightneſs, and ſo decreaſe again; ſuch a regular appearance would ſerve to meaſure out the diſtances of duration, to all that could obſerve it, as well without, as with motion. The freezing of water, the blowing of a plant returning at equidiſtant periods in all the parts of the earth would ſerve for the ſame purpoſe. In effect, we find that a people of *America* counted their years by the *coming* and *going away* of birds at certain ſeaſons.

§. 7. 'We muſt carefully diſtinguiſh betwixt duration itſelf, and the meaſures we make uſe of to judge of its length. Duration in itſelf, is to be conſidered *as going on in one conſtant, equal, uniform courſe:* But none of the meaſures of it, which we make uſe of, can be known to do ſo; nor can we be aſſured, that their aſſigned parts or periods are equal in duration one to another; for two ſucceſſive lengths of durations, however meaſured, can never be demonſtrated to be equal. All that we can do for a meaſure of time, is to take ſuch as have continual ſucceſſive appearances at ſeemingly equidiſtant periods; *of* which *ſeeming equality we have no other meaſure, but* ſuch *as the train of our own ideas* have lodged in our memories, with the concurrence of other probable reaſons, to perſuade us of their equality.'

§. 8. The

§. 8. The mind having once got such a measure of *Time, as the annual revolution of the sun, can easily apply it to Duration wherein that measure itself did not* exist: And the *idea* of *Duration* equal to an *Annual Revolution of the Sun*, is as easily applicable in our thoughts to Duration where no Sun, nor motion was, as the *idea* of a *Foot* or *Yard* to distances beyond the confines of the world.

§. 9. By the same means, and from the same original that we come to have the *idea* of Time, we have also that *idea* which we call *Eternity*: For having got the *ideas* of certain lengths of Duration, *we can in our thoughts add them to one another as oft as we please without ever coming to an end.*

§. 10. And thus it is plain, that from the two fountains of all knowledge before-mentioned, *viz. Sensation* and *Reflection*, we get the ideas of Duration, and the several measures of it. For,

1*st*, By observing what passes in our minds, how our ideas there in train constantly, some vanish, and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of *Succession*.

2*dly*, By observing a distance in the parts of this Succession, we get the idea of *Duration*.

3*dly*, By observing certain appearances at regular and seemingly equidistant periods, we get the ideas of certain lengths or measures of Duration, as *Minutes*, *Hours*, *Days*, &c.

4*thly*. By

4thly, By being able to repeat thoſe meaſures of Time, as often as we will, we can come to imagine *Duration, where nothing does really endure or exiſt:* Thus we imagine to-morrow, next year, or ſeven years hence.

5thly, By being able to repeat any ſuch idea of any length of Time, as of a Minute, Year, &c. as often as we will, and add them one to another without ever coming to an end, we come by the idea of *Eternity*.

6thly, By conſidering any part of infinite Duration, as ſet out by periodical meaſures, we come by the idea of what we call *Time* in general.

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expanſion conſidered together.

§. 1.

'THE *Mind*, having got the *idea* of the length of any part of *expanſion*, can, as has been ſaid, repeat that idea, and ſo adding it to the former, *enlarge its idea of length*, and ſo as often as it will, till it equals the diſtance of any parts of the earth one from another, and increaſe thus, till it amounts to the diſtance of the ſun, or remoteſt ſtar. It is true, we can eaſily in our thoughts come to the extremity and bounds of all body: But when the mind is there, it finds nothing to

hinder

'hinder its progreſs into this endleſs expanſion; of 'that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor 'let any one ſay, that beyond the bounds of body 'there is nothing at all, unleſs he will confine God 'within the limits of matter.'

§. 2. 'Juſt ſo is it in duration, *the mind, having 'got the idea of any length of duration, can double, 'multiply, and enlarge it*, beyond all the meaſures of 'time; taken from the great bodies of the world, 'and their motions. But yet every one eaſily admits, 'that though we make duration boundleſs, we cannot 'yet extend it beyond all being. God, every one 'eaſily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a 'reaſon, why any one ſhould doubt that he likewiſe 'fills immenſity? his infinite being is certainly as 'boundleſs one way as another; and methinks it 'aſcribes a little too much to matter, to ſay, where 'there is no body, there is nothing.'

§. 3. Time is to *Duration* as *Place* is to *Space* or *Expanſion*. They are ſo much of thoſe boundleſs oceans of *Eternity* and *Immenſity* as is ſet out and diſtinguiſhed from the reſt: And ſo are made uſe of to denote the poſition of finite real beings in reſpect one to another, in whoſe infinite oceans of Duration and Space.

§. 4. Each of theſe have a *twofold acceptation*. *Firſt*, Time in general is taken for ſo much of infinite Duration as is coexiſtent with the Univerſe, and

meaſured

measured out by the motions of its great bodies. Thus it is used in the phrases *before all time, when time shall be no more. Place* is likewise taken for that *portion* of infinite space possessed by the material world, though this might be more properly called *Extension*. Within *these two* are confined the particular Time or Duration, Extension or Place of all corporeal beings.

§. 5. *Secondly*, Time is sometimes applied to parts of that infinite Duration that were not really measured out by real existence, but such as we upon occasion do suppose equal to certain lengths of measured time, as in the *Julian Period*, which makes an excursion of seven hundred sixty four years beyond the Creation. Thus we may speak of Place or Distance in the great *Inane*, wherein I can conceive a space equal to, or capable of receiving a body of any assigned dimensions.

§. 6. '*Where* and *when* are questions belonging to 'all finite existences, and are by us always reckoned 'from some known parts of this sensible world, and 'from some certain epochs marked out to us by the 'motions observable in it. Without some such fixed 'parts or periods, the order of things would be 'lost, to our finite understandings, in the boundless 'invariable oceans of duration and expansion; which 'comprehend

'comprehend in them all finite beings, and, in their 'full extent, being only to the Deity.'

§. 7. 'But there is this manifeſt difference between 'the *ideas* of duration and expanſion, that the *ideas* 'of length, which we have of *expanſion*, are turn- 'ed every way, and ſo make figure, and breadth, 'and thickneſs; but *duration is but as it were the* 'length of one ſtraight line, extended *in infinitum*, 'not capable of multiplicity, variation, or figure; 'but is one common meaſure of all exiſtence what- 'ſoever, wherein all things, whilſt they exiſt, equally 'partake. Whether angels and ſpirits have any 'analogy to this, in reſpect of expanſion, is be- 'yond my comprehenſion. And perhaps, it is near 'as hard for us to have an *idea* of any real being, '*with a perfect negation of all manner of expan-* 'ſion; as it is, to have the idea of any real exiſt- 'ence, *with a perfect negation of all manner of dura-* 'tion. And therefore what ſpirits have to do with 'ſpace, or how they communicate in it, we know 'not.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Numbers.

§. 1.

THE complex *ideas* of *Number* are formed by adding ſeveral *Units* together. The *Simple*

Modes of it are each ſeveral combinations, as, *Two*, *Three*, &c. *Theſe are of all others moſt diſtinct*, the neareſt being as clearly different from each other as the moſt remote: *Two* being as diſtinct from *One*, as two hundred. But it is hard to form diſtinct *ideas* of every the leaſt exceſs in extenſion. Hence *demonſtrations in numbers are more general in their uſe, and more determinate in their application than thoſe of Extenſion.*

§. 2. *Simple Modes* of Numbers, being in our minds but ſo many combinations of Units which have no variety, but more or leſs: *Names* for each diſtinct combination, ſeem more neceſſary than in any other ſort of *ideas*. For without a *name* or *mark*, to diſtinguiſh that preciſe collection, it will hardly be kept from being a heap of confuſion. Hence ſome *Americans* have no diſtinct *idea* of any number beyond twenty: So that when they are diſcourſed with of greater numbers, they ſhew the hairs of their head.

§. 3. 'To ſhew how much *diſtinct names conduce* 'to our *well reckoning*, or having uſeful *ideas* of num-'bers, let us ſet all theſe following figures, as the 'marks of one number, *viz.*

Nonillions.	Octillions.	Septillions.
857324.	162486.	345896.
Sextillions.	**Quintillions.**	**Quatrillions.**
437916.	423147.	248106.

Trillions.

Trillions.	Billions.	Millions.	Units.
235421.	261734.	368149.	623137.

'The ordinary way of naming this number in *English*, will be the often repeating of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, (which is the denomination of the second six figures), in which way, it will be very hard to have any distinguishing notions of this number. But whether, by giving every six figures a new and orderly denomination, these, and perhaps a great many more figures in progression, might not easily be counted distinctly, and *ideas* of them both got more easily to ourselves, and more plainly signified to others, I leave it to be considered.'

§. 4. So that to reckon right, two things are required: First, *That the mind distinguish carefully* two *ideas which are different one from another, only by the addition or subtraction of one Unit.* Secondly, *That it retain in memory the names or marks of the several combinations from a Unit to that number*; and *that in exact order, as they follow one another.* In either of which if it fails, the whole business of *Numbering* will be disturbed; and there will remain only the confused *idea* of *Multitude*: But the *ideas* necessary to distinct Numeration will not be attained to.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Infinity.

§. 1.

THE *idea* signified by the name of *Infinity*, is beſt examined, by conſidering to *what* Infinity is by the Mind attributed, and then how it frames it. *Finite* and *Infinite* then are looked upon as the modes of Quantity, and attributed primarily to things that have parts, and are capable of increaſe or diminution, by the *Addition* or *Subtraction* of any the leaſt part. Such are the *ideas* of *Space*, *Duration*, and *Number*.

§. 2. When we apply this *idea* to the *Supreme Being*, we do it primarily in reſpect of his Duration and Ubiquity; more figuratively when to his *Wiſdom*, *Power*, *Goodneſs*, and other attributes which are properly *inexhauſtible* and *incomprehenſible*: For when we call them Infinite, we have no other *idea* of this Infinity, but what carries with it ſome reflection on the *Number*, or the *Extent* of the *acts* or *objects* of God's Power and Wiſdom, which can never be ſuppoſed ſo great or ſo many, that theſe attributes will not always ſurmount and exceed, though we multiply them in our thoughts,

thoughts, with the Infinity of *endless Number*. I do not pretend to say, how these attributes *are in God*, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities: But this is our way of *conceiving them*, and these our *ideas* of their Infinity.

§. 3. The next thing to be considered, is *how we come* by the *idea* of Infinity. Every one that has any *idea* of any stated lengths of Space, as a *Foot*, *Yard*, &c. finds that he can repeat that *idea*, and join it to *another*, to a *Third*, and so on *without ever coming to an end of his Additions*: From this power of enlarging his *idea* of Space, he takes the *idea* of Infinite Space or *Immensity*. By the same power of repeating the *idea* of any length of Duration we have in our minds, with all the endless addition of Number, we come by the *idea* of *Eternity*.

§. 4. If our *idea* of *Infinity* be got by repeating without end our own *ideas*; *why do we not attribute it to other ideas, as well as those of Space and Duration*; since they may be as easily and as often repeated in our minds as the other; yet no body ever thinks of infinite *Sweetness or Whiteness*, though he can repeat the *idea* of Sweet or white as frequently as those of *Yard* or *Day*. *I answer*, that those *ideas* that have parts, and are capable of increase, by the addition of any parts, afford us by their repetition an *idea* of Infinity;

finity; becauſe with the endleſs repetition there is continued an enlargement, of which there is no end: But it is not ſo in other *ideas*: For if to the perfecteſt *idea* I have of *White*, I add another of equal whiteneſs; it enlarges not my *idea* at all. Thoſe *ideas* that conſiſt not of parts, cannot be augmented to what preportion men pleaſe, or be ſtretched beyond what they have received by their ſenſes, but *Space*, *Duration*, and *Number* being capable of increaſe by repetition, leave in the mind an *idea* of an endleſs room for more; and ſo thoſe *ideas* alone lead the mind towards the thought of infinity.

§. 5. We are carefully to diſtinguiſh between the *idea* of the *Infinity of Space*, and the *idea* of a *Space Infinite*. The firſt is nothing but a ſuppoſed endleſs progreſſion of the mind over any repeated *idea* of Space. But to have actually in the mind the *idea* of a Space Infinite, is to ſuppoſe the mind already paſſed over all thoſe repeated *ideas* of Space, which an endleſs repetion can never totally repreſent to it; which carries in it a plain contradiction.

§. 6. This will be plainer, if we conſider *Infinity in Numbers*. The Infinity of numbers, to the end of whoſe addition every one perceives there is no approach, eaſily appears to any one that reflects on it:

But

But how clear soever this *idea* of the Infinity of Number be, there is nothing yet more evident than the absurdity of the actual *idea* of Infinite Number.

§. 7. 'And since in any bulk of matter, our 'thoughts can never arrive at the utmost *divisibility*, 'therefore there is an apparent Infinity to us also in 'that, which has the Infinity also of Number, but 'with this difference, that in the former considerations of the Infinity of Space and Duration, we only 'use addition of numbers; whereas this is like the 'division of an unit into its fractions, wherein the 'mind also can proceed *in infinitum*, as well as in 'the former additions, it being indeed but the addition still of new numbers: Though in the addition of 'the one, we can have no more the positive idea of a 'space infinitely great, than in the division of the 'other, we can have the *idea* of a body infinitely 'little; our *idea* of Infinity being, as I may so say, 'a growing and fugitive *idea*, still in a boundless progression, that can stop no where.'

§. 8. 'The *idea* of Infinite, has, I confess, some'thing of positive in all those things we apply to it. 'When we would think of Infinite Space or Duration, 'we at first step usually make some very large *idea*, 'as, perhaps, of millions of ages, or miles, which 'possibly we double and multiply several times. All 'that we thus amass together in our thoughts, is positive,

'fitive, and the assemblage of a great number of positive *ideas* of Space or Duration But what still remains beyond this, we have no more a positive 'distinct notion of, than a mariner has of the depth 'of the sea, where having let down a large portion 'of his sounding line, he reaches no bottom; Whereby he knows the depth to be so many fathoms and 'more; but how much that more is, he hath no 'distinct notion at all: And could he always supply 'new line, and find the plummet sink, without 'ever stopping, he would be something in the posture 'of the mind reaching after a complete and positive *idea* of infinity.

§. 9. 'I have been hitherto apt to think, that the 'great and *inextricable difficulties*, which perpetually 'involve all discourses *concerning infinity*, whether 'of space, duration, or divisibility, have been the 'certain *marks of a defect in our ideas of Infinity*, 'and the disproportion the nature thereof has to 'the comprehension of our narrow capacities. For 'whilst men talk and dispute of infinite Space or 'duration, as if they had as complete and positive 'ideas of them, as they have of a yard, or an hour, 'it is no wonder, if their minds be overlaid by an 'object too large and mighty to be surveyed and 'managed by them.'

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of other Simple Modes.

§. 1.

THE mind has several distinct *ideas* of *Sliding*, *Rowling*, *Walking*, *Creeping*, &c. which are all but the different modifications of motion. *Swift and Slow* are two different *ideas* of Motion, the measures whereof are made out of the distances of Time and Space put together.

§. 2. The like variety we have in *Sounds*: Every articulate word is a different modification of sound: As are also notes of different length put together, which make that complex *idea* called *Tune*.

§. 3. The modes of *Colours* might be also very various: Some of which we take notice of, as the different degrees, or as they are termed shades of the same colour. But since we seldom make assemblages of Colours without taking in Figure also, as in Painting, &c. those which are taken notice of do most commonly belong to mixed modes, as *Beauty*, *Rainbow*, &c.

§. 4. All compounded *Tastes* and *Smells* are also modes made up of the simple *ideas* of those senses: But they being such as generally we have no names

for, cannot be set down in writing, but must be left to the thoughts and experience of the reader.

CHAP XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

§. 1.

WHEN the mind turns its view inwards upon itself, *Thinking* is the first *idea* that occurs: Wherein it observes a great variety of modifications; and thereof frames to itself distinct *ideas*. Thus the perception annexed to any impression on the body made by an external object, is called *Sensation*. When an *idea* recurs without the presence of the object, it is called *Remembrance*. When sought after by the mind, and brought again in view, it is *Recollection*. When held there long under attentive consideration, it is *Contemplation*. When *ideas* float in the mind without regard or reflection, it is called in French *Resvery*, our language has scarce a name for it. When the *ideas* are taken notice of, and as it were registered in the memory, it is *Attention*. When the mind fixes its view on any one *idea*, and considers it on all sides, it is *Intention* and *Study*. *Sleep* without dreaming is rest from all these. And *Dreaming* is the perception of *ideas* in the mind, not suggested by any external objects, or known occasions;

nor

nor under any choice or conduct of the Understanding. Of these various modes of Thinking, the mind forms as distinct *ideas*, as it does of White and Red, a Square or a Circle.

§. 2. 'From hence I further conclude, that since 'the mind can sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of *thinking*; and be sometimes even 'in a waking man so remiss, as to have thoughts 'dim and obscure to that degree, that they are very 'little removed from none at all; and at last in the 'dark retirement of found sleep, loses the sight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever: Since, I say, this is 'evidently so in matter of fact, and constant experience, I ask, whether it be not probable, that '*thinking is the action, not the essence of the soul?* 'Since the operations of agents will easily admit of 'intention and remission; but the essences of things, 'are not conceived capable of any such variation.'

CHAP. XX.

Of the Modes of Pleasure and Pain.

§. 1.

PLEASURE and *Pain* are simple *ideas* which we receive both from Sensation and Reflection. There are thoughts of the Mind, as well as sensations, accompanied with Pleasure or Pain. Their causes are

termed *Good* or *Evil*. For things are esteemed Good or Evil only in reference to Pleasure or Pain. That we call *Good which is apt to cause or increase Pleasure, or diminish Pain in us: To procure or preserve the possession of any Good, or absence of any Evil:* And on the contrary, that we call *Evil, which is apt to produce or increase any Pain, or diminish any Pleasure in us:* Or else to *procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good:* By Pleasure and Pain I would be understood to mean of *Body* or *Mind*, as they are commonly distinguished; though in truth they are only different constitutions of the mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts of the mind.

§. 2. *Pleasure* and *Pain*, and their causes *good* and *Evil*, are the hinges upon which our passion turn: By reflecting on the various modifications or tempers of mind, and the internal sensations which Pleasure and Pain, Good and Evil produce in us, we may thence form to ourselves the *ideas* of our Passions. Thus, by reflecting upon the thought we have of the delight, which any thing is apt to produce in us, we have an *idea* we call *Love:* And, on the contrary, the thought of the Pain, which any thing present or absent produces in us, is what we call *Hatred*. *Desire* is that uneasiness which a man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing, the present enjoyment of which carries the *idea* of Delight with it. *Joy* is a Delight

of

of the mind arising from the present or assured approaching possession of a Good. *Sorrow* is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of a Good lost, or the sense of a present Evil. *Hope* is a Pleasure in the mind upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight. *Fear* is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of a future Evil likely to befall us. *Anger* is a discomposure of mind upon the receipt of injury, with a present purpose of Revenge. *Despair* is the thought of the unattainableness of any Good. *Envy* is an uneasiness of mind, caused by the consideration of a Good we desire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before us.

§. 3. It is to be considered that in reference to the Passions, the removal or lessening of a Pain, is considered, and operates as a Pleasure: And the loss or diminishing of a Pleasure, as a Pain. And farther, that the Passions in most persons operate on the body, and cause various changes in it: But these being not always sensible, do not make a necessary part of the *idea* of each Passion. Besides these modes of Pleasure and Pain which result from the various considerations of Good and Evil, there are many others, I might have instanced in, as the *Pain* of *Hunger* and *Thirst*, and the Pleasure of *Eating* and *Drinking*; and of

Musick,

Muſick, &c. but I rather chooſe to inſtance in the Paſſions, as being of much more concernment to us; 'and ſhow how the *ideas* we have of them, are derived from Senſation and Reflection.'

CHAP. XXI.

Of Power.

§. 1.

THE mind being every day informed by the ſenſes, of the alteration of thoſe ſimple *ideas* it obſerves in things without: Reflecting alſo on what paſſes within itſelf, and obſerving a conſtant change of its *ideas*, ſometimes by the impreſſions of outward objects upon the ſenſes; and ſometimes by the determination of its own choice: And concluding from what it has ſo conſtantly obſerved to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the ſame things, by the ſame agents, and by the like ways, conſiders in one thing the poſſibility of having any of its ſimple *ideas* changed; and in another, the poſſibility of making that change, and ſo comes by that *idea* which we call *Power*. Thus we ſay *Fire* has a power to *melt Gold*, and make it fluid; and *Gold* has a Power to be *melted*.

§. 2.

§. 2. Power thus considered, is twofold, *viz.* as able to make, or able to receive any change: The one may be called *Active*, the other *Passive Power*. Of *passive power* all sensible things abundantly furnish us with *ideas*, whose sensible qualities and beings we find to be in a continual flux, and therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the same change. Nor have we of *Active Power* fewer instances: Since, whatever change is observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change. But yet if we will consider it attentively, bodies by our senses do not afford us so clear and distinct an *idea* of *Active* Power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds. For all power relating to Action, and there being but two sorts of *Action*, viz. *Thinking* and *Motion*, let us consider whence we have the clearest *ideas* of the powers which produce these actions.

§. 3. Of *Thinking*, Body affords us no *idea* at all: It is only from reflection that we have that; neither have we from Body any *idea* of the beginning of motion. A body at rest affords us no *idea* of any *Active* Power to move; and when it is set in motion itself, that Motion is rather a Passion than an Action in it. The *idea* of the beginning of Motion we have only by reflection on what passes in ourselves; where

we

we find by experience that barely by willing it, we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at reſt.

§. 4. We find in ourſelves a Power to begin or forbear, continue or end ſeveral actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind. This power which the mind has thus to order the conſideration of any *idea*, or the forbearing to conſider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the Body to its Reſt, and *vice verſa* in any particular inſtance, is that we call the *Will*. The actual exerciſe of that power, is that which we call *Volition* or *Willing*.

The forbearance or performance of that Action; conſequent to ſuch order or command of the mind, is called *Voluntary*: And whatſoever Action is performed without ſuch a thought of the mind, is called *Involuntary*.

The Power of Perception is that we call the *Underſtanding*. *Perception*, which we make the Act of the Underſtanding, is of *three* ſorts. *Firſt*, The Perception of *ideas* in our minds. *Secondly*, The Perception of the Signification of Signs. *Thirdly*, The Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any diſtinct *ideas*. Theſe Powers of the mind, *viz.* of perceiving and preferring, are uſually called by another

ther name; and the ordinary way of ſpeaking is that the Underſtanding and Will are two *faculties* of the mind. A word proper enough, if it be uſed ſo as not to breed any confuſion in mens thoughts, by being ſuppoſed (as I ſuſpect it has been) to ſtand for ſome real Beings in the Soul that performs thoſe actions of Underſtanding and Volition.

§. 5. From the conſideration of the Extent of the power of the mind, over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himſelf, ariſe the *ideas* of *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*: So far as a man has a power to think or not to think; to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, ſo far is a man *free*. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind, there he is not *free*, though perhaps the action may be *voluntary*. So that the *idea* of *Liberty* is the *idea* of a power in any agent, to do or forbear any action according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him, according to his volition, there he is not at liberty: That agent is under *Neceſſity*. So that *Liberty* cannot be where there is no *Thought*, no *Volition*, no

Will: But there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition where there is no *Liberty*. Thus a *Tennis-ball*, whether in motion by the ſtroke of a racket, or lying ſtill at reſt, is not by any one taken to be a free Agent; becauſe we conceive not a *Tennis-ball* to think, and conſequently not to have any Volition or Preference of Motion to Reſt, or *vice verſa*. So a man ſtriking himſelf or his friend, by a convulſive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power by Volition or the direction of his mind, to ſtop or forbear; no body thinks he has in this *Liberty*, every one pities him as acting by *Neceſſity* and *Conſtraint*. Again, ſuppoſe a man be carried, whilſt faſt aſleep, into a room where is a perſon he longs to ſee, and be there locked faſt in beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to ſee himſelf in ſo deſirable company, which he ſtays willingly in; that is, prefers his ſtaying to going away. Is not this ſtay voluntary? I think no body will doubt it, and yet, being locked faſt in, he is not at liberty to ſtay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that *Liberty* is not an *idea* belonging to Volition or Preferring; but to the perſon having the power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the mind ſhall chuſe or direct.

§. 6.

§. 6. As it is in the motions of the body, so it is in the thoughts of our minds: Where any one is such that we have power to take it up, or lay it by according to the Preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. A waking man is not at liberty to think, or not to think no more than he is at liberty whether his body shall touch any other or no: But whether he will remove his contemplation from one *idea* to another is many times in his choice. And then he is in respect of his *ideas*, as much at liberty as he is in respect of bodies he rests on. He can at pleasure remove himself from one to another: But yet some *ideas* to the mind, like some motions to the body, are such, as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. Thus a man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the *idea* of *Pain*, and entertain other contemplations.

§. 7. Wherever Thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear, according to the direction of Thought, there Necessity takes place. This in an agent capable of Volition, when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to the preference of his mind, is called *Compulsion*; when the hindering or stopping any action is contrary to his Volition, it is called *Restraint*. Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing necessary agents.

§. 8. And thus I have, in a short draught, given a view of our *original ideas*, from whence all the rest are derived, and of which they are made up. And which may be all reduced to these few primary and original ones, *viz. Extension*, *Solidity*, and *Mobility*, which by our senses we receive from body: *Thinking* and the *power of moving*, which by reflection we receive from our minds. *Existence*, *Duration*, *Number*, which belong both to the one and to the other. By these I imagine might be explained the nature of *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Tastes*, *Smells*, and all other *ideas* we have; if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive the several modified extensions and motions of these minute bodies which produce those several sensations in us.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Mixed Modes.

§. 1.

MIXED *Modes* are combinations of *simple ideas* of different kinds, (whereby they are distinguished from simple modes, which consist only of simple *ideas* of the same kind, put together by the mind) as *Virtue*, *Vice*, a *Lie*, &c. The mind being once

once furniſhed with ſimple *ideas*, can put them together in ſeveral compoſitions, without examining whether they exiſt ſo together in nature. And hence I think it is, that theſe ideas are called *Notions*, as if they had their original and conſtant exiſtence more in the thoughts of men than in the reality of things: And to form ſuch ideas it ſufficed that the mind put the parts of them together, and that they were conſiſtent in the underſtanding, without conſidering whether they had any real being. There are three ways whereby we get theſe complex ideas of *mixed Modes*.

§. 2. *Firſt*, By *experience* and obſervation of things themſelves: Thus by ſeeing two men wreſtle, we get the *idea* of wreſtling.

§. 3. *Secondly*, By *invention* or voluntary putting together of ſeveral ſimple *ideas* in our own minds; ſo he that firſt invented PRINTING had an *idea* of it firſt in his mind, before it ever exiſted.

§. 4. *Thirdly*, By *explaining* the names of actions we never ſaw, or notions we cannot ſee; and by enumerating all thoſe *ideas* which go to the making them up. Thus the mixed Mode which the word *Lie* ſtands for, is made up of theſe ſimple *ideas*: Firſt, *Articulate ſounds*. Secondly, *Certain* ideas *in the mind of the ſpeaker*. Thirdly, *Thoſe words, the ſigns of theſe* ideas. Fourthly, *Thoſe ſigns put together* by Affirma-

Affirmation or Negation, otherwise than the *ideas* they stand for, are in the mind of the speaker. Since languages are made, *complex ideas* are usually got by the explication of those terms that stand for them: For since they consist of simple *ideas* combined, they may by words standing for those simple *ideas* be represented to the mind of one who understands those words, though that combination of simple *ideas* was never offered to his mind by the real existence of things.

§. 5. Mixed Modes have their *unity* from an act of the mind, combining those several simple *ideas* together, and considering them as one complex one: The *mark* of this union is one *name* given to that combination. Men seldom reckon any number of *ideas* to make one complex one: But such collections as there be names for. Thus the *killing of an old man*, is as fit to be united into one *complex idea*, as that of a *father*: Yet, there being no name for it, it is not taken for a particular complex *idea*; nor a distinct species of action, from that of killing any other man.

§. 6. Those collections of *ideas* have names generally affixed, which are of frequent use in conversation: In which cases men endeavour to communicate their thoughts to one another with all possible dispatch. Those others which they have seldom occasion to mention, they tie not together, nor give them names.

§. 7.

§. 7. This gives the reason, why *there are words in every language, which cannot be rendered by any one single word of another.* For the fashions and customs of one nation, make several combinations of *ideas* familiar in one, which another had never any occasion to make. Such were, Ὀργεωνισμὸς among the *Greeks*, *Proscriptio* among the *Romans*. This also *occasions the constant change of languages*; because the change of custom and opinions, brings with it new combinations of *ideas*, which, to avoid long descriptions, have new names annexed to them, and so they become *new species* of *mixed* modes.

§. 8. *Of all our simple ideas, those that have had most mixed modes made out of them*, are *Thinking* and *Motion*; (which comprehend in them all Action) and power, from whence these actions are conceived to flow. For actions being the great business of mankind, it is no wonder if the several modes of Thinking and Motion should be taken notice of, the *ideas* of them observed and laid up in memory, and have names assigned them. For without such *complex ideas* with names to them, men could not easily hold any communication about them. Of this kind are the modes of actions distinguished by their *causes*, *Means*, *Objects*, *Ends*, *Instruments*, *Time*, *Place*, and other circumstances; as also of the powers fitted for those actions:

tions: Thus *Boldneſs* is the power to do or ſpeak what we intend without fear or diſorder: Which power of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by the frequent doing the ſame thing, is that *idea* we call *Habit*: when forward and ready upon every occaſion to break into action, we call it *Diſpoſition*. Thus *Teſtineſs*, is a diſpoſition or aptneſs to be angry.

§. 9. *Power* being the ſource of all action, the ſubſtances wherein theſe powers are, when they exert this power, are called *Cauſes*: And the ſubſtances thereupon produced, or the ſimple *ideas* introduced into any ſubject, *Effects*. The efficacy whereby the new ſubſtance or *idea* is produced, is called in the ſubject exerting that power, *Action*; in the ſubject wherein any ſimple *idea* is changed, or produced, *Paſſion*: Which efficacy in *intellectual agents*, we can, I think, conceive to be nothing elſe but modes of Thinking and Willing: In *corporeal agents*, nothing elſe but modifications of motion. Whatever ſort of action beſides theſe produces any effect, I confeſs myſelf to have no notion, or *idea* of. And therefore *many words which ſeem to expreſs ſome action* ſignify nothing of the action, but *barely the effect*, with ſome circumſtances of the ſubject wrought on, or cauſe operating. Thus *Creation*, *Annihilation*, contain in them no *idea* of the action or manner, whereby they

are

are produced, but barely of the cauſe, and the thing done. And when a country man ſays the cold *freezes water*, though the word *Freezing*, ſeem to import ſome action, yet it truly ſignifies nothing but the effect, *viz.* That water that was before *fluid* is become *hard*, and *conſiſtent*, without containing any *idea* of the action whereby it is done.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas of *Subſtances.*

§. 1.

THE mind obſerving ſeveral ſimple *ideas* to go conſtantly together, which being preſumed to belong to one thing, are called ſo united in one ſubject by one name, which we are apt afterward to talk of and conſider as one ſimple *idea*, which indeed is a complication of many *ideas* together. We imagine not theſe ſimple *ideas* to ſubſiſt by themſelves, but ſuppoſe ſome *ſubſtratum*, wherein they ſubſiſt, which we call *ſubſtance*. The *idea* of *pure ſubſtance* is nothing but the *ſuppoſed, but unknown ſupport of theſe qualities which are capable of producing ſimple ideas in us.*

§. 2. The *ideas of particular ſubſtances* are compoſed out of this obſcure and general *idea* of Sub-

ſtance, together with ſuch combinations of ſimple *ideas*, as are obſerved to exiſt together, and ſuppoſed to flow from the internal conſtitution, and unknown eſſence of that ſubſtance. Thus we come by the *ideas* of *Man*, *Horſe*, *Gold*, &c. Thus the ſenſible qualities of *Iron*, or a *Diamond*, make the complex *ideas* of thoſe ſubſtances, which a Smith or a Jeweller commonly knows better than a philoſopher.

§. 3. The ſame happens concerning the operations of the mind, *viz. Thinking*, *Reaſoning*, &c. which we concluding not to ſubſiſt by themſelves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it; we think them the actions of ſome other ſubſtance, which we call *ſpirit*: *Of whoſe ſubſtance, or nature, we have as clear a notion as that of body*; the one being but the ſuppoſed *ſubſtratum* of the ſimple *ideas*, we have from without; as the other of thoſe operations which we experiment in ourſelves within: So that the *idea* of *corporeal ſubſtance* in matter, is as remote from our conceptions as that of *ſpiritual ſubſtance*.

§. 4. Hence we may conclude that he has the perfecteſt *idea* of any particular ſubſtance, who has collected moſt of thoſe ſimple *ideas* which do exiſt in it: Among which we are to reckon its *active powers*, and *paſſive capacities*, though not ſtrictly *ſimple ideas*.

§. 5.

§. 5. *Secondary qualities*, for the moſt part, ſerve to diſtinguiſh ſubſtances. For our ſenſes fail us in the diſcovery of the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Texture*, &c. of the minute parts of bodies on which their real conſtitutions and differences depend: And ſecondary qualities are nothing but powers with relation to our ſenſes. The *ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal ſubſtances*, are of three ſorts. *Firſt*, The *ideas* of primary qualities of things, which are diſcovered by our ſenſes: Such are *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. *Secondly*, The ſenſible ſecondary qualities, which are nothing but powers to produce ſeveral *ideas* in us by our ſenſes. *Thirdly*, The aptneſs we conſider in any ſubſtance to cauſe, or receive ſuch alterations of primary qualities, as that the ſubſtance ſo altered, ſhould produce in us different *ideas*, from what it did before: And they are called *Active* and *Paſſive Powers*. All which, as far as we have any notice, or notion of them, terminate in *ſimple ideas*.

§. 6. Had we ſenſes acute enough to diſcern the minute particles of bodies, it is not to be doubted, but they would produce quite different *ideas* in us; as we find in viewing things with *microſcopes*. Such bodies as to our naked eyes are coloured and opaque, will through *microſcopes* appear pellucid. *Blood* to the naked eye appears all red; but by a good *microſcope*

we see only some red globules swimming in a transparent liquor.

§ 7. The *infinite wise Author* of our beings has fitted our organs, and faculties, to the conveniencies of life and the business we have to do here: We may by our senses know and distinguish things so far as to accommodate them to the exigencies of this life. We have also insight enough into their admirable contrivances, and wonderful effects to admire, and magnify the wisdom, power, and goodness of their Author. Such a knowledge as this, which is suited to our present condition, we want not faculties to attain; and we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for the conveniencies of living.

§. 8. Besides the complex *ideas* we have of material Substances; by the simple *ideas* taken from the operations of our own minds, which we experiment in ourselves, as *Thinking*, *Understanding*, *Willing*, *Knowing*, &c. co-existing in the same substance, we are able to frame the complex *idea* of a *Spirit*. And this *idea* of an *immaterial substance*, is as clear as that we have of a *material*. By joining these with Substance, of which we have no distinct *idea*, we have the *idea* of a *Spirit*: And by putting together the *ideas* of coherent, solid parts, and power of being moved, joined with Substance, of which likewise we

we have no positive *idea*, we have the *idea* of *Matter*. *The one is as clear and distinct as the other.* The substance of *Spirit* is unknown to us; and so is the substance of *Body* equally unknown to us: Two primary qualities or properties of Body, *viz. Solid coherent parts*, and *impulse*, we have distinct clear *ideas* of: So likewise have we, of two primary qualities or properties of Spirit, *Thinking* and a *power of Action*, 'or a power of *putting body into motion, by* 'thought. The ideas of *Existence*, *Duration*, and 'Mobility, are common to them both.' We have also clear and distinct *ideas* of several qualities inherent in bodies, which are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts, and their motion. We have likewise the *ideas* of the several modes of Thinking, *viz.* Believing, Doubting, Hoping, Fearing, *&c.* as also of Willing and Moving the Body consequent to it.

§. 9. 'There is no reason why it should be 'thought strange that I make *Mobility* belong to Spi-'rit: For having no other idea of *Motion* but change 'of distance, with other beings that are considered as 'at rest, and finding that spirits, as well as bodies 'cannot operate but where they are, and that spirits 'do operate at several times in several places, I can-'not but attribute change of place to all finite spirits.'

§. 10.

§. 10. If this notion of Spirit may have some difficulties in it, not easy to be explained, we have no more reason to deny or doubt of the *existence of Spirits*, than we have, to deny or doubt of the *existence of Body*: Because the notion of Body is cumbered with some difficulties very hard, and perhaps impossible to be explained. The *divisibility in infinitum*, for instance, of any finite extension, involves us whether we grant or deny it in consequences impossible to be explicated, or made consistent. *We have* therefore *as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of* Spirit, *as with our notion of* Body; *and the existence of the one, as well as the other.* We have no other *idea* of the *Supreme Being*, but a complex one of *Existence*, *Power*, *Knowledge*, *Duration*, *Pleasure*, *Happiness*, and of several other qualities, and powers which it is better to have than be without, with the addition of *Infinite* to each of these.

§. 11. In which complex *idea* we may observe that there is no simple one, bating *Infinity*, which is not also a part of our complex *idea* of other spirits; because in our *ideas*, as well of spirits as other things, we are restrained to those we receive from *Sensation* and *Reflection*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Collective Ideas *of Subſtances.*

THERE are other *ideas* of Subſtances which may be called *Collective*, which are made up of many particular ſubſtances conſidered as united into one *idea*, as a *Troop*, *Army*, &c. which the mind makes by its power of compoſition. Theſe *collective* ideas are but the artificial draughts of the mind bringing things remote, and independent into one view, the better to contemplate and diſcourſe of them united into one conception, and ſignified by one name. For there are no things ſo remote, which the mind cannot by this art of compoſition, bring into one *idea*, as is viſible in that ſignified by the name *Univerſe*.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Relation.

§. 1.

THERE is another ſet of *ideas*, which the mind gets from the *comparing of one thing with another*. When the mind ſo conſiders one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and ſet it by another,

and

and carry its view from one to the other, this is *Relation* or *Respect*: And the denominations given to things intimating that Respect, are what we call *Relatives*, and the things so brought together *Related*. Thus when I call *Cajus*, *Husband*, or *Whiter*, I intimate some other person, or thing, in both cases, with which I compare him. Any of our *ideas* may be the foundation of *Relation*.

§. 2. Where languages have failed to give co-relative names, there the Relation is not so easily taken notice of: as in *Concubine*, which is a Relative name, as well as *Wife*.

§. 3. The *ideas* of Relation may be the same, in those men who have far different *ideas* of the things that are Related. Thus those who have different *ideas*, of *Man*, may agree in that of *Father*.

§. 4. There is no *idea* of any kind, which is not capable of an almost infinite number of considerations, in reference to other things: And therefore this makes no small part of mens words and thoughts. Thus one single man may at once sustain the Relations of *Father*, *Brother*, *Son*, *Husband*, *Friend*, *Subject*, *General*, *European*, *Englishman*, *Islander*, *Master*, *Servant*, *Bigger*, *Less*, &c. to an almost infinite number; he being capable of as many Relations as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things in any manner

manner of agreement, disagreement, or respect whatsoever.

§. 5. The *ideas* of Relations are much *clearer* and more *distinct* than of the things related; because the knowledge of one simple *idea* is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a Relation: But to the knowing of any substantial being, an accurate collection of sundry *ideas* is necessary.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations.

§. 1.

THE *ideas* of *Cause* and *Effect*, we get from our observation of the *vicissitude of things*, while we perceive some qualities or substances begin to exist, and that they receive their existence from the due application and operation of other beings: That which *produces*, is the *Cause*; that which is *produced*, the *Effect*. Thus *Fluidity* in wax is the effect of a certain degree of heat, which we observe to be constantly produced by the application of such heat.

§. 2. We distinguish the originals of things into two sorts. *First*, When the thing is wholly made new, so that no part thereof did ever exist before, as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exist,

which had before no being; it is called *Creation*. *Secondly*, When a thing is made up of particles which did all of them before exist, but the thing so constituted of pre-existing particles, which altogether make up such a collection of simple *ideas*; had not any existence before, as this *Man*, this *Egg*, this *Rose*, &c. This, when referred to a substance, produced in the ordinary course of nature, by an internal principle, but set on work by some external agent, and working by insensible ways which we perceive not, is called *Generation*. When the Cause is extrinsical, and the Effect produced by a sensible Separation or juxta-position of discernible parts, we call it *Making*; and such are all artificial things. When any simple *idea* is produced, which was not in that subject before, we call it *Alteration*.

§. 3. The denominations of things taken from *Time*, are for the most part only Relations. Thus when it is said that queen *Elizabeth* lived sixty-nine, and reigned forty-five years, no more is meant, than that the duration of her existence was equal to sixty-nine, and of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the sun: And so are all words answering, *How long?*

Young and *Old*, and other words of Time, that are thought to stand for positive *ideas*, are indeed Relative;

tive; and intimate a Relation to a certain length of Duration, whereof we have the *idea* in our minds. Thus we call a Man Young or Old, that has lived little or much of that time that men ufually attain to. This is evident from our application of thefe names to other things; for a *Man* is called Young at Twenty, but a *Horfe* Old, *&c.* The Sun and Stars we call not Old at all, becaufe we know not what period God has fet to that fort of Beings.

§. 4. There are other *ideas*, that are truly *Relative*, which we fignify by names, that are thought *Pofitive* and *Abfolute*; fuch as *Great* and *Little*, *Strong* and *Weak*. The things thus denominated are referred to fome ftandards with which we compare them. Thus we call an Apple *Great*, that is bigger than the ordinary fort of thofe we have been ufed to. And a Man *Weak*, that has not fo much ftrength or power to move as men ufually have, or thofe of his own fize.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diverfity.

§. 1.

ANOTHER occafion the mind takes of comparing, is the very *Being of Things*: When confidering a thing as exifting at any certain time, or place, and

comparing it with itself as existing at any other time, &c. it forms the *ideas* of *Identity* and *Diversity*. When we see any thing in any certain time and place, we are sure, it is that very thing; and can be no other, how like soever it may be in all other respects.

§. 2. We conceiving it impossible, that two things of the same kind should exist together in the same place, we conclude that whatever exists any where at the same time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there itself alone. When therefore we demand whether any thing be the *same*, or no, it refers always to something that existed such a time, in such a place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself, and no other.

§. 3. We have *ideas* of three sorts of substances, *First, of God.* Secondly, *Finite Intelligences.* Thirdly, *Bodies. First*, God being Eternal, Unalterable, and every where, concerning his *Identity* there can be no doubt. *Secondly*, Finite Spirits having had their determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the Relation to that time and place will always determine to each its *Identity*, as long as it exists. *Thirdly*, The same will hold of every particle of matter to which no addition or subtraction is made. These three exclude not one another out of the same place, yet each exclude those of the same kind out of the same place.

§. 4.

§. 4. The Identity and Diverſity of *Modes* and *Relations*, are determined after the ſame manner that Subſtances are; only the Actions of Finite Beings, as *Motion* and *Thought*, conſiſting in Succeſſion, they cannot exiſt in different times and places as permanent Beings: For no motion or thought conſidered as at different times can be the ſame, each part thereof having a different beginning of Exiſtence.

§. 5. From when it is plain, that Exiſtence itſelf is the *Principium Individuationis*, which determines a Being to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two Beings of the ſame kind. Thus, ſuppoſe an *Atom* exiſting in a determined time, and place; it is evident *that conſidered in any inſtant, it is the ſame with itſelf, and will be ſo, as long as its exiſtence continues.* The ſame may be ſaid of two, or more, or any number of particles, whilſt they continue together. The *Maſs will be the ſame however jumbled:* But if one atom be taken away, it is not the ſame maſs.

§. 6. In *Vegetables*, the identity depends not on the ſame maſs, and is not applied to the ſame thing. The reaſon of this is the difference between an animate body, and maſs of matter; *This* being only the coheſion of particles any how united; *The other*, ſuch a diſpoſition and organization of parts, as is fit to receive and diſtribute nouriſhment, ſo as to continue

tinue and frame the wood, bark, leaves, &c. (of an *Oak*, for instance) in which consists the vegetable life. *That therefore which has such an organization of parts partaking of one common life, continues to be the same Plant*, though *that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living Plant.*

§. 7. The case is not so much different in *Brutes*, but that any one may hence see what makes an *Animal*, and continues it the *same*.

§. 8. The identity of the *same Man* likewise consists in a *participation of the same continued life, in succeeding particles of matter vitally united to the same organized body.*

§. 9. To understand *Identity* aright, we must consider what *Idea* the word it is applied to stands for. It being one thing to be the *same Substance*, another *the same Man*, and a third the *same Person*.

§. 10. An *Animal*, is a living organized body: And the same animal, *is the same continued life communicated to different particles of matter, as they happen successively to be united to that body*, and our notion of *Man*, is but of a particular sort of Animal.

§. 11. *Person stands for an intelligent being, that reasons and reflects, and can consider itself the same thing in different times and places*; which it doth by that *Consciousness* that is inseparable from thinking. By this

this every one is to himself what he calls *Self*, without considering whether that *Self* be continued in the same, or divers substances. In this consists *Personal Identity*, or the sameness of a rational being: And *so far as this consciousness extends backward to any past action, or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person.* It is the same *Self* now, it was then: And it is by the same *Self*, with this present one, that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

§. 12. 'But it is enquired, whether if the same 'substance, which thinks, be changed, it can be the 'same person; or remaining the same, it can be different persons? I answer, that cannot be resolved, 'but by those who know what kind of substances 'they are that do think, and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one 'thinking substance to another. I grant, were the 'same consciousness the same individual action, it 'could not: But, it being but a present representation of a past action, why it may not be possible, 'that that may be represented to the mind to have 'been, which really never was, will be hard to determine.

'As to the second part of the question, whether 'the same immaterial substance remaining, there may 'be two distinct persons? All those who hold pre-'exist-

'existence, are evidently of this mind, since they 'allow the soul to have no remaining consciousness of 'what it did in that pre-existent state, either wholly 'separate from body, or informing any other body; 'and if they should not, it is plain, experience 'would be against them. So that personal identity 'reaching no farther than consciousness reaches, a pre-'existent spirit not having continued so many ages in 'a state of silence, must needs make different persons.

§. 13. 'And thus we may be able, without any 'difficulty, to conceive the same person at the resur-'rection, though in a body not exactly in make or 'parts the same which he had here, the same consci-'ousness going along with the soul that inhabits it. 'But yet the soul alone, in the change of bodies, 'would scarce to any one, but to him that makes the 'soul the *man*, be enough to make the same *man*.'

§. 14. *Self* is that conscious thinking thing, whatever substance it matters not, which is conscious of pleasure or pain, capable of happiness or misery; and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends. That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing, can join itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it; and so attributes to itself, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches.

§. 15.

§. 15. This *Perſonal Identity* is the object of reward and Puniſhment, being that by which every one is concerned for himſelf. If the *Conſciouſneſs* went along with the little finger, when that was cut off, it would be the ſame ſelf that was juſt before concerned for the whole body.

§ 16. If the ſame *Socrates*, waking and ſleeping, did not partake of the ſame conſciouſneſs, they would not be the ſame *Perſon*. *Socrates* waking, could not be in juſtice accountable fo what *Socrates* ſleeping did, no more than one *Twin*, for what his brother *Twin* did, becauſe their outſides were ſo like, that they could not be diſtinguiſhed.

§. 17. But ſuppoſe I wholly loſe the memory of ſome parts of my life, beyond a poſſibility of retrieving them, ſo that I ſhall never be conſcious of them again; am I not the *ſame Perſon* that did thoſe actions, though I have now forgot them? I anſwer, that we muſt here take notice what the word *I* is applied to, which in this caſe is the man only: And the ſame man being preſumed to be the ſame perſon, *I* is eaſily here ſuppoſed to ſtand alſo for the ſame perſon. But if it be poſſible for the ſame man, to have diſtinct incommunicable conſciouſneſs at different times, it is paſt doubt the ſame man would at different times, make different perſons. Which we ſee is the ſenſe of

mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the madman for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the madman did; thereby making them two persons. Thus we say in *English*, such a one *is not himself*, or *is besides himself*, in which phrases it is insinuated, that *Self* is changed, and the *Self same Person* is no longer in that man.

§. 18. But is not a man drunk or sober the same Person? Why else he is punished for the same fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same person, as a man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same person, and is as answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Human laws punish both with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge: Because in these cases they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, and what is counterfeit; and so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea. For though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness; and the drunkard perhaps is not conscious of what he did; yet human judicatures justly punish him, because the fact is proved against him; but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great day wherein the *Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open*,

it

it may be reasonable to think no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of, but shall receive his doom, his *own Conscience accusing*, or else *excusing him*.

§. 19. 'I am apt enough to think I have, in 'treating of this subject, made some suppositions 'that will look strange to some readers, and possibly 'they are so in themselves: But yet, I think, they 'are such as are pardonable in this ignorance we are 'in of the nature of that thinking thing that is in 'us, and which we look on as *ourselves*. Taking, 'as we ordinarily do the soul of a man, for an immaterial substance, independent from matter, and 'indifferent alike to it all, there can from the nature 'of things be no absurdity at all, to suppose that the 'same soul may, at different times, be united to different bodies, and with them make up, for that 'time, one man: As well as we suppose a part of a 'sheep's body yesterday, should be a part of a man's 'body to morrow, and in that union make a vital part 'of *Melibœus* himself, as well as it did of his ram.'

§. 20. To conclude, whatever substance begins to exist, it must during its existence be the same; Whatever compositions of substances begin to exist, during his union of those substances, the concrete must be the same. Whatsoever mode begins to exist, during

its existence it is the same: And so if the composition be of distinct substances, and different modes, the same rule holds. Whence it appears that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter, rather arises from *names ill used*, than from any *obscurity in the things* themselves. For whatever makes the specifick *Idea*, to which the name is applied, if that *Idea* be steadily kept to, the distinction of any thing into the *same*, and *divers*, will easily be conceived, and there can arise no doubt concerning it.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

§. 1.

ALL simple *Ideas*, wherein are parts or degrees, afford an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein they are to one another in respect of those simple *Ideas*. As *Whiter*, *Sweeter*, *More*, *Less*, &c. these depending on the equality and excess of the same simple *Idea*, in several subjects may be called, *Proportional Relations*.

§. 2. Another occasion of comparing things is taken from the circumstances of their origine, as *Father*, *Son*, *Brother*, &c. these may be called *Natural Relations*.

§. 3.

§. 3. Sometimes the foundation of conſidering things, is ſome act whereby any one comes by a moral right power, or obligation to do ſomething: Such are *General, Captain, Burgher*; theſe are *inſtituted*, and *Voluntary Relations*, and may be diſtinguiſhed from the *Natural*, in that they are alterable and ſeparable from the perſons to whom they ſometimes belonged, though neither of the ſubſtances ſo related be deſtroyed. But natural relations are not alterable, but are as laſting as their ſubjects.

§. 4. Another relation is the conformity or diſagreement of mens voluntary actions to a rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of: Theſe may be called *Moral Relations*. It is this conformity or diſagreement of our actions to ſome law (whereby good or evil is drawn on us from the will and power of the law maker, and is what we call *Reward or Puniſhment*) that renders our actions morally good, or evil.

§. 5. Of theſe moral *Rules* or *Laws*, there ſeem to be three ſorts with their different enforcements. *Firſt*, the *Divine Law*. Secondly, *Civil Law*. Thirdly, *The Law of Opinion* or *Reputation*. By their relation to the firſt, our actions are either *Sins* or *Duties*: To the ſecond, *Criminal* or *Innocent*: To the third, *Virtues* or *Vices*.

§. 6.

§. 6. *1ſt*, By the *Divine Law*, I mean that law which God has ſet to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of nature, or the voice of Revelation. That God has given a law to mankind, ſeems undeniable, ſince he has, *Firſt*, A right to do it, we are his creatures. *Secondly*, Goodneſs and wiſdom to direct our actions to what is beſt. *Thirdly*, Power to enforce it by reward, and puniſhment of infinite weight and duration. This is the only true touchſtone of moral rectitude, and by which men judge of the moſt conſiderable moral good or evil of their actions: that is, whether as duties or ſins they are like to procure them happineſs or miſery from the hands of the Almighty.

§. 7. *2dly*, The *Civil Law*, is the rule ſet by the Commonwealth, to the actions of thoſe that belong to it. This law no body over-looks; the rewards and puniſhments being ready at hand to enforce it, extending to the protecting or taking away of life, liberty, and eſtate of thoſe who obſerve or diſobey it.

§. 8. *3dly*, The law of Opinion or Reputation. *Virtue* and *Vice* are names ſuppoſed every where, to ſtand for actions in their own nature, Right and Wrong. As far as they are really ſo applied, they ſo far are coincident with the divine law. But it is viſible that theſe names in the particular inſtances of

their

their application, through the several nations and societies of men, are constantly attributed only to such actions as, in each country and society, are in reputation or discredit. So that the measure of what is every where called and esteemed virtue and vice, is the approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a tacit consent establishes itself in the societies and tribes of men in the world; whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions of the place.

§. 9. That this is so, appears hence: That though that passes for Virtue in one place, which is elsewhere accounted Vice; yet every where *Virtue* and *Praise*, *Vice* and *Blame* go together; *Virtue* is every where that which is thought praise-worthy: And nothing else but that which has the allowance of public esteem, is called *Virtue*. These have so close an alliance, that they are often called by the same name.

§. 10. It is true, Virtue and Vice do in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, which the laws of God have established; because the observation of these laws visibly secures and advances the general good of mankind, and the neglect of them breeds mischief and confusion: And therefore men, without

renounce

renouncing all ſenſe and reaſon, and their own intereſt, could not generally miſtake in placing their commendation and blame on that ſide that deſerved it not. They who think not commendation and diſgrace ſufficient motives to engage men to accommodate themſelves to the opinions and rules of thoſe with whom they converſe, ſeem little ſkilled in the hiſtory of mankind. The greateſt part whereof govern themſelves chiefly by this *law of Faſhion*.

The penalties that attend the breach of God's laws are ſeldom ſeriouſly reflected on, and thoſe that do reflect on them, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation. And for the puniſhment due from the laws of the commonwealth, men flatter themſelves with the hopes of impunity: But no man eſcapes cenſure and diſlike who offends againſt faſhion; nor is there one of ten thouſand ſtiff and inſenſible enough, to bear up under the conſtant diſlike and condemnation of his own club.

§. 11. *Morality* then is nothing but a relation to theſe laws or rules; and theſe rules being nothing but a collection of ſeveral ſimple *ideas*, the conformity thereto is but ſo ordering the action, that the ſimple *ideas*, belonging to it, may correſpond to thoſe which the law requires. By which we ſee how moral beings, and notions are founded on, and terminated in the

ſimple

ſimple *ideas* of ſenſation and reflection. For example, let us conſider the complex *idea* ſignified by the word *Murder*. Firſt from reflection, we have the *ideas* of *Willing*, *Conſidering*, *Purpoſing Malice*, &c. Alſo of *Life*, *Perception*, and *Self-Motion*. Secondly from Senſation, we have the *ideas* of *man*, and of ſome action whereby we put an end to that perception and motion in the man, all which ſimple *ideas* are comprehended in the word *Murder*.

This collection of ſimple *ideas* being found to agree or diſagree with the eſteem of the country I have been bred in, and to be held worthy of praiſe or blame, I call the action *Virtuous* or *Vicious*. If I have the will of a Supreme Inviſible Law maker for my rule, then, as I ſuppoſe the action commanded or forbidden by *God*, I call it Good or Evil, *Sin* or *Duty*: If I compare it with the Civil Law of my Country, I call it *Lawful* or *Unlawful*, a Crime or no Crime.

§. 12. Moral actions may be conſidered two ways.

Firſt, As they are in themſelves a collection of ſimple *ideas*, in which ſenſe they are poſitive abſolute *ideas*. *Secondly*, As *Good* or *Bad*, or *Indifferent*: In this reſpect they are *Relative*, it being their conformity or diſagreement with ſome rule that makes them be ſo. We ought carefully to diſtinguiſh between

the positive *idea* of the action, and the reference it has to a rule: Both which are commonly comprehended under one name, which often occasions confusion, and misleads the judgment.

§. 13. Thus the taking from another what is his, without his consent, is properly called *Stealing*: But that name being commonly understood to signify also the moral pravity of the action, men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called *Stealing* as an ill action, disagreeing with the rule of Right. And yet the private taking away his sword from a madman to prevent his doing mischief, though it be properly denominated *Stealing*, as the name of such a *mixed Mode*, yet when compared to the law of God, it is no sin or transgression, though the name *Stealing* ordinarily carries such an intimation with it.

§. 14. It would be infinite to go over all sorts of Relations; I have here mentioned some of the most considerable, and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our *ideas* of Relations, and wherein they are founded.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of clear, obſcure, diſtinct, and confuſed ideas.

§. 1.

HAVING ſhown the original of our *ideas*, and taken a view of their ſeveral ſorts: I ſhall offer ſome few other conſiderations concerning them. The firſt is, that ſome are *clear*, others *obſcure*: Some *diſtinct*, and others *confuſed*.

§. 2. Our ſimple *ideas* are clear, when they are ſuch as the objects themſelves from whence they were taken, did in a well-ordered ſenſation or perception preſent them. Whilſt the memory retains them thus, and can produce them ſo to the mind when it has occaſion to conſider them, they are clear *ideas*. Our *complex ideas* are clear when the *ideas* that go to their compoſition are clear: And the number and order of thoſe ſimple *ideas*, that are their ingredients, is determinate and certain.

§. 3. The cauſe of *Obſcurity* in ſimple *ideas* ſeems to be either dull organs, or ſlight impreſſions made by the objects, or a weakneſs in the memory, not able to retain them as received.

§. 4. A *diſtinct idea* is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other: And a *confuſed*, is ſuch an one as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from another from which it ought to be different. Obſcurity is oppoſed to clearneſs, confuſion to diſtinctneſs.

§. 5. This confuſion incident to ideas, is only in reference to their names. For every idea a man has being viſibly what it is, and diſtinct from all other *ideas* but itſelf, that which makes it *confuſed* is, when it is ſuch that it may as well be called by another name as that which it is expreſſed by, the difference which keeps the things diſtinct, and makes ſome of them to belong rather to the one, and ſome of them to the other of thoſe names being left out; and ſo the diſtinction which was intended to be kept up by theſe different names is quite loſt.

Confuſion is occaſioned chiefly by the following defaults. *Firſt*, When any *complex idea* (for it is *complex ideas* that are moſt liable to confuſion) is made up of too ſmall a number of ſimple *ideas*, and ſuch as are common to other things: Whereby the differences that make it deſerve a different name, are left out. Thus an *idea* of a *Leopard* being conceived only as a ſpotted beaſt, is confuſed; it not being thereby ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from a *Panther*, and other ſorts of beaſts that are ſpotted. Where the *ideas* for

which

which we use different terms, have not a difference answerable to their distinct names, and so cannot be distinguished by them, there it is that they are truly confused.

§. 7. *Secondly.* When the *ideas* are so jumbled together in the complex one, that it is not easily discernible, whether it more belongs to the name given it, than to any other. We may conceive this confusion by a sort of pictures usually shewn, wherein the colours mark out very odd and unusual figures, and have no discernible order in their position. This, when said to be the picture of a *Man* or *Cæsar*, we reckon confused, because it is not discernible in that state, to belong more to the name *Man* or *Cæsar*, than to the name *Baboon* or *Pompey*. But when a cylindrical mirror rightly placed, hath reduced those irregular lines on the table, into their due order and proportion, than the eye presently sees that it is a *Man* or *Cæsar*; that is, that it belongs to those names, and is sufficiently distinguishable from a *Baboon* or *Pompey*; that is, from the *ideas* signified by those names.

§. 8. *Thirdly*, When any one of our *ideas* signified by a name is uncertain and undetermined. Thus he that puts in, or leaves out an *idea* out of his complex one of *Church* or *Idolatory*, every time that he thinks

of

of either, and holds not steady to any one precise combination of *ideas*, that makes it up, is said to have a confused *idea* of *Church* or *Idolatory*. Confusion always concerns two *ideas*, and those most, which most approach one another. To avoid confusion therefore we ought to examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be separated from; and that will be found an *idea* belonging to another name, and so should be a different thing, from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct, and so keeps not that difference from that other *idea* which the different name imports.

§. 9. It is to be observed that our *complex ideas* may be very clear and distinct in one part, and very obscure and confused in another. Thus in *Chiliedrum*, or Body of a *Thousand Sides*, the *idea* of the figure may be confused, though that of the number be very distinct: We can discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of this *complex idea* which depends on the number Thousand; though it is plain we have no precise *idea* of its figure, so as to distinguish it by that from one that has but Nine Hundred Ninety-nine sides. The not observing this, causes no small error in mens thoughts, and confusion in their discourses.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantaſtical Ideas.

§. 1.

OUR *ideas* in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which they may be ſuppoſed to repreſent, come under a *Threefold* diſtinction, and are, Firſt, either *Real* or *Fantaſtical*. Secondly, *Adequate* or *Inadequate*. Thirdly, *True* or *Falſe*.

By *real ideas* I mean ſuch as have a foundation in nature, ſuch as have a conformity with the real being and exiſtence of things, or with their Archetypes.

Fantaſtical are ſuch as have no foundation in nature, nor any conformity with that reality of being, to which they are referred as to their *Archetypes*.

§. 2. By examining the ſeveral ſorts of *ideas* we ſhall find, that Firſt, our *ſimple ideas* are all real; not that they are images or repreſentations of what does exiſt, but as they are the certain effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker, to produce in us ſuch ſenſations: They are real *ideas* in us, whereby we diſtinguiſh the qualities that are really in things themſelves. Their reality lies in the ſteady correſpondence they have with the diſtinct conſtitutions of real beings. But whether they anſwer to thoſe con-

conſtitutions as to *Cauſes* or *Patterns*, it matters not; it ſuffices that they are conſtantly produced by them.

§. 3. *Complex ideas* being arbitrary combinations of *ſimple ideas* put together, and united under one general name, in forming of which the mind uſes its liberty; we muſt enquire which of theſe are real, and which imaginary combinations, and to this I ſay, that,

§. 4. *Firſt*, Mixed modes and relations, having no other reality than what they have in the minds of men; nothing elſe is required to make them real, but a poſſibility of exiſting conformable to them. Theſe *ideas* being themſelves *Archetypes*, cannot differ from their *Archetypes*, and ſo cannot be chimerical; unleſs any one will jumble together in them inconſiſtent *ideas*. Thoſe indeed that have names aſſigned them in any language, muſt have a conformity to the ordinary ſignification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantaſtical.

§. 5. *Secondly*, Our complex *ideas* of Subſtances being made, in reference to things exiſting without us, whoſe repreſentations they are thought, are no farther real, than as they are ſuch combinations of *ſimple ideas*, as are really united, and co-exiſt in things without us. Thoſe are fantaſtical which are made up of ſeveral *ideas*, that never were found united, as *Centaur*, &c.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Ideas *Adequate or Inadequate.*

§. 1.

REAL *ideas* are either *Adequate* or *Inadequate*; *First, Adequate*, which perfectly represent those Archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from, and which it makes them to stand for. *Secondly, Inadequate*, which are such as do but partially or incompleatly represent those Archetypes to which they are referred; Whence it appears,

§. 2. *First*, That all our *simple ideas* are *Adequate*; for they being but the effects of certain powers in things fitted and ordained by God, to produce such sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to such powers, and we are sure they agree to the reality of things.

§. 3. *Secondly*, Our *complex ideas of modes* being voluntary collections of *simple ideas*, which the mind puts together without reference to any real Archetypes, cannot but be *Adequate ideas*. They are referred to no other pattern, nor made by any original, but the good liking and will of him that makes the combination. If indeed one would confirm his *ideas*,

to those which are formed by another person, they may be wrong or *Inadequate*, because they agree not to that which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern. In which respect only, any *ideas* of modes can be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate.

§. 4. *Thirdly*, Our *ideas of Substances* have in the mind a double reference: *First*, They are sometimes referred to a supposed real essence, of each species of things. *Secondly*, They are designed for representations in the mind of things that do exist, by *ideas* discoverable in them: In both which respects they are *Inadequate*.

First, If the names of Substances stand for things, as supposed to have certain real essences, whereby they are of this or that species, (of which real essences men are wholly ignorant and know nothing) it plainly follows that the *ideas* they have in their minds, being referred to real essences, as *Archetypes* which are unknown, they must be so far from being Adequate, that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all. Our complex *ideas* of Substances are, as have been shown, nothing but certain collections of simple *ideas* that have been observed, or supposed constantly to exist together. But such a complex *idea* cannot be the real essence of any Substance; For then the properties we discover in it would

would be deducible from it, and their neceſſary connection with it be known, as all the properties of a *Triangle* depend on, and are deducible from the complex *idea* of *Three Lines including a Space*: But it is certain that in our complex *ideas* of Subſtances, are not contained ſuch *ideas* on which all the other qualities that are to be found in them depend.

§. 5. *Secondly*, Thoſe that take their *ideas* of Subſtances from their ſenſible qualities, cannot form Adequate *ideas* of them: Becauſe their qualities and powers are ſo various, that no man's complex *idea* can contain them all. Moſt of our ſimple *ideas*, whereof our complex ones of Subſtances do conſiſt, are powers which being relations to other Subſtances; we cannot be ſure we know all the powers, till we have tried what changes they are fitted to give and receive from other Subſtances, in their ſeveral ways of application: Which being not poſſible to be tried upon one body, much leſs upon all, it is impoſſible we ſhould have Adequate *ideas* of any Subſtance, made of a collection of all its properties.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of True and False Ideas.

§. 1.

TRUTH and *Falſhood* in propriety of ſpeech belong only to propoſitions; and when *ideas* are termed *True* or *Falſe*, there is ſome ſecret or tacit propoſition, which is the foundation of that denomination. Our *ideas* being nothing but *Appearances* or *Perceptions* in the mind, can in ſtrictneſs of ſpeech no more be ſaid to be true or falſe, than ſingle names of things can be ſaid to be true or falſe. The *idea* of *Centaur* has no more falſhood in it, when it appears in our minds, than the name *Centaur* when it is pronounced or writ on paper. For truth or falſhood lying always in ſome affirmation or negation, our *ideas* are not capable, any of them, of being falſe, till the mind paſſes ſome judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies ſomething of them. In a *metaphyſical* ſenſe they may be ſaid to be true, that is, to be really ſuch as they exiſt; though in things called true, even in that ſenſe, there is perhaps a ſecret reference to our *ideas*, looked upon as the ſtandards of that truth; which amounts to a *mental propoſition*.

§. 2.

§. 2. When the mind refers any of its *ideas* to any thing extraneous to it, they are then *capable of being true or false*: Because in such a reference the mind makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing; which supposition, as it is true or false, so the *ideas* themselves come to be denominated. This happens in these cases: *First*, When the mind supposes its *idea, conformable to that in other mens minds*; called by the same name, such as that of *Justice, Virtue*, &c.

Secondly, When the mind supposes any *idea conformable to some real existence*. Thus that of *Man* is true, that of *Centaur* false, the one having a conformity to what has really existed; the other not. *Thirdly*, When the mind refers any of its *ideas*, to that real constitution, and essence of any thing whereon all its properties depend: And thus the greatest part, if not all our *ideas of Substances*, are false.

§. 3. As to the *First*, *When we judge of our ideas by their conformity to those of other men, they may be any of them false*. But *simple ideas are least liable to be so mistaken*; we seldom mistake *Green* for *Blue*, or *Bitter for Sweet*; much less do we confound the names belonging to different senses, and call a *Colour* by the name of a *Taste*. *Complex ideas are much more liable to falsehood in this particular: And those of Mixed Modes more than Substances*. Because in Substances

stances their sensible qualites serve for the most part to distinguish them clearly: But in Mixed Modes we are more uncertain, and we may call that *Justice*, which ought to be called by another name. *The reason of this is*, that the abstract *ideas* of Mixed Modes, being mens voluntary combinations of such a precise collection of simple *ideas*, we have nothing else to refer our *ideas* of Mixed Modes as standards to; but the *ideas* of those who are thought to use names in their proper significations: And so as our *ideas* conform or differ from them, they pass for true or false.

§. 4. As to the *Second, When we refer our ideas to the real existence of things* none can be termed false, but our complex *ideas* of Substances.

§. 5. For our simple *ideas* being nothing but perceptions in us answerable to certain powers in external objects, their truth consists in nothing but such appearances, as are produced in us suitable to those powers: Neither do they become liable to the imputation of falshood, whether we judge these *ideas* to be in the things themselves, or no. For God having set them as marks of distinguishing things, that we may be able to discern one thing from another, and thereby chuse them as we have occasion; it alters not the nature of our simple *ideas*, whether we think the *idea* of *Blue* (for instance) to be in the *Violet* itself, or in the

the mind only: And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated *Blue*, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that causes in us that *idea*: Since the name *Blue* notes properly nothing but that mark of distinction, that is in a Violet, discernibly only by our eyes, whatever it consists in.

Neither would our simple *ideas* be *false*, if by the different structure of our organs it were so ordered *that the same object should produce in several mens minds different ideas*. For this could never be known since objects would operate constantly after the same manner. It is most probable nevertheless, that the *ideas* produced by the same objects in different mens minds, are very near and undiscernibly like. Names of simple *ideas* may be misapplied, as a man ignorant in the *English* tongue may call *Purple*, *Scarlet*: But this makes no falshood in the *ideas*.

§. 6. *Complex ideas of modes cannot be false in reference to the essence of any thing really existing*; because they have no reference to any pattern existing, or made by nature.

§. 7. *Our complex ideas of Substances, being all referred to patterns in things themselves, may be false.* They are so, *First*, When looked upon as representations of the unknown essences of things. *Secondly*, *When they put together simple ideas* which, in the real existence

existence of things, have no union: As in *Centaur*. *Thirdly*, When from any collection of simple *ideas*, that do always exist together, there is separated by a direct negation any one simple *idea*, which is constantly joined with them. Thus, if from extension, solidity, fixedness, malleableness, fusibility, &c. we remove the colour observed in *Gold*. If this *idea* be only left out of the complex one of *Gold*, it is to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect, rather than a false one: Since, though it contains not all the simple *ideas*, that are united in nature: Yet it puts none together, but what do really exist together.

§. 8. Upon the whole, I think that our *ideas* as they are considered by the mind, either in reference to the proper signification of their names, or in reference to the reality of things, may more properly be called *Right* or *Wrong ideas*, according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred. The *ideas* that are in mens minds simply considered, cannot be wrong, unless *complex ideas*, wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other *ideas* are in themselves right, and the knowledge about them right, and true knowledge. But when we come to refer them to any patterns, or archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such archetypes.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Association of Ideas.

§. 1.

THERE is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in itself really extravagant in the opinions, reasonings, and actions of other men. The least flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to espy, and forward to condemn in another, though he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly be convinced of.

§. 2. This sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to Education and Prejudice, and for the most part truly enough; though that reaches not the bottom of the disease, nor shows distinctly enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assigned for the cause; and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself; but yet I think he ought to look a little farther who would trace it to the root it springs from, and so explain it, as to show whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational

minds, and wherein it consists. For this being a weakness to which all men are liable, and a taint which universally infects mankind, the greater care should be taken to lay it open.

§. 3. Some of our *ideas* have a natural correspondence and connexion one with another: It is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these, and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this, there is another connection of *ideas* wholly owing to chance or custom: *Ideas* that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some mens minds, that it is very hard to separate them; they always keep company, and the one no sooner comes into the understanding, but its associate appears with it; and if they are more than two, the whole gang always inseparably show themselves together. This strong combination of *ideas* not allied by nature, the mind makes in itself either voluntarily, or by chance: And hence it comes in different men to be very different, according to their different *Inclinations*, *Educations*, *Interests*, &c. Custom settles habits of Thinking in the Understanding as well as of Determining in the Will, and of motion in the Body; all which seem to be but trains of motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a going, continue on in the same steps they have been used to; which by often

ten trading are worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and, as it were, natural. As far as we can comprehend Thinking, thus *ideas* seem to be produced in our minds; or if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual train, when once they are put into that track, as well as it does to explain such motions of the Body.

§. 4. This connexion in our minds of *ideas* in themselves loose and independent one of another, is of so great force to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after. Thus the *ideas* of *Goblins* and *Sprights* have really no more to do with Darkness than Light: yet let but a foolish Maid inculcate these often on the mind of a Child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives; but Darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful *ideas*. A man has suffered pain or sickness in any place; he saw his friend die in such a room; though these have in nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the *idea* of the *place* occurs to his mind, it brings that of the Pain and Displeasure with it, he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

§. 5. *Intellectual Habits* and Defects this way contracted are not less frequent and powerful, though less observed. Let the *ideas* of *Being* and *Matter* be strongly joined either by Education or much Thought, whilst these are still combined in the mind, what notions, what reasonings will there be about separate Spirits? Let Custom from the very Childhood have joined Figure and Shape to the *idea* of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity? Let the *idea* of *Infallibility* be joined to any person, and these two constantly together possess the mind, and then one Body in two places at once, shall be swallowed for a certain truth, whenever that imagined Infallible Person dictates and demands assent without inquiry.

§. 6. Some such wrong combinations of *ideas* will be found to establish the irreconcileable opposition between different sects of philosophy and religion: For we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth offered by plain Reason. Interest, though it does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness, as that every one of them should knowingly maintain falsehood; Some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to; *i. e.* to pursue truth sincerely. That therefore which captivates their reasons, and leads

leads men of ſincerity blindfold from common ſenſe, will, when examined, be found to be, what we are ſpeaking of: Some independent *ideas*, are by education, cuſtom, and the conſtant din of their party ſo coupled in their minds, that they always appear there together, and they can no more ſeparate them in their thoughts, than if they were but one *idea*; and they operate as if they were ſo. This gives ſenſe to jargon, demonſtration to abſurdities, and conſiſtency to nonſenſe, and is the foundation of the greateſt, I had almoſt ſaid, of all the errors in the world: Or, if it does not reach ſo far, it is at leaſt the moſt dangerous one, ſince ſo far as it obtains it hinders men from ſeeing and examining. The confuſion of two different *ideas* which a cuſtomary connexion of them in their minds hath to them in effect made but one, cannot but fill mens heads with falſe views, and their reaſonings with falſe conſequences.

§. 7. Having thus given an account of the *Original Sorts* and *Extent* of our *ideas*, which are the inſtruments or materials of our knowledge, I ſhould immediately proceed to ſhow, what uſe the underſtanding makes of them, and what knowledge we have by them. But, upon a nearer approach, I find that there is ſo cloſe a connexion between *ideas* and *words*; and our abſtract *ideas* and general *words* have ſo conſtant a relation one to another, that it is impoſſible

possible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge, which all consists in propositions, without considering first, the Nature, Use, and Signification of Language, which therefore must be the business of the next Book.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language in General.

§. 1.

GOD having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with *Language*, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society. Man therefore had by nature his organs so fashioned, as to be *fit to frame articulate sounds*, which we call Words.

§. 2. But besides articulate sounds (which birds may be taught to imitate) it was further necessary that he should be *able to use these sounds as signs of internal Conceptions*, and make them stand as marks of the *ideas* in his mind, whereby they might be made known to others.

§. 3.

§. 3. But neither is it enough for the perfection of language, that founds can be made ſigns of *ideas*, unleſs theſe can be made uſe of, ſo as *to comprehend ſeveral particular things*; for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their uſe, had every particular thing need of a diſtinct name to be ſignified by. To remedy this inconvenience, Language had yet a farther improvement in the uſe of *General Terms*, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular exiſtences, which advantageous uſe of ſounds was obtained only by the difference of the *ideas* they were made ſigns of. Thoſe names becoming *general*, which are made to ſtand for *general ideas*; and thoſe remaining *particular*, where the *ideas* they are uſed for are *particular*. There are other words which ſignify the *want* or *abſence* of *ideas*, as *Ignorance*, *Barrenneſs*, &c. which relate to *poſitive ideas*, and ſignify their abſence.

§. 4. It is obſervable that the words which ſtand for Actions and Notions, quite removed from ſenſe, are borrowed from ſenſible *ideas*, *v. g.* to Imagine, Apprehend, Comprehend, Underſtand, Adhere, Conceive, Inſtil, Diguſt, Diſturbance, Tranquillity, &c. which are all taken from the Operations of Things Senſible, and applied to *modes of Thinking*. *Spirit* in its primary ſignification is no more than breath; *Angel* a meſſenger. By which we may gueſs what kind of notions they were, and whence derived; which filled

the

the minds of the first begginners of languages, and how nature, even in the naming of things unawares, suggested to men the originals of all their knowledge: Whilst to give names that might make known to others any operations they felt in themselves, or any other *ideas*, that came not under their senses, they were fain to borrow words from the ordinary and known *ideas* of *Sensation*.

§. 5. The better to understand the *Use* and *Force* of Language, as subservient to Knowledge, it will be convenient to consider.

First, *To what it is that Names in the use of Language are immediately applied.*

Secondly, Since all (except proper names) are *General*, and so stand not for this or that single thing, but for *Sorts* and *Ranks*: It will be necessary to consider what those sorts and kinds of things are; wherein they consist, and how they come to be made. This shall be considered in the following chapters.

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

§. 1.

MAN, though he have great variety of thoughts, yet are they all within his own breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made

made to appear. It was neceſſary therefore, for the comfort and advantage of Society, that man ſhould find out ſome *External Signs*, whereby thoſe inviſible *ideas* might be made known to others. For which purpoſe nothing was ſo fit either for plenty or quickneſs, as thoſe *Articulate Sounds* he found himſelf able to make. Hence *words* came to be made uſe of by men, as ſigns of their *ideas*: Not upon the account of any *natural* connexion between articulate ſounds, and certain *ideas*; for then there would be but one Language amongſt all men: but by a voluntary impoſition, whereby ſuch a word is made *arbitrarily* the mark of ſuch an *idea*. The uſe then of words, is to be ſenſible marks of our *ideas*; and the *ideas* they ſtand for, are their *proper* and *immediate Signification*: In which *they ſtand for nothing more but the ideas in the mind of him that uſes them*. For when a man ſpeaks to another, it is that he may be underſtood; that is, that his *ſounds* may make known his *ideas* to the hearer.

§. 2. Words being voluntary Signs, cannot be impoſed on things we know not: This would be to make them ſigns of nothing, ſounds without ſignifications. A man cannot make his words the ſigns either of *Qualities* in things, or of *Conceptions* in the mind of another, whereof he has no *ideas* in his own.

§. 3. *Words in all mens mouths* (that ſpeak with any meaning) *ſtand for the ideas which thoſe that uſe*

them have, and which they would expreſs by them. Thus a *Child* that takes notice of nothing more in the metal he hears called *Gold*, than the *Yellow Colour*, calls the ſame *colour* in a Peacock's tail *Gold*. Another, that hath better obſerved, adds to ſhining Yellow, great Weight; and then the found Gold ſtands, when he uſes it, for a complex *idea* of a ſhining Yellow, and very weighty Subſtance.

§. 4. Though words ſignify properly nothing but the *ideas* in mens minds, yet they are in their thoughts ſecretly referred to *two* other things.

Firſt, *They ſuppoſe their words to be marks of ideas, in the minds of other men with whom they communicate*; elſe they could not diſcourſe intelligibly with one another: In this caſe men ſtand not to examine whether their *ideas* and thoſe of other men be the ſame; they think it enough that they uſe the word in the common acceptation of that Language.

§. 5. Secondly, *They ſuppoſe their words to ſtand alſo for the reality of things.*

§. 6. Words then being immediately the ſigns of mens *ideas*, whereby they expreſs their thoughts and imaginations to others; *there ariſes by conſtant uſe ſuch a connexion between certain ſounds and the ideas they ſtand for*; that the names heard almoſt as readily excite certain *ideas*, as if the objects themſelves were preſent to the ſenſes,

§. 7.

§. 7. And becauſe we examine not preciſely the ſignification of words, we often in attentive conſideration *ſet our thoughts more on words than things:* Nay, ſome (becauſe we often learn words before we know the *ideas* they ſtand for) ſpeak ſeveral words no otherwiſe than *Parrots* do, without any meaning at all. But ſo far as words are of uſe and ſignification, ſo far there is a conſtant connexion between the *ſound* and *idea*; and a deſignation that the one ſtand for the other; without which application of them, they are nothing but inſignificant noiſe.

§. 8. Since then words ſignify only mens peculiar *ideas*, and that by an *arbitrary impoſition*, it follows that every man has an inviolable liberty to make words ſtand for what *ideas* he pleaſes. It is true, common uſe by a tacit conſent appropriates certain ſounds to certain *ideas* in all Languages; which ſo far limits the ſignification of each ſound, that unleſs a man applies it to the ſame *ideas*, he cannot *ſpeak properly:* And unleſs a man's words excite the ſame *ideas* in the hearer, which he makes them ſtand for in ſpeaking, he cannot *ſpeak intelligibly*. But whatever be the conſequence of any man's uſe, of words, different either from their public uſe, or that of the perſons to whom he addreſſes them, this is certain, their ſignification in his uſe of them is limited to his *ideas*, and they can be ſigns of nothing elſe.

CHAP. III.

Of General Terms.

§. 1.

ALL things that exiſt being Particulars, it might be expected that words ſhould be ſo too in their ſignification: But we find it quite contrary; for moſt of the words that make all languages are *General Terms.* This is the effect of Reaſon and Neceſſity; for,

§. 2. Firſt, *It is impoſſible that every particular thing ſhould have a diſtinct peculiar name,* becauſe it is impoſſible to have diſtinct *ideas* of every particular thing; to retain its name, with its peculiar appropriation to that *idea.*

§. 3. Secondly, *It would be uſeleſs,* unleſs all could be ſuppoſed to have the ſame *ideas* in their minds. For names applied to particular things, whereof I alone have the *ideas* in my mind, could not be ſignificant or intelligible to another, who is not acquainted with all thoſe particular things which had fallen under my notice.

§. 4. Thirdly, *It would be of no great uſe for the Improvement of Knowledge:* Which, though founded in particular things, enlarges itſelf by general views; to

to which things reduced into ſorts under general names, are properly ſubſervient. In things where we have occaſion to conſider and diſcourſe of *Individuals*, and particulars, we uſe *proper* names: As in *Perſons*, *Countries*, *Cities*, *Rivers*, *Mountains*, &c. Thus we ſee that Jockeys have particular names for their horſes, becauſe they often have occaſion to mention this or that particular horſe when he is out of ſight.

§. 5. The next thing to be conſidered, is how *General Words come to be made*. Words become general by being made ſigns of *General Ideas*: *Ideas* become general by ſeparating from them, the circumſtances of Time, Place, or any other *ideas* that may determine them to this or that particular exiſtence. By this way of *Abſtraction*, they become capable of repreſenting more Individuals, than one: Each of which having a conformity to that abſtract *idea*, is of that ſort.

§. 6. But it may not be amiſs to trace our notions and names, from their beginning; and obſerve by what degrees we proceed and enlarge our *ideas*, from our firſt infancy. It is evident that the firſt *ideas Children* get, are only particular, as of the *Nurſe* or *Mother*, and the names they give them are confined to theſe Individuals. Afterwards obſerving that there are a great many other things in the world, that reſemble them in ſhape, and other qualities, they frame an

an *idea* which they find thoſe many particulars do partake in; to that they give with others the name *Man* for example; in this they make nothing *new*, but only leave out of the complex *idea* they had of *Peter*, *James*, *Mary*, &c. that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to all. And *thus they come to have a general name*, and a general *idea*.

§. 7. By the ſame method they *advance to more general names* and notions. For obſerving ſeveral things that differ from their *idea* of *Man*, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name, to agree with Man in ſome certain qualities, by retaining only thoſe qualities, and uniting them into one *idea*, they have another more general *idea*, to which giving a name they make a *term* of a more comprehenſive extenſion. Thus by leaving out the ſhape, and ſome other properties ſignified by the name *Man*, and retaining only a body with life, ſenſe, and ſpontaneous motion; we form the *idea*, ſignified by the name *Animal*. By the ſame way the mind proceeds to *Body*, *Subſtance*, and at laſt, to *Being*, *Thing*, and ſuch univerſal Terms, which ſtand for any *ideas* whatſoever. Hence we ſee that the whole myſtery of *Genus* and *Species*, is nothing elſe but *abſtract ideas* more or leſs comprehenſive, with *names* annexed to them.

§. 8.

§. 8. This shews us the reason why in defining words, *we make use of the Genus*: Namely to save the labour of enumerating the several simple *ideas*, which the next general term stands for. 'But though de-'fining by *Genus*, and *differentia*, be the shortest way; 'yet, I think, it may be doubted whether it be the 'best. This I am sure it is not the only, and so not 'absolutely necessary.' From what has been said it is plain that *General* and *Universal* belong not to the *real* existence of things; but *are inventions of the Understanding made by* it for its own use, *and concern only signs*, either *words* or *ideas*.

§. 9. It must be considered in the next place, *what kind of signification it is that general words have*. It is evident that they do not barely signify one particular thing: For then they would not be general terms, but proper names: Neither do they signify a *Plurality*; for then *Man* and *Men* would signify the same thing; but that which they signify, is a *sort* of things, and this they do, by being made a sign of an *abstract idea* in the mind, to which *idea*, as things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that name, or to be of that sort. The *Essences then of the sorts or species* of things, are nothing but these *abstract ideas*.

§. 10. It is not denied here that Nature makes things alike, and so lays the foundation of this sorting and

and classing: But the *sorts* or *species* themselves *are the workmanship of Human Understanding*: So that every distinct *abstract idea*, is a distinct *Essence*, and the names that stand for such distinct *ideas*, are the names of things essentially different. Thus *Oval*, *Circle*, *Rain* and *Snow* are essentially different. To make this clearer, it may not be amiss to consider the *several significations of the word* Essence.

§. 11. *First*, It may be taken for *the very being of any thing whereby it is, what it is*; thus the real internal, (but unknown) constitution in *Substances*, may be called their *Essence*. This is the proper signification of the word.

§. 12. *Secondly*, In the *Schools* the word Essence has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of *Genus* and *Species*; it is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things: And it is past doubt there must be some real constitution, on which any collection of *simple ideas*, co-existing, must depend. But it being evident that things are ranked into sorts, under names only as they agree to certain *abstract ideas*, to which we have annexed those names, the essence of each *Genus* or *Species*, is nothing but the *abstract idea*, which the name stands for; this the word *Essence* imports in its most familiar use.

§. 13.

§. 13. These two sorts of *Essence* may not unfitly be termed the one *Real*, the other *Nominal*. *Between the nominal Essence and the name, there is* so near a *connexion*, that the name of any sort of things, cannot be attributed to any particular being, but what has the *Essence* whereby it answers that *abstract idea*, whereof that name is the sign.

§. 14. Concerning the real Essences of corporeal Substances, there are two opinions.

First, Some using the word *Essence* for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those *Essences*, according to which, all natural things are made, and of which they equally partake, and do become of this or of that Species.

Secondly, Others look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown constitution of their insensible parts, from whence flow their sensible qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another; and according to which we rank them into sorts, under common denominations. The former supposition seems irreconcileable with the frequent production of monsters, in all the species of Animals: Since it is impossible that two things partaking of the same real *Essence*, should have different *Properties*. But were there no other reason against it; yet *the supposition of Essences which cannot be known*, and yet the making them to be that which distinguisheth the species of

things, *is* so *wholly* useless and unserviceable to any part of *Knowledge*, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by.

§. 15. We may further observe that the nominal, and *real* Essences of *simple ideas* and *modes*, are *always the same:* But *in Substances always quite different.* Thus a figure including a space between three lines, is the real as well as nominal Essence of a triangle; it being that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to which they are inseparably annexed; but it is far otherwise in *Gold* or any other sort of *Substance*; it is the real constitution of its insensible parts, on which depend all those Properties that are to be found in it; which constitution since we know not, nor have any particular *idea* of, we can have no name that is the sign of it. But yet it is its *Colour*, *Weight*, *Fusibility*, and *Fixedness*, &c. which makes it to be *Gold*, or gives it a right to that name; which is therefore its *nominal Essence*, since nothing can be called *Gold* but what has a conformity to that abstract complex *idea*, to which that name is annexed.

§. 16. That Essences are but abstract *ideas*, may farther appear by their being held *ingenerable* and *incorruptible.* This cannot be true of the real constitution of things. All things in Nature (save the *Author* of it) are liable to change: Their *real Essences* and Constitutions are destroyed and perish: But as they are

ideal

ideas eſtabliſhed in the mind, they remain immutable. For whatever becomes of *Alexander* or *Bucephalus*, the *ideas* of man and horſe remain the ſame. By theſe means the Eſſence of *Species* reſts ſafe and entire, without the exiſtence of one *Individual* of that kind.

§. 17. It is evident then that this doctrine *of the immutability of Eſſences* proves them to be only abſtract *ideas*, and is founded on the relation eſtabliſhed between them and certain ſounds, as ſigns of them, and will always be true, as long as the ſame name can have the ſame ſignification.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of Simple Ideas.

§. 1.

WORDS though they ſignify nothing immediately, but the *ideas* in the mind of the Speaker; yet we ſhall find that the names of ſimple *Ideas*, mixed *Modes*, and natural *Subſtances* have each of them ſomething peculiar. And,

§. 2. *Firſt*, the names of *ſimple ideas* and *ſubſtances*, with the abſtract *Ideas* in the Mind, *intimate ſome real Exiſtence*, from which was derived their original pattern: But the names of *mixed Modes terminate in the idea* that is in the Mind.

§. 3. *Secondly*, The names of *ſimple Ideas* and *Modes ſignify the real as well as nominal Eſſences of their ſpecies*: The names of *ſubſtances* ſignify rarely, if ever any thing, but *barely the nominal Eſſences* of thoſe ſpecies.

§. 4. *Thirdly*, The names of *ſimple Ideas are not capable of Definitions*; thoſe of *complex Ideas* are: The reaſon of which I ſhall ſhow from the nature of our *ideas*, and the ſignification of *words*.

§. 5. It is agreed that a *Definition* is nothing elſe but the ſhowing the meaning of one word, by ſeveral other, *not ſynonymous Terms*. The meaning of words being only the *ideas* they are made to ſtand for; the meaning of any term is then ſhowed, or the word defined, when by other words the *idea* it is made the ſign of, is, as it were, repreſented or ſet before the view of another, and thus its ſignification aſcertained.

§. 6. The names then of *ſimple ideas are incapable of being defined*, becauſe the ſeveral terms of a Definition ſignifying ſeveral *ideas*, they can altogether by no means repreſent an *idea* which has no compoſition at all, and therefore a Definition, which is but the ſhowing of the meaning of one word, by ſeveral others not ſignifying each the ſame thing, can in the names of ſimple *ideas* have no place.

§. 7. The not obſerving this difference in our *ideas*, has occaſioned thoſe *trifling* Definitions which are

are given us of ſome ſimple *ideas*: Such as is that of *motion*, viz. *The Act of a Being in Power, as far forth as in Power.* The Atomiſts, who define Motion to be a *Paſſage from one place to another*, what do they more than put one ſynonymous word for another? For what is *Paſſage* other than a Motion? Nor will the ſucceſſive application of the parts of the ſuperficies of one body to thoſe of another, which the *Carteſians* give us, prove a much better definition of Motion when well examined.

§. 8. *The Act of Perſpicuous, as far forth as perſpicuous*, is another Peripatetick definition of a ſimple *idea*, which it is certain can never make the meaning of the word *Light*, which it pretends to define, underſtood by a blind man. And when the *Carteſians* tell us, that Light is a great number of little globules ſtriking briſkly on the bottom of the eye; theſe words would never make the *idea* the word Light ſtands for, known to a man that had it not before.

§. 9. *Simple ideas* then *can only* be got *by the impreſſions* objects make on our minds, by the proper *Inlets* appointed to each ſort. If they are not received this way, all the *words* in the world *will never be able to produce in us the ideas they ſtand for.* Words being ſounds, can produce in us no other ſimple *ideas* than of thoſe very ſounds, nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connexion which they have with ſome

ideas

ideas which common use has made them signs of: And therefore he that has not before received into his mind by the proper In-lett the simple *idea*, which any word stands for, can never come to know the signification of that word, by any other words or sounds whatsoever.

§. 10. But in *complex ideas* which consist of several simple ones, the case is quite otherwise; for words standing for those several *ideas* that make up the composition, may imprint complex *ideas* in the mind, that never were there before, and so make their names be understood. *In them definitions take place.* Thus the word *Rainbow*, to one who knew all those colours, but yet had never seen that *Phenomenon*, might, by enumerating the *Figure*, *Largeness*, *Position*, and *Order* of the *Colours*, be so well defined, that it might be perfectly understood.

§. 11. 'Fourthly, This farther may be observed, 'concerning *simple ideas* and their names, that they 'have but few ascents in linea prædicamentali, (as 'they call it) *from the lowest Species to the summum* 'Genus. The reason whereof is, that the lowest 'species being but one simple *idea*, nothing can be 'left out of it, that so the difference being taken 'away, it may agree with some other thing in one 'idea common to them both; which, having one 'name, is the *Genus* of the other two.'

§. 12.

§. 12. *Fifthly*, The names of ſimple *Ideas*, *Subſtances*, and *mixed Modes* have alſo this difference, that thoſe of *mixed Modes* ſtand for *ideas* perfectly arbitrary: Thoſe of *Subſtances* are not perfectly ſo, but refer to a pattern, though with ſome latitude; and thoſe of ſimple *ideas* are perfectly taken from the exiſtence of things, and are not arbitrary at all.

The names of *ſimple modes* differ little from thoſe of *ſimple ideas*.

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of Mixed Modes *and Relations.*

§. 1.

THE names of *mixed Modes* being general, ſtand for *abſtract ideas* in the mind, as other general names do; but they have ſomething peculiar which may deſerve our attention.

§. 2. And *Firſt*, the *ideas* they ſtand for, or if you pleaſe the eſſences of the ſeveral ſpecies of mixed *modes, are made by the underſtanding*; wherein they differ from thoſe of *ſimple ideas*.

§. 3. *Secondly*, They are made *arbitrarily*, without patterns, or reference to any real exiſtence, wherein they differ from thoſe of *Subſtances*. The mind

unites

unites and retains certain collections, as so many distinct specifick *ideas*, whilst other combinations that as often in nature occur, and are as plainly suggested by outward things, pass neglected without particular names, or specifications.

§. 4. The mind *in forming those complex ideas*, makes no new *idea*, but only puts together those which it had before, wherein it does *three* things. *First*, It chuses a certain number. *Secondly*, It gives them connexion, and combines them into one *idea*. *Thirdly*, It ties them together by a name; all this may be done before any one individual of that species of Modes ever existed: As the *ideas* of *Sacrilege* or *Adultery* might be framed, before either of them was committed; and we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made laws about species of Actions, which were only the creatures of their own understanding.

§. 5. But though *mixed Modes* depend on the mind, and are made arbitrarily; yet they *are not made at random*, and jumbled together without any reason at all, but are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language, and therefore such combinations are only made, as men have frequent occasion to mention. Thus men having joined to the *idea* of killing, the *idea* of *Father* and *Mother*, and so made a distinct species from the killing a man's *Son* or *Neighbour*, because of the

the different heinousness of the crime, and the distinct punishment due to it; found it necessary to mention it by a distinct name, which is the end of making that distinct combination.

§. 6. In *mixed Modes*, it is the *name* that seems to preserve their Essences, and to give them their lasting duration. 'For the connexion between the loose 'parts of those complex *ideas*, being made by the 'mind, this union, which has no particular foundation in nature, would cease again, were there not 'something that did, as it were, hold it together, and 'keep the parts from scattering.' Though therefore the collection of *ideas* is made by the mind, yet the name is as it were the *Knot* which ties them fast together: Hence we seldom take any other for distinct species of *mixed Modes*, but such as are set out by names. We must observe that the names of *mixed Modes* always signify the real Essences of their species, which being nothing but the abstract complex *ideas*, and not referred to the real existence of things; there is no supposition of any thing more signified by any name of a *mixed Mode*, but barely that *complex idea* the mind itself has formed: Which when the mind has formed, is all it would express by it, and is that on which all the properties of the *species* depend, and from which alone they flow; and so in these the *real* and *nominal* Essence is the same.

§. 7. This also shows the reason *why the names of mixed Modes are commonly got, before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known:* Because there being no species of these ordinarily taken notice of, but such as have names, as those species being *complex ideas* made arbitrarily by the mind, it is convenient, if not necessary, to know the names, before we learn the *complex ideas*; unless a man will fill his head with a company of abstract *complex ideas*, which others having no names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by, and forget again. In the beginning of languages it was necessary to have the *idea* before one gave it the *name*; and so it is still, where a *new complex idea* is to be made, and a name given it. In *simple ideas* and *substances*, I grant it is otherwise; which being such *ideas* as have real existence and union in nature, the *ideas* or names are got, one before the other, as it happens.

§. 8. What has been said here of *mixed Modes*, is with very little difference applicable to *Relations* also; which since every man himself may observe, I may spare myself the pains to enlarge on.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Subſtances.

§. 1.

THE common *names* of *Subſtances ſtand for ſorts* as well as other general terms; that is, for ſuch *complex ideas*, wherein ſeveral particular Subſtances do, or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable to be comprehended in one common conception, and be ſignified by one name; I ſay, *do* or *might agree*, for though there be but one *Sun*, exiſting, yet the *idea* of it being abſtracted, is as much a *ſort*, as if there were as many ſuns as there are ſtars.

§. 2. The meaſure and boundary of each ſort whereby it is conſtituted that *particular ſort*, and diſtinguiſhed from others, is what we call it *Eſſence*; which is nothing but that *abſtract idea to which that name is annexed*, ſo that every thing contained in that *idea*, is eſſential to that ſort. This I call *Nominal Eſſence*, to diſtinguiſh it from that real conſtitution of *ſubſtances*, on which this *Nominal Eſſence*, and all the properties of that ſort depend, and may be called its *real Eſſence*: Thus the *nominal Eſſence* of *Gold* is that *complex idea* the word *Gold* ſtands for, let it be for inſtance a *Body*, Yellow, Weighty, Malleable, Fuſible,

and Fixed: But its real *Essence* is the constitution of its insensible parts, on which those qualities, and all its other properties depend; which is wholly unknown to us.

§. 3. That *Essence*, in the ordinary use of the word relates to *Sorts*, appears from hence, that if you take away the abstract *ideas* by which we sort Individuals, and rank them under common names, then the thought of any thing essential to any of them instantly vanishes: We have no notion of the one without the other, which plainly shows their Relation. No property is thought essential to any Individual whatsoever, till the mind refers it to some sort or *species* of Things, and then presently, according to the abstract *idea* of that sort, something is found essential; *so that essential or not essential, relates only to our abstract ideas, and the names annexed to them*, which amounts to no more but this, that whatever particular thing has not in it those qualities contained in the abstract *idea* which any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that species, nor be called by that name; since that *abstract idea* is the very Essence of that *species*. Thus if the *idea* of *Body* with some people be bare Extension, or Space, then *Solidity* is not essential to *Body*: If others make the *idea*, to which they give the name *Body* to be Solidity and Extension; then solidity is essential also to *Body*.

That

That alone therefore is considered as essential, *which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a Sort stands for*, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort, nor be entitled to that name.

§. 4. *Substances* are distinguished into *Sorts* and *Species* by their *nominal Essence*; for it is that alone, that the name which is the mark of the Sort signifies; And the *species* of Things to us *are nothing but the ranking them under distinct names, according to the complex idea in Us*, and not according to precise, distinct, *real Essences* in *Them*.

§. 5. We cannot rank and sort Things by their *real Essences*, because we know them not: Our faculties carry us no farther in the knowledge of Substances, than a collection of those sensible *ideas* we observe in them. But the internal Constitution whereon their properties depend, is utterly unknown to us. This is evident when we come to examine but the *stones* we tread on, or the *iron* we daily handle: We soon find that we know not their make, and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them; and yet how infinitely these come short of the fine contrivances and unconceiveable real Essences of *Plants* and *Animals*, every one knows. The workmanship of the All-wise and Powerful *God* in the great fabrick of the Universe, and every part thereof farther exceeds the comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent

gent man, than the beſt contrivance of the moſt ingenious man, doth the conceptions of the moſt ignorant of rational creatures. In vain therefore do we pretend to range things into *ſorts*, and diſpoſe them into certain *Claſſes*, under names by their *real Eſſences*, that are ſo far from our diſcovery or comprehenſion.

§. 6. But though the *nominal Eſſences of Subſtances* are made by the mind, they are not yet *made ſo arbitrarily as thoſe of mixed Modes*. To the making of any *nominal Eſſence*, it is neceſſary.

Firſt, That the *ideas* whereof it conſiſts, have ſuch an union as to make but one *idea*, how compounded ſoever.

Secondly, That the particular *ideas* ſo united be exactly the ſame, neither more or leſs: For if two abſtract complex *ideas* differ either in *number* or *ſorts* of their component parts, they make two different, and not one and the ſame Eſſence.

§. 7. In the *Firſt* of theſe, the mind in making its *complex ideas* of Subſtances, only follows *Nature*, and puts none together which are not ſuppoſed to have an union in nature. For men obſerving certain qualities always joined and exiſting together therein copy nature, and of *ideas* ſo united, make their complex ones of Subſtances.

Secondly, Though the mind in making its *complex ideas of Subſtances*, never puts any together that do not

not *really*, or are not ſuppoſed to co-exiſt; yet the *number it combines depends upon the various care, induſtry, or fancy of him that makes it.* Men generally content themſelves with ſome few obvious qualities, and often leave out others as material and as firmly united as thoſe that they take in.

In bodies organized and propagated by Seeds, as *Vegetables* and *Animals*, the *ſhape* is that which to us is the leading quality, and moſt characteriſtical part that determines the *ſpecies*: In moſt other bodies not propagated by ſeed, it is the *colour* we chiefly fix on, and are moſt led by. Thus where we find the colour of *Gold*, we are apt to imagine all the other qualities comprehended in our complex *idea* of *Gold*, to be there alſo.

§. 8. Though the *nominal* Eſſences of Subſtances are all ſuppoſed to be copied from Nature, yet they are all, or moſt of them, very imperfect: And ſince the compoſition of thoſe complex *ideas* is in ſeveral men very different, we may conclude that theſe boundaries of ſpecies are as *Men*, and not as *Nature* makes them; if at leaſt there are in Nature any ſuch preſixed bounds.

It is true, that many particular Subſtances are ſo made by Nature, that they have an agreement and likeneſs one with another, and ſo afford a foundation of being ranked into Sorts: But the *ſorting* of things by

by us, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, that Nature sets the *boundaries* of the species of things. But if it be so, our *boundaries* of species, are not exactly conformable to Nature.

§. 9. If the *first sorting of Individuals depends on the mind of man*, variously collecting the simple *ideas*, *that make the nominal Essence* of the lowest species; it is much more evident, that the more *comprehensive Classes*, called *Genera*, do so. In forming more general *ideas* that may comprehend different sorts, the mind leaves out those qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its new collection only such *ideas* as are common to several sorts. Thus by leaving out those qualities which are peculiar to Gold, Silver, &c. and retaining a complex *idea*, made up of those that are common to each species, there is a new *Genus* constituted, to which the name *Metal* is annexed.

§. 10. So that in this whole business of *Genera* and *Species*, the *Genus* or more comprehensive, is but a partial conception of what is in the *Species*, and the *species* is but a partial *idea* of what is to be found in each *Individual*. In all which there is no new thing made, but only more or less comprehensive signs, whereby we may be enabled to express in a few syllables great numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or less general conceptions, which we have framed

framed to that purpose. If these *abstract general ideas* be thought to be compleat, it can only be in respect of a certain established relation between them, and certain names, which are made use of to signify them, and not in respect of any thing existing as made by Nature.

§. 11. *This is adjusted to the true end of Speech*; which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our notions. This is the proper business of *Genus* and *Species*: And this men do without any consideration of *real essences*, and *substantial forms*, which come not within the reach of our knowledge, when we think of those things; nor within the signification of our words, when we discourse with others.

§. 12. 'This is farther to be observed concerning 'Substances, that they *alone* of all our several sorts of 'ideas, *have* particular or *proper names*, whereby one 'only particular thing is signified. Because in simple 'ideas, modes and relations, it seldom happens that 'men have occasion to mention often this, or that 'particular, when it is absent.'

CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

§. 1.

BESIDES words, which are the names of *ideas* in the mind, there are others made use of to signify the *Connexion* that the mind gives to *ideas* or propositions one with another, and to intimate some particular *Action* of its own at that time relating to those *ideas*. This it does several ways; as *is*, *is Not*, are marks of the mind affirming or denying: Besides which, the mind does in declaring its sentiments to others connect not only the parts of propositions, but whole sentences one to another with their several relations, and dependences to make a coherent discourse.

§. 2. The words signifying that connexion the mind gives to several affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued Reasoning or Narration, are called *Particles*. And it is in the right use of these, that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a *Good Stile*. To express the dependence of his Thoughts and Reasonings, one upon another, a man must have words to show what connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis, &c. he gives to each respective part of his discourse.

§. 3.

§. 3. These cannot be understood rightly, without a clear view of the postures, stands, turns, limitations, exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind: Of these there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of Particles that most languages have to express them by; for which reason it happens, that most of these Particles have divers, and sometimes almost opposite significations. Thus the particle *But* in *English*, has several very different significations; as, *But to say no more:* Here it intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came to the end of it. *I saw but two Planets:* Here it shows that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed with a Negation of all other: *You pray, but it is not that God would bring you to the true Religion, but that he would confirm you in your own.* The former of these intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be: The latter shows, that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before. *All Animals have sense, But a Dog is an Animal.* Here it signifies the connexion of the latter proposition with the former. To these, divers other significations of this Particle might be added, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude.

§. 4. I intend not here a full explication of this sort of Signs, the instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in

language, and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these *Particles*, some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them.

CHAP. VIII.

Of abstract and concrete Terms.

§. 1.

THE Mind, as has been shown, has a power to *abstract* its *idea*, whereby the Sorts of Things are distinguished: Now each *abstract idea* being distinct, so that the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge perceive their difference; and therefore in propositions, no two whole *ideas* can ever be affirmed one of another: Nor does the common use of language permit *that any two abstract words or names of abstract ideas, should be affirmed one of another.* All our affirmations are only in *Concrete*, which is the affirming one *abstract idea* to be joined to another: Which abstract *ideas* in *Substances*, may be of any sort, though the most of them are of *Powers*: In all the rest these are little else but Relations.

§. 2.

§. 2. *All our simple ideas have abstract as well as concrete names*, as *Whiteness White*, *Sweetness Sweet*, &c. The like also holds in our *ideas* of Modes and Relations, as *Justice Just*, *Equality Equal*, &c. But as to our *ideas* of Substances, we have very few abstract names at all. Those few that the schools have forged, as *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, &c. hold no proportion with the infinite number of names of substances, and could never get admittance into common use, or obtain the license of publick approbation; which seems to intimate the confession of all mankind, that they have no *ideas* of the real Essences of Substances, since they have not names for such *ideas*. It was only the doctrine of *substantial Forms*, and the confidence of mistaken Pretenders to a Knowledge they had not, which first coined, and then introduced *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, and the like: Which yet went very little farther than their own schools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding men.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

§. 1.

TO examine the *Perfection* or *Imperfection* of Words, it is necessary to consider their use and end, which is twofold; *First*, to *record* our own thoughts: *Secondly*, to *communicate* our thoughts to others: The *First* is for the help of our own memories, whereby we do, as it were, talk to ourselves: For this purpose any Words may serve the turn: Words being *arbitrary signs*, we may use which we please for this purpose; and there will be no Imperfection in them, if we constantly use the same *sign* for the same *idea*.

§. 2. *Secondly*, As to *Communication* by Words; that too has a double use: *First*, Their *Civil Use*, which is such a Communication of thoughts and *ideas* by Words, as may serve in common Conversation and Commerce, about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniencies of Civil Life. *Secondly*, The *philosophical* use of Words, by which I mean such an use of them, as may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express certain Truths in general Propositions, these two uses are very distinct, and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one, than in the other.

§. 3.

§. 3. The end of Language in Communication is to be *underſtood*; that is, to excite by ſounds in the *hearer*, the ſame *idea* which they ſtand for in the mind of the *ſpeaker*. The *doubtfulneſs and uncertainty of their ſignification*, which is the *imperfection* we are here ſpeaking of, has its cauſe more in the *ideas* themſelves, than in any incapacity in the *ſounds* to ſignify them; for in that regard they are all equally perfect. That then which makes the difference, is the difference of *ideas* they ſtand for, which muſt be learned and retained by thoſe, who would diſcourſe together intelligibly. Now this is difficult in theſe caſes;

§. 4. *Firſt*, Where the *ideas* they ſtand for are very complex. Hence the names of *mixed Modes* are liable to great uncertainty and obſcurity in their ſignification. For here the *idea* being made up of many parts, it is not eaſy to form and retain it exactly; of this ſort chiefly are moral words, which have ſeldom in two different men, the ſame preciſe ſignification.

§. 5. *Secondly*, Where the *ideas* they ſtand for, have no certain connexion in nature, and therefore no *ſettled ſtandard* to rectify and adjuſt them by. This again is the caſe of the names of *mixed Modes*, which are aſſemblages of *ideas* put together at pleaſure. *Common uſe indeed regulates the meaning of Words pretty well for common converſation*: But it is not ſufficient to adjuſt them to philoſophical diſcourſes, there being ſcarce

ſcarce a name of any very *complex idea*, which in common uſe has not a great latitude; and is not made the ſign of far different *ideas*.

§. 6. *The way of learning theſe names does not a little contribute to the doubtfulneſs of their ſignification.* For we may obſerve that children are taught the names of ſimple *ideas*, and ſubſtances, by having the things ſhown them; and then they repeat the name that ſtands for it; as *White, Sweet, Milk, Sugar*, &c. But in mixed *Modes* the ſounds are learned firſt, and men are to learn afterwards their ſignification, by their own obſervation and induſtry, or the explication of others: Which is the reaſon that theſe words are little more than *bare ſounds* in the minds of moſt, becauſe few are at the pains to ſettle their *ideas* and notions preciſely; and thoſe which are, make them the ſigns of *ideas*, different from what others underſtand by them, which is the occaſion of moſt diſputes.

§. 7. *Thirdly*, Where the ſignification of a word is *referred to a ſtandard* which is not eaſily known: This is the caſe of the names of *ſubſtances*, which being ſuppoſed to ſtand for their *real Eſſences*, muſt needs be of uncertain application, becauſe theſe Eſſences are utterly unknown; and it will be impoſſible to know what is, or what is not *Antimony*, *v. g.* when that word is to ſtand for the real Eſſence of it; whereof we have no *idea* at all.

§. 8.

§. 8. Or suppose these names only stand for simple *ideas*, found to co-exist in *substances*, yet thus they will be liable to great uncertainty too: Because these simple *ideas* being very numerous, men frame different *ideas* of the same subjects, by putting different *ideas* into their complex one, of such substances several men observe several properties in the same substance, and none of them all; who having but imperfect descriptions of things, can have but uncertain significations of words.

§. 9. *Fourthly*, Where the signification of the word, and the real Essence of the thing, are not the same, which is still the case of substances, from hence we may observe:

§ 10. *First*, That the names of simple *ideas* are least liable to mistakes: *First*, Because the *ideas* they stand for, being each but one single perception, are easier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones of Substances and Mixed Modes. *Secondly*, Because they are not referred to any other Essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify.

§. 11. Secondly, *Names of simple Modes are next to simple ideas least liable to doubt or uncertainty*, especially those of *Figure* and *Number*, of which men have so clear and distinct *ideas*.

§ 12. *Thirdly*, In *mixed Modes*, when they are composed of a few and obvious *ideas*, their names are

clear and distinct enough; otherwise doubtful and uncertain.

§. 15. *Fourthly*, The names of *substances* being annexed to *ideas* that are neither the real Essences, nor exact Representations of things, are liable yet to greater Imperfection, when we come to a philosophical use of them.

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

§. 1.

BESIDE the natural and unavoidable Imperfections of Languages, there are *wilful Faults* and *Neglects*, which men are often guilty of in their use of words. For,

§. 2. *First*, They use words *without clear and distinct* Ideas, or, which is worse, signs without any thing signified; such are for the most part introduced by *sects* of Philosophy and Religion, either out of an affectation of *singularity*, or to support some strange *Opinion*; or to cover the weakness of their *Hypothesis*. These are commonly such as had no determinate collection of *ideas* annexed to them, when they were first invented; or at least such, as, if well examined, will be found incon-

sistent,

diſtinct, and therefore may juſtly be called inſignificant terms: Inſtances of this kind may eaſily be had from the *ſchool men* and *metaphyſicians*. Others learn words which the propriety of language has affixed to very important *ideas*, and often upon occaſion uſe them without any diſtinct meaning at all: Whence their notions being unſteady and confuſed, their diſcourſe muſt be filled with empty unintelligible *Noiſe* and *Jargon*, eſpecially in moral matters where the words ſtand for arbitrary, and numerous collections of *ideas*, not regularly and permanently united in Nature.

§. 3. *Secondly*, Another Abuſe is *Inconſtancy in the uſe of Words*: It is hard to find a diſcourſe on any ſubject wherein the ſame words are not uſed ſometimes for one collection of *ideas*, ſometimes for another. The wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater diſhoneſty: And a man in his accounts with another, may with as much fairneſs make the characters of numbers, ſtand ſometimes for one, and ſometimes for another collection of *Units*; as in his diſcourſe, or reaſoning, make the ſame words ſtand for different collections of ſimple *ideas*.

§. 4. *Thirdly*, Another is an *affected obſcurity*, either by uſing old words in new ſignifications, or by introducing new and ambiguous terms, without defining them; or putting them together, ſo as to confound their ordinary meaning. Though the *Peripa-*

tetick philoſophy has been moſt eminent in this way, yet other ſects have not been wholly clear of it. The admired *art of diſputing* hath added much to the natural imperfection of Languages, whilſt it has been made uſe of, and fitted to perplex the ſignification of words, more than to diſcover the Knowledge and Truth of things: And he that will look into that ſort of learned writings, will find the words there much more obſcure, uncertain, and undetermined in their meaning, than they are in ordinary Converſation.

§. 5. *Fourthly*, Another is the *taking words for things*: This, though it in ſome degree concerns all names in general; yet more particularly affects thoſe of Subſtances. Thus in the *Peripatetick philoſophy*, *Subſtantial Forms*, *Abhorrence of Vacuum*, &c. are taken for ſomething real. To this Abuſe thoſe men are moſt ſubject, who confine their thoughts to any one *ſyſtem*; and give themſelves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received *Hypotheſis*; whereby they come to be perſuaded, that the terms of that ſect, are ſo ſuited to the nature of things, that they perfectly correſpond with the real exiſtence.

§. 6. *Fifthly*, Another is the *ſetting them in the place of things which they can by no means ſignify*. We may obſerve that in the general names of Subſtances, whereof the nominal Eſſences are only known to us, when we affirm or deny any thing about them, we do moſt

moſt commonly tacitly ſuppoſe or intend they ſhould ſtand for the real Eſſence of a certain ſort of Subſtances. Thus when a man ſays *Gold* is *malleable*, he would inſinuate ſomething more than this, what I call *Gold* is *malleable*, (though truly it amounts to no more) *namely*, that what has the real Eſſence of *Gold* is *malleable*, that is that *malleableneſs* depends on, and is inſeparable from the real Eſſence of *Gold*. But a man not knowing wherein that real Eſſence conſiſts, the connexion in his mind of *malleableneſs*, is not truly with an *Eſſence* he knows not, but with the ſound *Gold* he puts for it. It is true, the names of Subſtances would be much more uſeful; and Propoſitions expreſt by them much more certain, were the real Eſſences of Subſtances the *ideas* in our minds, which thoſe words ſignified. And it is for want of thoſe real Eſſences that our words convey ſo little knowledge, or certainty in our diſcourſes about them. But to ſuppoſe theſe names to ſtand for a thing, having the real Eſſence on which the properties depend, is ſo far from diminiſhing the imperfection of our words, that by a plain abuſe it adds to it; when we would make them ſtand for ſomething, which not being in our complex *ideas*, the name we uſe can no way be the ſign of it. In *mixed Modes*, any *idea* of the complex one being left out, or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, that is, to be of another *ſpecies*, as is plain in *Chance medley*,

medley, Manslaughter, Murder, &c. because the complex *idea* signified by that name, is the *real* as well as *nominal* Essence; and there is no secret reference of that name to any other Essence, but that. But in Substances it is not so; for though in that called *Gold*, one puts in his complex *idea*, what another leaves out, and *vice versa*, yet men do not usually think the species changed, because they refer the name in their minds to a real immutable Essence of a thing existing, on which those properties depend: But this reference of the name to a thing we have not the *idea* of, is so far from helping us at all, that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties. This reference is grounded on this supposition, namely, that the same precise internal constitution goes always with the same specifick name: In which are contained these two false *suppositions*.

First, There are certain precise *Essences*, according to which, Nature makes all particular things; and by which they are distinguished into *species*.

Secondly, This tacitly insinuates as if we had *ideas* of these Essences; for why do we enquire, whether this or that thing have the real Essence of that species *man* for instance, if we did not suppose it known, which yet is utterly false; and therefore such applications of names as would make them stand for *ideas*, we have not, must needs cause great disorder in discourse

courſe and reaſonings about them; and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words.

§. 7. *Sixthly*, Another more general, though leſs obſerved, abuſe of words, is, that men having by long and familiar uſe, annexed to them certain *ideas*, they *are apt to imagine ſo near and neceſſary a connexion, between the names, and the ſignifications they uſe them in, that they forwardly ſuppoſe one cannot but underſtand what their meaning is*; as if it were paſt doubt, that in the uſe of theſe common received ſounds, the ſpeaker and hearer had neceſſarily the ſame preciſe *ideas*. And ſo likewiſe taking the words of others, as naturally ſtanding for juſt what they themſelves have been accuſtomed to apply them to, they never trouble themſelves to explain their own, or underſtand another's meaning: From whence commonly proceeds noiſe, and wrangling without improvement or information; whilſt men take words to be the conſtant regular marks of agreed notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unſteady ſigns of their own *ideas*. Thus *life*, is a term, none more familiar: Any one almoſt would take it for an affront, to be aſked what he meant by it, and yet if it comes in queſtion, whether ſuch a thing has *life*, or not, it is eaſy to perceive, that a clear diſtinct ſettled *idea*, does not always accompany the uſe of ſo known a word.

§. 8,

§. 8. Seventhly, *Figurative speech* is also an abuse of Language: For though in discourses, where we seek rather pleasure and delight, than information and improvement, such ornaments as are borrowed from figurative speeches and allusions, can scarce pass for faults; yet if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow, that all the *art of rhetorick*, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong *ideas*, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheat. And therefore, however allowable they may be in harangues and popular addresses; they are certainly in all discourses that pretend to inform and instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them.

§. 9. To conclude this consideration, *the ends of language in our discourses with others*, are chiefly these *three*.

First, *To make our thoughts or ideas known to another*: this we fail in: *1st*, When we use names without clear and distinct *ideas* in our minds. *2dly*, When we apply received names to *ideas*, to which the common use of that language does not apply them. *3dly*, When we apply them unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by and by for another *idea*.

§. 10.

§. 10. Secondly, *To make known our thoughts with as much eaſe and quickneſs as is poſſible.* This men fail in when they have complex *ideas*, without having diſtinct names for them, which may happen either through the defect of a language, which has none, or the fault of that man who has not yet learned them.

§. 11. Thirdly, *To convey the knowledge of things:* This cannot be done, but when our *ideas* agree to the reality of things.

§. 12. *Firſt*, He that hath *names* without *ideas*, wants meaning in his words, and ſpeaks only empty ſounds. *Secondly*, He that hath *complex ideas*, without names for them, wants diſpatch in his expreſſion. *Thirdly*, He that uſes his words looſely and unſteadily, will either not be minded, or not underſtood. *Fourthly*, He that applies his names to *ideas*, different from their common uſe, wants *propriety* in his language, and ſpeaks gibberiſh. *Fifthly*, And he that hath *ideas* of *ſubſtances*, diſagreeing with the real exiſtence of things, ſo far wants the materials of true knowledge in his underſtanding, and has inſtead thereof, *chimeras*.

§. 13. Language being the great conduit whereby men convey their diſcoveries, reaſonings, and knowledge from one to another; he that makes an ill uſe of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge which are in things themſelves, yet he does

as much as in him lies, break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to the publick use and advantage of mankind. He that uses words without any clear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into errors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge.

§. 14. If we look into books of controversy of any kind, we shall see that the effect of obscure, unsteady, and equivocal terms, is nothing but noise and wrangling about sounds, without convincing or bettering a man's understanding. For if the *idea* be not agreed on between speaker and hearer, for which the words stand, the argument is not about *things* but *names*.

§. 15. It deserves to be considered, and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the disputes in the world, are not merely *verbal*, and about the signification of words; and that if the terms they are made in were defined and reduced in their significations, to the single *ideas* they stand for, those disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish,

CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.

§. 1.

TO *remedy the defects of ſpeech* above-mentioned, the following rules may be of uſe.

Firſt, A man ſhould take care *to uſe no word without a ſignification*, no *name* without an *idea* for which he makes it ſtand. This rule will not ſeem needleſs to any one, who will take the pains to recollect how often he has met with ſuch words, as *Inſtinct*, *Sympathy*, *Antipathy*, &c. ſo made uſe of, as he might eaſily conclude, that thoſe that uſed them had no *ideas* in their minds to which they applied them.

§. 2. *Secondly*, Thoſe *ideas* he annexes them to ſhould be *clear* and *diſtinct*, which in complex *ideas* is by knowing the particular ones that make that compoſition; of which, if any one be again complex, we muſt know alſo the preciſe collection that is united in each, and ſo till we come to ſimple ones. In Subſtances, the *ideas muſt not only be diſtinct, but alſo conformable to things as they exiſt.*

§. 3. *Thirdly*, He *muſt apply his words, as near as* may be, *to ſuch ideas, as common uſe has annexed*

them to: For words, especially of languages already framed, are no man's private possession, but the common measure of commerce and communication; and therefore it is not for any one to change the stamp they are current in, nor alter the *ideas* they are affixed to; or, at least, when there is a necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice of it. And therefore,

§. 4. *Thirdly*, When common use has left the signification of a word uncertain and loose, or where it is to be used in a peculiar sense; or where the term is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake, *there it ought to be defined*, and its *signification ascertained.*

§. 5. Words standing for *simple ideas* being not *definable*, their signification must be shown either, *First*, By a synonymous word. *Secondly*, By *naming a subject, wherein that simple idea is to be found. Thirdly*, By *presenting to the senses that subject, which may produce it in the mind*, and make him actually have the *idea* that word stands for.

§. 6. *Mixed Modes* may *be perfectly defined*, by exactly enumerating those *ideas* that go to each composition. This ought more especially to be done in mixed Modes belonging to *Morality:* Since definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of *moral Words* can be known: And yet a way whereby their precise meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room for any contest about it.

§. 7.

§. 7. *For the explaining the signification of the names of substances*, both the fore mentioned ways, *viz. of showing and defining, are requisite* in many cases to be made use of; their names are best defined by their *leading Qualities*, which are mostly *shape* in animals and vegetables; and *colour* in inanimate bodies; and in some, both together. Now these leading Qualities are best made known by showing, and can hardly be made known otherwise. The shape of a *Horse* or *Cassowary* will be but imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words: The sight of the animals doth it much better. And the *idea* of the particular colour of *Gold* is not to be got by any description of it, but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about it. The like may be said of those other simple *ideas*, peculiar in their kind to any substance, for which precise *ideas* there are no peculiar names.

But because many of the simple *ideas* which make up our specifick *ideas* of substances, are powers which lie not obvious to our sense in the things, as they ordinarily appear; therefore in the signification of our *names of Substances*, some *part of the signification will be better made known, by enumerating those simple ideas, than in showing the substance itself.* For he that to the *Yellow shining colour of* Gold, got by sight, shall from my enumerating them have the *ideas* of great *Ductility, Fusibility, Fixedness*, and *Solubility* in *Aqua Regia*,

Regia, will have a perfecter *idea* of *Gold*, than he can have by seeing a piece of *Gold*, and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities.

§. 8. It were to be wished that words standing for things, which are known and distinguished by their outward shapes, should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them. A Vocabulary made after this fashion, would perhaps with more ease, and in less time, teach the true signification of many terms, especially in languages of remote countries, or ages; and settle truer *ideas* in mens minds of several things whereof we read the names in ancient authors, than all the large and laborious comments of learned criticks. *Naturalists* that treat of *Plants* and *Animals*, have found the benefit of this way: And he that consults them will find that he has a clearer *idea* of *Apium* and *Ibex* from a little print of that herb or beast, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them; and so no doubt he would have of *Strigil* and *Sistrum*, if instead of a *Curry-comb* or *Cymbal*, which are the English names dictionaries render them by, he could see stamped in the margin small pictures of these instruments, as they were in use amongst the ancients.

§. 9. *Fifthly*, The last rule that I shall mention is, that in all discourses wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should *use the same*

words

word constantly in the same sense; if this were done (which no body can refuse, without great disingenuity) many of the books extant might be spared; many of the controversies in dispute, would be at an end; several of those great volumes swollen with ambiguous words, now used in one sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow compass: And many of the *Philosophers*, (to mention no other) as well as *Poets* works, might be contained in a *Nut shell*.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in General.

§. 1.

SINCE the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings, has no other immediate object but its own *ideas*, which alone it does or can contemplate; it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them. *Knowledge* then seems to be nothing but *the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas*: Where this perception is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of *Knowledge*. When we know that

White

White is not *Black*, what do we but perceive that these two *ideas* do not agree? Or that the three angles of a *Triangle*, are equal to two right ones; what do we more but perceive that equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three angles of a Triangle! But to understand a little more distinctly, wherein this agreement or disagreement consists, we may reduce it to all these *four sorts*; First, *Identity* or *Diversity*: Secondly, *Relation*; Thirdly, *Co-existence*; Fourthly, *Real Existence*.

§. 2. 1*st Identity* or *Diversity*: It is the first act of the mind, *to perceive* its ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby to perceive their difference, that is, the one not to be the other: By this the mind clearly perceives each *idea* to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct *ideas* to disagree. This it does without any pains or deduction, by its natural power of perception and distinction. This is what men of art have reduced to those general rules, *viz. What is, is.* And *it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.* But no *maxim* can make a man know it clearer, that *Round* is not *Square*, than the bare perception of those two *ideas*, which the mind at first sight perceives to disagree.

§. 3. 2*dly*, The next sort of agreement or disagreement the mind perceives in any of its *ideas*, may

be called *Relative*, and is nothing but *the perception of the Relation, between any two ideas* of what kind soever; that is, their agreement or disagreement one with another in several ways the mind takes of comparing them.

§. 4 *3dly*, The third sort of agreement or disagreement to be found in our *ideas*, is *Coexistence*, or *Non-coexistence* in the same subject; and this belongs particularly to Substances. Thus when we pronounce concerning *Gold*, that it is fixed, it amounts to no more but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an *idea* that always accompanies that particular sort of *Yellowness*, *Weight*, *Fusibility*, &c. which make our complex *idea*, signified by the word *Gold*.

§ 5. *4thly*, The fourth sort is that of actual and *real Existence* agreeing to any *idea*. Within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement, I suppose is contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of. For all that we know or can affirm concerning any *idea*, is, that it is, or is not the same with some other: As that *Blue is not Yellow*. That it does, or does not coexist with another in the same subject: As that *Iron is susceptible of Magnetical Impressions*: That it has that or this Relation to some other *ideas*: As that *two Triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal*; or that it has a real Existence without the mind: As *that God is*.

§. 6. There are several ways wherein the mind is possessed of truth, each of which is called Knowledge. *First*, There is *actual Knowledge*, when the mind has a present view of the agreement or disagreement of any of its *ideas*, or of the Relation they have one with another. *Secondly*, A man is said to know any proposition, when having once evidently perceived the agreement or disagreement of the *ideas* whereof it consists, and so lodged it in his memory, that whenever it comes to be reflected on again, the mind assents to it without doubt or hesitation, and is certain of the truth of it. And this may be called *habitual Knowledge*: And thus a man may be said to know all those truths which are lodged in his memory, by a foregoing, clear, and full perception.

§. 7. Of *habitual Knowledge* there are two sorts: The one is of *such truths laid up in the memory, as whenever they occur to the mind, it actually perceives the Relation that is between those* ideas. And this is in all those truths, where the *ideas* themselves, by an immediate view, discover their agreement or disagreement one with another. The other is of *such truths, whereof the mind having been convinced, it retains the memory of the conviction, without the proofs.* Thus a man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the demonstration, that the three angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, knows it to be true, when that

that demonſtration is gone out of his mind, and poſſibly cannot be recollected: But he knows it in a different way from what he did before; namely, not by the intervention of thoſe intermediate *ideas*, whereby the agreement or diſagreement of thoſe in the propoſition was at firſt perceived; but by remembering, *i. e.* knowing that he was once certain of the truth of this propoſition, that the three angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutability of the ſame Relations between the ſame immutable things, is now the *idea* that ſhows him, that if the three angles of a Triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be ſo. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true, is always true; what *ideas* once agreed, will always agree; and conſequently, what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it.

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

§. 1.

ALL our Knowledge conſiſting in the view the mind has of its own *ideas*, which is the utmoſt light, and greateſt certainty we are capable of: The *different clearneſs of our Knowledge*, ſeems to lie in

the different way of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its *ideas*.

§. 2. When the mind perceives this agreement or disagreement of two *ideas immediately* by themselves, without the intervention of any other; we may call it *intuitive Knowledge*, in which cases the mind perceives truth, as the eye does light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives that *White is not Black*, that *Three are more than two*, and *equal to One and Two*. This part of Knowledge is irresistible, and like the bright sun-shine, forces itself immediately to be perceived as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way. It is on this *intuition*, that depends all the certainty and evidence of our other Knowledge; which certainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater.

§. 3. The next degree of Knowledge is, where the mind perceives not this agreement or disagreement immediately, or by the *Juxta position* as it were of the *ideas*, because those *ideas* concerning whose agreement or disagreement the enquiry is made, cannot by the mind be so put together, as to show it. In this case the mind is fain to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches, by the intervention of other *ideas*: And this is that which we call *Reasoning*: And thus, if we would know the agreement or disagree-

ment

ment in bigneſs, between the three angles of a Triangle, and two right Angles; we cannot by an immediate view, and comparing them, do it; becauſe the three angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any other one, or two angles. And ſo of this, the mind has no immediate or intuitive Knowledge. But we muſt find out ſome other Angles, to which the three angles of a Triangle have equality, and finding thoſe equal to two right ones, we come to know the equality of theſe three Angles to two right ones. Thoſe intervening *ideas*, which ſerve to ſhow the agreement of any two others, are called *Proofs*. And where the agreement or diſagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called *Demonſtration*. A quickneſs in the mind to find thoſe Proofs, and to apply them right, is, I ſuppoſe, that which is called *Sagacity*.

§. 4. This Knowledge, though it be certain, is not ſo *clear and evident* as *intuitive* Knowledge. It requires pains and attention, and ſteady application of mind, to diſcover the agreement or diſagreement of the *ideas* it conſiders, and there muſt be a progreſſion by ſteps and degrees, before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty. Before Demonſtration there was a doubt, which in *intuitive Knowledge* cannot happen to the mind, that has its faculty of Perception left to a degree capable of diſtinct *ideas*, no more than it can

can be a doubt to the Eye (that can distinctly see *White* and *Black*) whether this Ink and Paper be all of a Colour.

§. 5. Now *in every step that Reason makes in demonstrative Knowledge, there is an intuitive Knowledge* of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate *idea*, which it uses as a Proof; for if it were not so, that yet would need a Proof; since, without the Perception of such agreement or disagreement, there is no Knowledge produced. By which, it is evident, that every step in Reasoning, that produces Knowledge, has *intuitive Certainty*; which when the mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to make the agreement or disagreement of the *ideas* concerning which we enquire, visible and certain. This *intuitive Perception* of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate *ideas* in each step and progression of the Demonstration, must also be exactly carried in the mind; and a man must be sure that no part is left out; which because in long deductions, the memory cannot easily retain, this Knowledge becomes more imperfect than *intuitive*; and men often embrace Falsehoods, for Demonstrations.

§. 6. It has been generally taken for granted, that *Mathematicks* alone are capable of demonstrative Certainty. But to have such an agreement or disagreement as may be *intuitively* perceived, being as I imagine

gine not the privilege of the *ideas* of *Number*, *Extenſion* and *Figure* alone; it may poſſibly be the want of due method and application in us, and not of ſufficient evidence in things, that Demonſtration has been thought to have ſo little to do in other parts of Knowledge. For in whatever *ideas* the mind can perceive the agreement or diſagreement immediately, there it is capable of *intuitive Knowledge*: And where it can perceive the agreement or diſagreement of any two *ideas*, by an *intuitive Perception* of the agreement or diſagreement they have with any intermediate *ideas*, there, the mind is capable of Demonſtration, which is not limited to the *ideas* of Figure, Number, Extenſion, or their Modes. The reaſon why it has been generally ſuppoſed to belong to them only, is becauſe in comparing their Equality or Exceſs, the *Modes of Numbers* have every the leaſt difference, very clear and perceivable: And in *Extenſion*, though every the leaſt Exceſs is not ſo perceptible, yet the mind has found out ways to diſcover the juſt Equality of two Angles, Extenſions, or Figures; and both, that is, Numbers and Figures, can be ſet down by viſible and laſting marks.

§. 7. But in other ſimple *ideas*, whoſe Modes and Differences are made and counted by Degrees, and not Quantity, we have not ſo nice and accurate a diſtinction of their Differences, as to perceive or find ways to meaſure their juſt Equality, or the leaſt Differences

ferences. For those other simple *ideas* being Appearances or Sensations produced in us, by the *Size, Figure*, Motion, &c. of minute Corpuscles singly insensible; their different Degrees also depend on the variation of some, or all of those causes; which since it cannot be observed by us in Particles of Matter, whereof each is too subtile to be perceived, it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple *ideas*. Thus, for instance, not knowing what number of Particles, nor what Motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of *Whiteness*; we cannot demonstrate the certain equality of any two degrees of *Whiteness*, because we have no certain standard to measure them by, nor means to distinguish every the least difference: The only help we have being from our senses, which in this point fail us.

§. 8. But where the difference is so great as to produce in the mind *ideas* clearly distinct; there *ideas* of *Colours*, as we see in different kinds, *Blue* and *Red* (for instance) are as capable of Demonstration, as *ideas* of Number and Extension. What is here said of Colours, I think, holds true in all secondary Qualities. These two then, *Intuition* and *Demonstration*, are the degrees of our *Knowledge*: Whatever comes short of one of these, is but *Faith* or *Opinion*, not *Knowledge*, at least in all *general Truths*.

§. 9

§. 9. There is indeed another Perception of the mind employed about the *particular Existence of finite Beings*, without us, which going beyond Probability, but not reaching to either of the foregoing degrees of Certainty, passes under the name of Knowledge. Nothing can be more certain, than that the *idea* we receive from an external Object is in our minds. This is *intuitive Knowledge*; but whether we can thence certainly infer the Existence of any thing without us, corresponding to that *idea*, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made, because men may have such an *idea* in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such Object affects their senses. But it is evident that we are invincibly conscious to ourselves of a different Perception, when we look upon the *Sun* in the day, and think on it by night; when we actually taste *Wormwood*, or smell a *Rose*, or only think on that *Savour* or *Odour*: So that I think we may add to the two former sorts of Knowledge, this also of the Existence of particular external Objects, by that Perception and Consciousness we have, of the actual entrance of *ideas* from them, and allow these three degrees of Knowledge, *viz. intuitive, demonstrative, and sensative.*

§. 10. But since our Knowledge is founded on, and employed about our *ideas* only; will it follow thence that it must be conformable to our *ideas*, and

that where our *ideas* are clear and distinct, obscure and confused, there our Knowledge will be so too? *I answer, No:* For our Knowledge consisting in the Perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two *ideas*; its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that Perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the *ideas* themselves. A man (for instance) that has a clear *idea* of the angles of a Triangle, and of Equality to two right ones, may yet have but an obscure Perception of their agreement; and so have but a very obscure Knowledge of it. But obscure and confused *ideas* can never produce any clear or distinct Knowledge; because, as far as any *ideas* are obscure or confused, so far the mind can never perceive clearly, whether they agree or disagree: Or, to express the same thing in a way less apt to be misunderstood; he that hath not determined *ideas* to the words he uses, cannot make propositions of them, of whose truth he can be certain.

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Human Knowledge.

§. 1.

FROM what has been said concerning Knowledge, it follows, *First*, That we can have no Knowledge farther than we have *ideas*.

§. 2.

§. 2. *Secondly*, That we have no Knowledge farther than we can have Perception of that agreement or disagreement of our *ideas*, either by *Intuition*, *Demonstration*, or *Sensation*.

§. 3. *Thirdly*, We cannot have an *intuitive* Knowledge that shall extend itself to all our *ideas*, and all that we would know about them; because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another, by Juxta position, or an immediate Comparison one with another. Thus we cannot *intuitively* perceive the equality of two Extensions, the difference of whose figures makes their parts uncapable of an exact immediate application.

§. 4. *Fourthly*, Our *rational* Knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our *ideas*; because between two different *ideas* we would examine, we cannot always find such *Proofs* as we can connect one to another, with an *intuitive Knowledge* in all the parts of the Deduction.

§. 5. *Fifthly*, *Sensative* Knowledge reaching no farther than the Existence of things actually present to our senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

§. 6. From all which it is evident, that the *extent of our Knowledge*, comes not only short of the reality of *Things*, but even of the extent of our own *ideas*. We have the *ideas* of a *Square*, a *Circle* and *Equality*,

and yet perhaps ſhall never be able to find a *Circle equal to a Square.*

§. 7. 'We have the *ideas* of *matter* and *thinking*, 'but poſſibly ſhall never be able to know, whether 'any mere material being thinks or no; it being im- 'poſſible for us, by the contemplation of our own 'ideas, without revelation, to diſcover, whether Om- 'nipotency has not given to ſome ſyſtems of matter 'fitly diſpoſed, a *power to perceive and think*, or elſe 'joined to matter ſo diſpoſed, a *thinking immaterial* '*Subſtance*: It being not much more remote from our 'comprehenſion to conceive, that God can, if he 'pleaſes, ſuperadd to matter *a faculty of thinking*, 'than that he ſhould ſuperadd to it *another ſubſtance*, '*with a faculty of thinking*; ſince we know not 'wherein thinking conſiſts, nor to what ſort of ſub- 'ſtances the Almighty has been pleaſed to give that 'power, which cannot be in any created being, but 'merely by the good pleaſure and bounty of the 'Creator.

§. 8. 'I ſay not this, that I may any way leſſen 'the belief of the ſoul's *immateriality*: I am not here 'ſpeaking of probability, but knowledge; and I 'think that it is of uſe to us, to diſcern how far our 'knowledge does reach; for the ſtate that we are at 'preſent in, not being that of viſion, we muſt, in 'many things, content ourſelves with faith and proba- 'bility;

'bility: And in the preſent queſtion, about the immateriality of the ſoul, if our faculties cannot 'arrive at demonſtrative certainty, we need not think 'it ſtrange. All the great ends of morality and religion, are well enough ſecured, without philoſophical proofs of the ſoul's immateriality, ſince it is 'evident, that he who made us ſenſible intelligent 'beings, can, and will reſtore us to the like ſtate of 'ſenſibility in another world, and make us capable 'there to receive the retribution he has deſigned to 'men, according to their doings in this life. And 'therefore it is not of ſuch mighty neceſſity to determine one way or the other, as ſome over zealous 'for, or againſt the immateriality of the ſoul, have 'been forward to make the world believe.'

§. 9. The affirmations or Negations we make concerning the *ideas* we have, being reduced to the four ſorts above-mentioned, *viz. Identity*, *Coexiſtence*, *Relation*, and *real Exiſtence*; I ſhall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of theſe.

Firſt, As to *Identity and Diverſity*, *our intuitive Knowledge is as far extended as our ideas themſelves*; and there can be no *idea* in the mind, which it does not preſently, by an *intuitive Knowledge*, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

§. 10. *Secondly*, As to the agreement or diſagreement of our *ideas* in *Coexiſtence*: In this our Know-

ledge

ledge is very short, though in this consists the greatest and most material part of our Knowledge, concerning *Substances:* For our *ideas* of *Substances*, being, as I have shown, nothing but certain *Collections of simple ideas, coexisting in one subject*, (our *idea* of *Flame*, for instance, is a Body *hot*, *luminous*, and *moving upward*.) When we would know any thing farther concerning this or any other sort of Substance, what do we but enquire what other qualities or powers these Substances have or have not? which is nothing else but to know what other simple *ideas* do, or do not *coexist* with those that make up that complex *idea*. The reason of this is, because the simple *ideas* which make up our complex *ideas* of Substances, have no visible necessary connexion or inconsistence with other simple *ideas*, whose Coexistence with them we would inform ourselves about. These *Ideas* being likewise, for the most part, *secondary Qualities* which depend upon the *primary* Qualities of their minute or insensible parts, or on something yet more remote from our comprehension; it is impossible we should know which have a necessary Union, or Inconsistency one with another, since we know not the Root from whence they spring, or the Size, Figure, and Texture of Parts on which they depend, and from which they result.

§. 11. Besides this, there is no *discoverable Connexion* between any *secondary* Quality, and *those primary*

mary Qualities that it depends on. We are so far from knowing what Figure, Size, or Motion produces (for instance) a *yellow Colour*, or *sweet Taste*, or a *sharp Sound*, that we can by no means conceive how any *Size*, *Figure*, or *Motion* can possibly produce in us the *idea* of any *Colour*, *Taste*, or *Sound*, whatsoever; and there is no conceivable Connexion between the one and the other.

§. 12. Our knowledge therefore of Coexistence reaches little farther than *Experience*. Some few indeed of the *primary* Qualities have a necessary Dependence, and visible Connexion one with another: As *Figure* necessarily supposes *Extension*, *receiving or communicating Motion by Impulse*, supposes *Solidity*. But Qualities coexistent in any subject, without this Dependence and Connexion, cannot certainly be known to coexist any farther, than experience by our senses informs us. Thus, though upon trial we find *Gold* Yellow, Weighty, Malleable, Fusible and Fixed, yet because none of these have any evident Dependence, or necessary connexion with the other; we cannot certainly know, that where any *four* of these are, the *fifth* will be there also, how highly probable soever it may be: But the highest degree of *Probability*, amounts not to *Certainty*; without which there can be no true Knowledge: For this Coexistence can be no further known, that it is perceived; and it cannot be

be perceived, but either in *particular* subjects, by the observation of our senses; or in *general*, by the necessary Connexion of the *ideas* themselves.

§. 13. As to *Incompatibility* or *Repugnancy to Coexistence*, we may know that any subject can have of each sort of *primary* Qualities, but one particular at once. One Extension, one Figure; and so of sensible *ideas* peculiar to each sense: For whatever of each kind is present in any subject, excludes all other of that sort: For instance, one subject cannot have *two Smells*, or *two Colours* at the same time.

§. 14. As to *Powers of Substances*, which makes a great part of our enquiries about them, and is no inconsiderable branch of our Knowledge: Our Knowledge as to these reaches little farther than *Experience*; because they consist in a Texture and Motion of parts, which we cannot by any means come to discover; and I doubt whether with those *Faculties* we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge much farther in this part. *Experience* is that which in this part we must depend on; and it were to be wished that it were more improved: We find the advantages some mens generous pains, have this way brought to the stock of *natural Knowledge*. And if others, especially the *Philosophers by fire* who pretend to it, had been so wary in their Observations, and sincere in their Reports, as those who call themselves *Philosophers*, ought

ought to have been: Our acquaintance with the Bodies here about us, and our insight into their powers and operations had been yet much greater.

§. 15. As to the third sort the *agreement or disagreement of our* ideas *in any other Relation:* This is the largest field of Knowledge, and it is hard to determine how far it may extend. This part depending on our sagacity in finding intermediate *ideas*, that may show the Habitudes and Relations of *ideas*; it is an hard matter to tell when we were at an end of such discoveries. They that are ignorant of *Algebra*, cannot imagine the wonders in this kind that are to be done by it: And what farther improvements and helps, advantageous to other parts of Knowledge, the sagacious mind of man may yet find out, it is not easy to determine. This at least I believe, that the *ideas* of *Quantity*, are not those alone that are capable of Demonstration and Knowledge: And that other, perhaps more useful parts of Contemplation, would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Passions, and domineering interest did not oppose or menace endeavours of this kind.

§. 16. The *idea* of a *supreme Being*, infinite in Power, Goodness, and Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the *idea* of *ourselves*, as understanding rational Creatures, would, I suppose, if duly considered, afford such Foundations

of our *Duty*, and *Rules* of *Action*, as might place *Morality among the Sciences capable of Demonstration*: Wherein I doubt not but from principles as inconteſtible as thoſe of the *Mathematicks*, by neceſſary conſequences, the meaſure of *Right* and *Wrong* might be made out, to any one that will apply himſelf with the ſame indifferency and attention to the one, as he does to the other of theſe Sciences. The Relations of other Modes may certainly be perceived as well as thoſe of Number and Extenſion. *Where there is no Property, there is no Injuſtice*, is a Propoſition as certain as any Demonſtration in *Euclid*: For the *idea* of *Property* being a right to any thing; and the *idea* of *Injuſtice*, being the invaſion or violation of that right; it is evident that theſe *ideas* being thus eſtabliſhed, and theſe names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this Propoſition to be true, as that a *Triangle has three Angles equal to two right ones*. Again, *no Government allows abſolute Liberty*. The *idea* of *Government* being the eſtabliſhment of Society upon certain rules or laws, which require conformity to them; and the *idea* of *abſolute Liberty*, being for any one to do whatever he pleaſes, I am as capable of being certain of the truth of this Propoſition, as of any in *Mathematicks*.

§. 17. What has given the advantage to the *ideas* of *Quantity*, and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonſtration, is,

Firſt,

First, That they can be represented by sensible marks, which have a nearer correspondence with them, than any Words or Sounds. *Diagrams* drawn on paper, are copies of the *ideas*, and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their signification. But we have no sensible Marks that resemble our *moral ideas*, and nothing but words to express them by; which though, when written, they remain the same; yet the *ideas* they stand for, may change in the same man; and it is very seldom that they are not different in different persons.

Secondly, *moral ideas*, are commonly more complex than Figures: Whence these two inconveniences follow: *First*, That their names are of more uncertain Signification; the precise collection of simple *ideas* they stand for, not being so easily agreed on, and so the Sign that is used for them in Communication always, and in thinking often, does not steadily carry with it the same *idea*. *Secondly*, The mind cannot easily retain those precise combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary; in the examination of the Habitudes and Correspondences, agreements or disagreements of several of them one with another, especially where it is to be judged of by long deductions, and the Intervention of several other complex *ideas*, to show the agreement or disagreement of two remote ones.

§. 18. Now one part of these disadvantges in *moral ideas*, which has made them be thought not capable of Demonstration, may in a good measure be remedied by *Definitions*, setting down that collection of simple *ideas* which every term shall stand for, and then using the terms steadily and constantly for that precise collection.

§. 19. As to the fourth sort of Knowledge, *viz. Of the real actual Existence of things*, we have an *intuitive* Knowledge of our *own Existence*: A *demonstrative* Knowledge of the *Existence of God*; and a *sensitive* Knowledge of the *Objects that present themselves to our Senses.*

§. 20. From what has been said we may discover the *Causes of our Ignorance*, which are chiefly these three, *First*, Want of *ideas*; *Secondly*, Want of a discoverable connexion between the *ideas* we have; *Thirdly*, Want of tracing and examining our *ideas.*

§. 21. *First*, There are some things we are ignorant of for *want of ideas.* All the simple *ideas* we have, are confined to the Observation of our Senses, and the Operation of our Minds, that we are conscious of in ourselves. What other *ideas* it is possible other creatures may have, by the assistance of other senses and faculties more or perfecter than we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to determine; but to say or think there are no such, because we

we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argument, than if a blind man should be positive in it, that there was no such thing as sight and colours, because he had no manner of *idea* of any such thing. What faculties therefore other species of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want other views of them, besides those we have to make discoveries of them more perfect. The *intellectual* and *sensible* world are in this perfectly alike, that the parts which we see of either of them, hold no proportion with that we see not; and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes, or our thoughts of either of them, is but a point, almost nothing, in comparison of the rest.

§. 22. Another great cause of Ignorance, is *the want of* ideas *that we are capable of*. This keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known. Bulk, Figure, and Motion we have *ideas* of: Yet not knowing what is the particular bulk, motion and figure of the greatest part of the bodies of the Universe, we are ignorant of the several Powers, Efficacies and Ways of Operation, whereby the Effects we daily see are produced. These are hid from us in some things, by being *too remote*, in others by being *too minute*.

§. 23.

§. 23. When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world, and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our ken, is but a small part of the immense Universe; we shall then discover an huge Abyss of Ignorance. What are the particular fabricks of the great masses of Matter, which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal Beings, how far they are extended, and what is their motion, and how continued, and what influence they have upon one another, are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themselves in. If we confine our thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this System of our Sun, and the grosser Masses of Matter that visibly move about it; what several sorts of Vegetables, Animals, and Intellectual corporeal Beings, infinitely different from those of our little spot of Earth, may probably be in other *Planets*, to the knowledge of which, even of their outward figures and parts, we can no way attain, whilst we are confined to this Earth, there being no natural means, either by Sensation or Reflection, to convey their certain *ideas* into our minds?

§. 24. There are other Bodies in the Universe, no less concealed from us by their *minuteness*. These insensible Corpuscles being the active parts of Matter, and the great instruments of Nature, on which depend all their *secondary* Qualities and Operations, our want

of

of precise distinct *ideas* of their *primary* Qualities, keeps us in incurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them. Did we know the mechanical affections of *Rhubarb* and *Opium*, we might as easily account for their Operations of *Purging* and *causing Sleep*, as a Watch-maker can for the motions of his watch. The dissolving of Silver in *Aqua Fortis*, or Gold in *Aqua Regia*, and not *vice versa*, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know, than it is to a *Smith*, to understand why the turning of one key will open a lock, and not the turning of another. But whilst we are destitute of senses, acute enough to discover the minute particles of Bodies, and to give us *ideas* of their mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their Properties and Operations; nor can we be assured about them any farther, than some few trials we make, are able to reach: But whether they will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural Bodies: And our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact.

§. 25. And therefore I am apt to doubt, that how far soever human Industry may advance useful and *experimental Philosophy* in physical things, yet *scientifical* will still be out of our reach; because we want perfect and adequate *ideas* of those very Bodies

which

which are nearest to us, and most under our command.

§. 26. This at first sight shows us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent, even of *material* Beings: To which, if we add the consideration of that infinite number of Spirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our Knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance: We shall find this cause of Ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole *intellectual* world: A greater certainly and a more beautiful world than the *material*. For bating some very few *ideas* of Spirit, we get from our own mind by reflection, and from thence the best we can collect, of the *Father of all Spirits*, the Author of them, and us, and all things: We have no certain Information, so much as of the Existence of other Spirits but by Revelation: Much less have we distinct *ideas* of their different Natures, States, Powers, and several Constitutions, wherein they agree or differ one from another, and from us. And therefore in what concerns their different Species and Properties, we are under an absolute Ignorance.

§. 27. The *second* Cause of Ignorance is the *want of discoverable connexion* between those *ideas* we have; where we want that, we are utterly incapable of universal and certain Knowledge; and are, as in the former case, left only to *Observation* and *Experiment*.

Thus

Thus the mechanical affections of Bodies, having no affinity at all with the *ideas* they produce in us, we can have no diſtinct Knowledge of ſuch Operations beyond our Experience; and can reaſon no otherwiſe about them, than as the effects or appointment of an infinitely *wiſe Agent*, which perfectly ſurpaſs our comprehenſions.

The Operation of our minds upon our Bodies, is as unconceivable. How any *Thought* ſhould produce a motion in *Body*, is as remote from the nature of our *ideas*, as how any *Body* ſhould produce any *thought* in the *mind*. That it is ſo, if experience did not convince us, the conſideration of the things themſelves, would never be able in the leaſt to diſcover to us.

§. 28. In ſome of our *ideas* there are certain Relations, Habitudes, and Connexions, ſo viſibly included in the nature of the *ideas* themſelves, that we cannot conceive them ſeparable from them by any power whatſoever: In theſe only we are capable of certain and univerſal knowledge. Thus the *idea* of a *right lined Triangle*, neceſſarily carries with it an *Equality of its Angles to two right ones*. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter; the production of Senſation in us, of *Colours* and *Sounds*, &c. by Impulſe, and Motion, being ſuch wherein we can diſcover no natural Connexion with any *ideas* we have, we cannot but aſcribe them to the arbitrary

will and good pleasure of the wise Architect. The things that we observe constantly to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law set them; but yet by a law that we know not; whereby, though causes work steadily, and effects flow constantly from them; yet their connexions and dependencies being not discoverable in our *ideas*, we can have but experimental knowledge of them. Several effects come every day within the notice of our *Senses*, of which we have so far *sensitive* Knowledge. But the Causes, Manner, and Certainty of their Production, we must, for the foregoing reasons, be content to be ignorant of. In these we can go no farther than particular *Experience* informs us of matter of fact, and by *Analogy*, guess what effects the like Bodies are upon other Trials like to produce. But as to perfect science of *natural Bodies* (not to mention *spiritual* Beings) we are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it.

§. 29. The *third* cause of Ignorance is our *want of tracing those* ideas *we have*, or may have; and finding out those intermediate *ideas* which may show us what Habitude of Agreement or Disagreement they may have one with another: And thus many are ignorant of *mathematical* Truths, for want of application in enquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those *ideas*.

§. 30.

§. 30. Hitherto we have examined the *Extent* of our Knowledge, in reſpect of the ſeveral ſorts of Beings that are. There is another *Extent* of it, in reſpect of *Univerſality*, which will alſo deſerve to be conſidered; and in this regard our Knowledge follows the Nature of our *ideas*. If the *ideas* are *abſtract*, whoſe agreement or diſagreement we perceive, our Knowledge is *univerſal*. For what is known of ſuch general *ideas*, will be true of every particular thing in which that *Eſſence*, that is, that *abſtract idea* is to be found: And what is once known of ſuch *ideas*, will be perpetually, and for ever true. So that, as to all general Knowledge, we muſt ſearch and find it only in our own minds: And it is only the examining of our own *ideas*, that furniſhes us with that. Truths belonging to Eſſences of things (that is, to *abſtract ideas*) are *eternal*, and are to be found out by the Contemplation only of thoſe Eſſences; as the exiſtence of things is to be known only from Experience. But I ſhall ſay more of this in the following Chapters, where I ſhall ſpeak of *general*, and *real* Knowledge.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

§. 1.

I DOUBT not but my Reader, by this time, may be apt to think that I have been all this while only building a *Caſtle* in the Air; and be ready to object, If it be true, that all Knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our own *ideas*, the viſions of an *enthuſiaſt*, and the reaſonings of a *ſober* man will be equally certain: It is no matter how things are, ſo a man obſerve but the agreement of his own imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all Truth, all Certainty. That an *Harpy* is not a *Centaur*, is by this way as certain Knowledge, and as much Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle. But *of what uſe is all this Knowledge of mens own Imaginations*, to a man that enquires after the reality of things?

§. 2. To which *I anſwer*, That if our Knowledge of our *ideas* ſhould terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is ſomething farther intended, our moſt ſerious thoughts would be of little more uſe, than the *Reveries* of a crazy brain. But I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of

Certainty

Certainty by the Knowledge of our own *ideas*, goes a little farther than bare Imagination: And that all the Certainty of general Truths a man has, lies in nothing else but this Knowledge of our *ideas*.

§. 3. It is evident that the mind knows not things immediately, but by the intervention of the *ideas* it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is *real*, only so far as there is a conformity between our *ideas*, and the reality of things. But how shall we know when our *ideas* agree with things themselves? I answer, there be *two sorts* of *ideas* that we may be assured agree with things: These are,

§. 4. *First*, *Simple ideas*; which since the mind can by no means make to itself, must be the effect of things operating upon the mind in a natural way; and producing therein those perceptions, which by the will of our Maker, they are ordained and adapted to. Hence it follows, that *simple ideas* are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us, really operating upon us; which carry with them all the conformity our state requires, which is to represent things under those appearances they are fitted to produce in us. Thus the *idea* of *Whiteness*, as it is in the mind, exactly answers that power which is in any body to produce it there. And this conformity between our *simple ideas*, and the existence of things, is sufficient for real Knowledge.

§. 5.

§. 5. *Secondly*, All our *complex ideas, except those of Substances*, being *Archetypes* of the mind's own making, and not referred to the existence of things as to their originals, *cannot want any conformity necessary to real Knowledge.* For that which is not designed to represent any thing but itself, can never be capable of a wrong representation. Here the *ideas* themselves are considered as *Archetypes*, and things no otherwise regarded, than as they are conformable to them. Thus the *Mathematician* considers the Truth and Properties belonging to a *Rectangle* or *Circle* only, as they are *ideas* in his own mind, which possibly he never found existing mathematically, that is, precisely true: Yet his knowledge is not only certain, but *real*; because real things are no farther concerned nor intended to be meant by any such propositions, than as things really agree to those *Archetypes* in his mind. It is true of the *idea* of a *Triangle, that its three Angles are equal to two right ones*; it is true also of a *Triangle* wherever it *exists*: What is true of those Figures, that have barely an *ideal* existence in his mind, will hold true of them also, when they come to have a *real* existence in Matter.

§. 6. Hence it follows, *that moral Knowledge is* as *capable of real Certainty* as *Mathematicks*: For *Certainty* being nothing but the Perception of the agreement or disagreement of our *ideas*, and *Demon-*

stration

ſtration nothing but the Perception of ſuch agreement by the intervention of other *ideas*; our *moral ideas* as well as *mathematical*, being *Archetypes* themſelves, and ſo adequate or complete *ideas*, all the agreement or diſagreement we ſhall find in them, will produce *real* Knowledge as well as in *mathematical Figures*. That which is requiſite to make our Knowledge *certain*, is the clearneſs of our *ideas*; and that which is required to make it *real* is, that they anſwer their *Archetypes*.

§. 7. But it will here be ſaid, that if *moral* Knowledge be placed in the Contemplation of our own *moral ideas*; and thoſe be of our own making, what ſtrange notions will there be of *Juſtice* and *Temperance*? What confuſion of *Virtues* and *Vices*, if every man may make what *ideas* of them he pleaſes? *I anſwer*, No confuſion nor diſorder at all, in the things themſelves, nor the reaſonings about them, no more than there would be a change in the Properties of Figures, and their Relations one to another, if a man ſhould make a *Triangle* with four Corners, or a *Trapezium* with four Right Angles; that is, in plain Engliſh, change the names of the Figures, and call that by one name, which is called ordinarily by another. The change of name will indeed at firſt diſturb him, who knows not what *idea* it ſtands for: But as ſoon as the figure is drawn, the conſequences and demonſtration

monſtration are plain and clear. Juſt the ſame is it in *moral* Knowledge: Let a man have the *idea* of taking from others, without their conſent, what they are juſtly poſſeſſed of, and call this Juſtice if he pleaſes; he that takes the name here, without the *idea* put to it, will be miſtaken by joining another *idea* of his own to that name; but *ſtrip* the *idea* of that name, or take it ſuch as it is in the Speaker's mind; and the ſame things will agree to it, as if you called it Injuſtice.

§. 8. One thing we are to take notice of, That where *God*, or any other Law maker, has defined any *moral names*, there they have made the Eſſence of that *Species* to which that name belongs: And there it is not ſafe to apply, or uſe them otherwiſe. But in other caſes it is bare impropriety of Speech, to apply them contrary to the common uſage of the country they are uſed in.

§. 9. *Thirdly*, But the complex *ideas* which we refer to *Archetypes* without us, may differ from them, and ſo our Knowledge about them may come ſhort of being real: And ſuch are our *ideas* of *Subſtances*. Theſe muſt be taken from ſomething, that does or has exiſted, and not be made up of *ideas* arbitrarily put together without any real Pattern. Herein therefore is founded the Reality of our Knowledge concerning *Subſtances*, that all our complex *ideas* of them muſt be ſuch, and ſuch only, as are made up of ſuch ſimple

ones,

ones, as have been discovered to coexist in Nature. And our *ideas* being thus true, though not perhaps very exact Copies, are the Subjects of *real* Knowledge of them. Whatever *ideas* we have, the agreement we find they have with others will be Knowledge. If those *ideas* be abstract, it will be *general* Knowledge: But to make it *real* concerning *Substances*, the *ideas* must be taken from the real Existence of things. Wherever therefore we perceive the agreement or disagreement of our *ideas*, there is *certain Knowledge*: And wherever we are sure those *ideas* agree with the Reality of Things, there is *certain real Knowledge*.

CHAP. V.

Of Truth in General.

§. 1.

TRUTH, in the proper import of the word, signifies *the joining or separating of signs; as the things signified by them, do agree or disagree one with another.* The *joining* or *separating* of signs, is what we call *Propositions*; so that *Truth* properly belongs only to *Propositions*; whereof there are *two* Sorts, *Mental* and *Verbal*, as there are *two* sorts of Signs commonly made use of, *Ideas* and *Words*.

§. 2. It is difficult to treat of *mental* Propositions without *verbal*: Because in speaking of *mental*, we must make use of *Words*, and then they become *verbal*. Again, men commonly in their thoughts and reasonings, use *words* instead of *ideas*; especially if the subject of their meditation contains in it *complex ideas*. If we have occasion to form *mental* Propositions about *White*, *Black*, *Circle*, &c. we can, and often do, frame in our minds the *ideas* themselves, without reflecting on the *Names*. But when we would consider, or make Propositions about the more *complex ideas*, as of a *Man*, *Vitriol*, *Fortitude*, *Glory*, &c. we usually put the *name* for the *idea*; because the *idea* these *names* stand for, being for the most part confused, imperfect, and undetermined; we reflect on the *names* themselves, as being more clear, certain, distinct, and readier to occur to our thoughts, than pure *ideas*; And so we make use of these *words* instead of the *ideas* themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within ourselves, and make tacit *mental Propositions*.

§. 3. We must then observe two sorts of *Propositions*, that we are capable of making. First, *mental Propositions, wherein the* ideas *in our Understandings are put together, or separated by the mind, perceiving or judging of their agreement or disagreement.* Secondly, *Verbal Propositions*, which *are words put together, or separate*

separate in affirmative or negative Sentences: So that *Propoſition* conſiſts in joining or ſeparating Signs: And *Truth* conſiſts in putting together, or ſeparating theſe Signs, according as the things they ſtand for agree or diſagree.

§. 4. *Truth* as well as Knowledge may well come under the Diſtinction of *Verbal* and *Real*; that being only *Verbal Truth*, wherein Terms are joined according to the agreement or diſagreement of the *ideas* they ſtand for, without regarding whether our *ideas* are ſuch as really have, or are capable of having an Exiſtence in Nature. But then it is they contain *real Truth*, when theſe Signs are joined, as our *ideas* agree; and when our *ideas* are ſuch as we know, are capable of having an Exiſtence in Nature; which in *Subſtances* we cannot know, but by knowing that ſuch have exiſted.

§. 5. *Truth* is the marking down in words the agreement or diſagreement of *ideas*, as it is. *Falſehood* is the marking down in words the agreement or diſagreement of *ideas*, otherwiſe than it is; and ſo far as theſe *ideas* thus marked by Sounds, agree to their *Archetypes*, ſo far only is the *Truth real*. The Knowledge of this *Truth* conſiſts in knowing what *ideas* the words ſtand for, and the Perception of the agreement or diſagreement of thoſe *ideas*, according as it is marked by thoſe words.

§. 6. Besides *Truth* taken in the strict Sense before mentioned, there are other sorts of *Truths*: As, 1*st*, *Moral Truth*, which is, speaking things according to the persuasion of our own minds. 2*dly*, *Metaphysical Truth*, which is nothing but the real Existence of things conformable to the *ideas* to which we have annexed their names.

These Considerations of *Truth* either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here only to have mentioned them.

CHAP. VI.

Of universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

§. 1.

THE prevailing custom of using *Sounds* for *ideas*, even when men think and reason within their own breasts, makes *the consideration of Words and Propositions so necessary a part of the Treatise of Knowledge*, that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other. And since *general Truths*, which with reason are most sought after, can never be well made known, and are *seldom apprehended*,

handed, but as conceived and expreſſed in words; it is not out of our way in the examination of our own Knowledge, to enquire into the *Truth* and *Certainty* of *univerſal Knowledge*.

§. 2. But it muſt be obſerved, that Certainty is two fold, *Certainty of Truth, and Certainty of Knowledge*. Certainty of *Truth* is, when words are ſo put together in *Propoſitions*, as exactly to expreſs the agreement or diſagreement of the *ideas* they ſtand for; as really it is. Certainty of *Knowledge*, is to perceive the agreement or diſagreement of *ideas* as expreſſed in any *Propoſitions*. This we uſually call *Knowing*, or being certain of the Truth of any *Propoſition*.

§. 3. Now becauſe we *cannot be certain of the Truth of any general Propoſition, unleſs we know the preciſe bounds and extent of the Species its terms ſtand for*; it is neceſſary we ſhould know the Eſſence of each *Species*, which is that which conſtitutes and bounds it. This in all *ſimple ideas* and *modes* is not hard to do: For in theſe the *real* and *nominal* Eſſence being the ſame, there can be no doubt how far the *Species* extends, or what things are comprehended under each Term: Which it is evident are all that have an exact Conformity with the *ideas* it ſtands for, and no other. But in *ſubſtances* wherein a *real* Eſſence, diſtinct from the *nominal*, is ſuppoſed to conſtitute, and bound the *Species*, the extent of the general word is very

very uncertain; becauſe not knowing this real Eſſence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that *Species*, and conſequently what may, or may not with Certainty be affirmed of it.

§. 4. Hence we may ſee that *the names of Subſtances, when made to ſtand for Species, ſuppoſed to be conſtituted by real Eſſences*, which we know not, *are not capable of conveying Certainty to the Underſtanding*. Of the *truth of general Propoſitions* made up of ſuch Terms we cannot be ſure. For how can we be ſure that this or that Quality is in *Gold*, for inſtance, when we know not what is, or is not *Gold*; that is, what has, or has not the *real Eſſence* of *Gold*, whereof we have no *idea* at all.

§. 5. On the other ſide, the names of Subſtances, when made uſe of for the *complex ideas* men have in their minds; though they carry a clear and determinate Signification with them, *will not yet ſerve us to make many univerſal Propoſitions, of whoſe truth we can be certain:* becauſe the *ſimple ideas*, out of which the *complex* are combined, carry not with them any diſcoverable Connexion of Repugnancy, but with a very few other *ideas*.

§. 6. For inſtance, *All Gold is fixed*, is a Propoſition we cannot be certain of, how univerſally ſoever it be believed: For if we take the term *Gold* to ſtand for a *real Eſſence*, it is evident we know not what particular Subſtances are of that *Species*, and ſo cannot

not with Certainty affirm any thing univerſally of *Gold*. But if we make the term *Gold* ſtand for a *Species*, determined by its *nominal Eſſence*, be its *complex idea* what it will; for inſtance, a body *Yellow*, *Fuſible*, *Malleable*, and *very heavy*; no Quality can with Certainty be denied or affirmed univerſally of it, but what has a diſcoverable connexion, or inconſiſtency with that *nominal Eſſence*: *Fixedneſs*, for inſtance, having no neceſſary connexion that we can diſcover with any *ſimple idea* that makes the *complex* one, or with the whole combination together; it is impoſſible that we ſhould certainly know the truth of this Propoſition, *All Gold is Fixed*. But is not this an univerſal certain Propoſition, *All Gold is malleable?* I anſwer, it is ſo, if *Malleableneſs* be a part of the *complex idea*, the word *Gold* ſtands for: But then here is nothing affirmed of *Gold*, but that, that Sound ſtands for an *idea*, in which *Malleableneſs* is contained. And ſuch a ſort of Truth and Certainty it is, to ſay a *Centaur* is *four footed*.

§. 7. I imagine amongſt all the ſecondary Qualities of Subſtances, and the Powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whoſe neceſſary Coexiſtence or Repugnance to coexiſt can be certainly known, unleſs in thoſe of the ſame Senſe, which neceſſarily exclude one another. Thus by the Colour we cannot certainly know what *Smell*, *Taſte*, &c. any body is of.

§. 8.

§. 8. It is no wonder then that *Certainty is to be found but in very few general Propositions concerning Substances:* Our knowledge of their Qualities and Properties goes very seldom farther than our Senses reach, or inform us. Inquisitive and observing men may, by Strength of Judgment, penetrate farther; and on Probabilities taken from wary Observations and Hints well laid together, often guess right at what Experience has not yet discovered to them: But this is but *guessing* still; it amounts only to *Opinion*; and has not that Certainty which is requisite to *Knowledge*.

§. 9. To conclude: General Propositions, of w kind soever, are then only capable of Certainty, when the Terms used in them stand for such *ideas*, whose agreement or disagreement, as there expressed, is capable to be discovered by us. And we are then certain of their Truth or Falsehood, when we perceive the *ideas* they stand for, to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another; whence we may take notice, that general Certainty is never to be found but in our *ideas*. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere in Experiment or Observations without us, our Knowledge goes not beyond particulars.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of Maxims.

§. 1.

THERE are a ſort of Propoſitions, which under the name of *Maxims* and *Axioms*, have paſſed for Principles of Science: And becauſe they are ſelf-evident, have been ſuppoſed *innate*. 'But if thoſe, 'who would perſuade us that there are *innate* prin-'ciples, had conſidered, ſeparately, the parts out of 'which thoſe propoſitions are made, they would not, 'perhaps, have been ſo forward to believe they were '*innate*. Since, if the *ideas*, which made up theſe 'truths, were not, it was impoſſible * that the propo-'ſitions, made up of them, ſhould be *innate*, or our 'knowledge of them be born with us. For if the '*ideas* be not *innate*, there was a time when the mind 'was without thoſe principles; and then, they will 'not be *innate*, but be derived from ſome other origi-'nal. *It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and 'not to be*, is certainly (if there be any ſuch) an *innate* 'principle. But the names *impoſſibility* and *identity* 'ſtand for two *ideas*, ſo *far from being innate*, or

* Book I. Chap. iv. §. 1. and 3.

'born with us, that I think it requires great care and 'attention to form them right in our understanding. 'They are so far from being brought into the world 'with us, so remote from the thoughts of infancy and 'childhood, that I believe, upon examination, it will 'be found, that many grown men want them.'

§. 2. It may be worth while likewise to enquire into the reason of the Evidence of these Maxims, and examine how far they influence our other Knowledge. Knowledge being but the Perception of the agreement or disagreement of *ideas*, where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the Intervention or Help of any other *ideas*, there our *Knowledge is self-evident:* Which being so, not only *Maxims*, but an infinite number of other Propositions partake equally with them in this Self-evidence. For,

§. 3. In respect of *Identity* and *Diversity*, we may have as many Self-evident Propositions as we have distinct *ideas*. It is the first act of the mind, to know every one of its *ideas* by itself, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in himself, that he knows the *ideas* he has; that he knows also when any one is in his Understanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly, one from another; so that all affirmations, or negations concerning them, are made without

without any possibility of Doubt or Uncertainty; and must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood: That is, as soon as we have in our minds the *ideas* clear and distinct, which the Terms in the Proposition stand for. Thus a *Circle is a Circle, Blue is not Red*, are as self-evident Propositions, as those general ones, *What is, is*, and *it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*; nor can the Consideration of these *Axioms* add any thing to the Evidence, or Certainty of our Knowledge of them.

§. 4. As to the agreement or disagreement of *Co-existence*, the mind has an immediate Perception of this, but in very few. And therefore, in this sort we have very little *intuitive* Knowledge: Though, in some few Propositions we have. *Two Bodies cannot be in the same Place*, I think is a self-evident Proposition. The *idea* of fitting a place equal to the contents of its superficies being annexed to our *idea* of Body.

§. 5. As to the Relations of *Modes*, Mathematicians have framed many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality, as *Equals taken from Equals, the Remainder will be equal*, &c. which however received for Axioms, yet I think have not a clearer self-evidence than these, that *One and One are equal to Two*: That *if from the five Fingers of one Hand, you take two, and from the five Fingers of the other Hand two, the remaining Numbers will be equal*. These and

a thousand other such Propositions may be found in Numbers, which carry with them an equal, if not greater clearness than those mathematical Axioms.

§. 6. As to *real Existence*, since that has no connexion with any other of our *ideas*, but that of ourselves, and of a *first Being*: we have not so much as a demonstrative, much less a self-evident Knowledge, concerning the *real Existence* of other Beings.

§. 7. In the next place let us consider what influence these Maxims have upon the other parts of our Knowledge. The rules established in the schools, that all reasonings are *ex præcognitis et præconcessis*, seem to lay the Foundation of all other Knowledge in these Maxims, and to suppose them to be *præcognita*; whereby I think is meant two things: *1st*, That these Axioms are those truths that are first known to the mind: *2dly*, That upon them the other parts of our Knowledge depend.

§. 8. *First*, That these Axioms are not the truths first known to the mind, is evident from experience: For who knows not that a *child perceives that a stranger is not its mother*, long before he knows, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. And how many truths are there about Numbers, which the mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it ever thought on these general Maxims? Of this the Reason is plain; for that which

makes

makes the mind assent to such Propositions, being nothing but the Perception it has of the agreement or disagreement of its *ideas*, according as it finds them affirmed or denied in words one of another; and every *idea* being known to be what it is, and every two distinct *ideas* not to be the same, it must necessarily follow, that such self-evident truths must be first known, which consist of *ideas*, that are first in the mind; and the *ideas* first in the mind, it is evident, are those of particular things; from whence, by slow degrees, the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones, which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of Sense, are settled in the mind, with general names to them. Thus particular *ideas* are first received and distinguished, and so Knowledge got about them; and next to them the less general or specifick, which are next to particular ones.

§. 9. For *abstract ideas* are not so obvious or easy to *Children*, or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to grown *Men*, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. 'For when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find, 'that general *ideas* carry difficulty with them, and 'do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to 'imagine. It is true, the mind, in this imperfect 'state, has need of such *ideas*, and makes all the 'haste to them it can, for the conveniency of com-

'munication

'munication and enlargement of knowledge; to both 'which it is naturally very much inclined.'

§. 10. *Secondly*, From what has been said, it plainly follows, that these magnified *Maxims* are not the principles and *foundations* of all our other Knowledge: For if there be a great many other truths, as self-evident as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impossible that they should be the *Principles*, from which we deduce all other Truths. Thus, that *One and Two are equal to Three*, is as evident, and easier known than that the *Whole is equal to all its Parts*. Nor after the Knowledge of this Maxim, do we know that *One and Two are equal to Three*, better, or more certainly than we did before. For if there be any odds in these *ideas*, the *ideas* of *Whole*, *and Parts*, are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be settled in the mind, than those of *One*, *Two*, and *Three*. Either therefore all Knowledge does not depend on certain *Præcognita*, or general Maxims, called Principles; or else, such as these, (*That One and One are Two, that Two and Two are Four*, &c.) and a great part of Numeration will be so. To which if we add all the self-evident propositions that may be made about all our distinct *ideas*; Principles will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which men arrive to the Knowledge of, at different ages; and a great many of those innate Principles, they never

never come to know all their lives. But whether they come in view early or later, they are all known by their native evidence, and receive no light, nor are capable of any proof one from another; much less the more particular, from the more general; or the more simple from the more compounded: The more simple and less abstract, being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended.

§. 11. These *general Maxims* then, are only of use in disputes, *to stop the mouths of wranglers*; but not of much use to the discovery of unknown Truths; or to help the mind forwards in its search after Knowledge. Several general Maxims, are no more than bare verbal Propositions; and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names, one to another; as, *The Whole is equal to all its parts*: What real Truth does it teach us more, than what the signification of the word *Totum*, or *whole*, does of itself import?

§. 12. But yet, *Mathematicians* do not without reason place this, and some other such amongst their *Maxims*; that their scholars having in the entrance perfectly acquainted their thoughts with these Propositions made in such general Terms, may have them ready to apply to all particular cases: Not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident, than the particular instances they are brought to confirm; but that being more familiar to the Mind,

the

the very naming them is enough to satisfy the Understanding. But this I say, is more from our custom of using them, than the different evidence of the things.

§. 13. 'One thing further, I think, it may not be 'amiss to observe concerning those general maxims, 'that they do not prove the existence of things without us; neither of these two self-evident principles, 'viz. *what is is*, and *the same thing cannot be, and be*, 'will serve to prove to us, that any, or what bodies 'do exist: For that we are left to our senses, to discover to us as far as they can. Those universal and 'self-evident principles, can assure us of nothing that 'passes without the mind; they cannot discover or 'prove to us the least knowledge of the nature of 'substances, as they are found and exist without us, 'any farther than grounded on experience.'

§. 14. So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, that where our *ideas* are clear and distinct, there is little, or no use at all of these *Maxims*, to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the Truth, or Falsehood of such Propositions, without the help of these and the like Maxims, will not be helped by these Maxims to do it. He that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his assent to this Proposition, that *Two are equal to Two*, or that *White is not Black*, will also have need

need of a proof to make him admit that, *What is, is*, or, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be.*

§. 15. And as theſe *Maxims* are of *little uſe*, where we have clear and diſtinct *ideas*; ſo they are of *dangerous uſe*, where our *ideas* are confuſed, and where we uſe words that are not annexed to clear and diſtinct *ideas*; but to ſuch as are of a looſe and wandering ſignification, ſometimes ſtanding for one, and ſometimes for another *idea*, from which follows Miſtake and Error, which theſe Maxims (brought as proofs to eſtabliſh Propoſitions wherein the terms ſtand for confuſed and uncertain *ideas*) do by their authority confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling Propoſitions.

§. 1.

THERE are univerſal Propoſitions, which though they be certainly true, yet add no light to our Underſtandings, bring no increaſe to our Knowledge: Such are,

§. 2. *Firſt*, All *purely identical Propoſitions*. Theſe at firſt *bluſh*, appear to contain no Inſtruction in

them: For when we affirm the same term of itself, it shows us nothing but what we must certainly know before, whether such a Proposition be either made by, or proposed to us.

§. 3. *Secondly,* Another sort of trifling Propositions is, when a *part of the complex* idea *is predicated of the name of the whole*; a part of the definition, of the word defined, as, *Lead is a Metal, Man, an Animal.* These carry no information at all, to those who know the complex *ideas*, the names *Lead*, and *Man* stand for: Indeed to a man that knows the signification of the word *Metal*, and not of the word *Lead*, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word *Lead*, by saying it is a *Metal*, than by enumerating the simple *ideas* one by one, which make up the complex *idea* of *Metal.*

§. 4. Alike trifling it is to *predicate any one of the simple ideas of a complex one of the name of the whole complex idea*; as *all Gold is fusible*; for fusibility being one of the simple *ideas*, that goes to the making up the complex one, the sound *Gold* stands for; what can it be but playing with sounds, to affirm that of the name *Gold*, which is comprehended in its received signification? What instruction can it carry, to tell one that which he is supposed to know before? for I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me.

§. 5.

§. 5. The general Propositions that are made about *Substances, if they are certain, are for the most part* but *trifling*; and if they are instructive, are uncertain; and such as we have no Knowledge of their real truth, how much soever constant Observation and Analogy may assist our Judgments in *Guessing*. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses, that amount yet to nothing. For names of substantial Beings, as well as others, having settled Significations affixed to them, may with great truth be joined negatively and affirmatively in Propositions, as their Definitions make them fit to be so joined; and Propositions consisting of such terms, may with the same clearness be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most real truths; and all this without any Knowledge of the nature or reality of things existing without us. Thus he that has learnt the following words, with their ordinary acceptations annexed to them, *viz. Substance, Man, Animal, Form, Soul, Vegetative, Sensative, Rational*, may make several undoubted Propositions about the Soul, without any Knowledge at all of what the Soul really is. And of this sort a man may find an infinite number of Propositions, Reasonings and Conclusions, in books of *Metaphysicks, School-Divinity*, and some part of *Natural Philosophy*; and after all, know as little of *God, Spirits*, or *Bodies*, as he did before he set out.

§. 6. *Thirdly*, The worſt ſort of *Trifling* is, to *uſe words loſely and uncertainly*, which ſets us yet farther from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain to by them, or find in them. That which occaſions this, is, that men may find it convenient to ſhelter their ignorance or obſtinacy, under the obſcurity or perplexedneſs of their terms; to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill-cuſtom does in many men much contribute.

§. 7. To conclude, barely *verbal Propoſitions* may be known by theſe following marks.

§. 8. *Firſt*, All Propoſitions, wherein two abſtract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the Signification of Sounds. For ſince no abſtract *idea* can be the ſame with any other, but itſelf; when its abſtract name is affirmed of any other term, it can ſignify no more but this, that it may or ought to be called by that name; or that theſe two names ſignify the ſame *idea*.

§. 9. *Secondly*, All Propoſitions, *wherein a part of the complex idea, which any term ſtands for, is predicated of that term*, are only *verbal*: And thus all Propoſitions wherein more comprehenſive terms called *Genera*, are affirmed of ſubordinate, or leſs comprehenſive, called *Species*, or *Individuals*, are barely *verbal*. When by theſe two rules we examine the Propoſitions that make up the diſcourſes we ordinarily meet with, both in

and

and out of books; we shall perhaps find, that a greater part of them, than is usually suspected, are purely about the Signification of words, and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these Signs.

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledge of Existence.

§. 1.

HITHERTO we have only considered the *Essences* of things, which, being only *abstract ideas*, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular Existence, give us no Knowledge of *Existence* at all. We proceed now to enquire concerning our *Knowledge of the Existence of* things, and how we come by it.

§. 2. I say then, that we have the Knowledge of our *own Existence*, by *Intuition*: of the *Existence of God*, by *Demonstration*; and of *other Things*, by *Sensation*.

§. 3. As for our own *Existence*, we perceive it so plainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. *I think, I reason*; *I feel pleasure and pain*: Can any of these be more evident to me than my *own Existence?* If I doubt of all other things, that very

Doubt

Doubt makes me perceive my *own Existence*, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. If I know I doubt, I have as certain a Perception of the *Thing* Doubting, as of that *Thought* which I call *Doubt*. Experience then convinces us that we have an *intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence*; and an internal infallible Perception that we are. In every act of Sensation, Reasoning or Thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own Being, and in this matter come not short of the highest degree of *Certainty*.

CHAP. X.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God.

§. 1.

THOUGH *God* has given us no *innate ideas* of himself, yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not *left himself without a witness*, since we have Sense, Perception, and Reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us: Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point, since he has so plentifully provided us with means to discover, and know him, so far as is necessary to the end of our Being, and the great concern-

ment

ment of our Happineſs. But though this be the moſt obvious truth that Reaſon diſcovers, yet it requires Thought and Attention; and the mind muſt apply itſelf to a regular deduction of it, from ſome part of our *intuitive* Knowledge; or elſe we ſhall be as ignorant of this as of other Propoſitions which are in themſelves capable of clear Demonſtration. To ſhow therefore, that we are capable of knowing, that is, *being certain*, that *there is a God*; and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than ourſelves, and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own *Exiſtence*.

§. 2. I think it is beyond queſtion, that *man has a clear perception of his own being:* He knows certainly that he exiſts, and that he is ſomething.

§. 3. In the next place, man knows by an *intuitive* Certainty, that *bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right Angles.* If therefore we know there is ſome real Being, it is an evident Demonſtration, that *from Eternity there has been ſomething*; ſince what was not from Eternity, had a beginning; and what had a beginning, muſt be produced by ſomething elſe.

§. 4. Next it is evident, *that what has its being from another, muſt alſo have all that which is in, and belongs to its being from another too:* All the powers it has muſt be owing to, and received from the ſame ſource.

fource. This eternal fource then of all Being muft be alfo the fource and original of all Power; and fo this *Eternal Being muft be alfo the moft powerful.*

§. 5. Again, man finds in himfelf *Perception* and *Knowledge:* We are certain then that there is not only fome Being, but fome knowing, intelligent Being in the world. There was a time then, when there was no knowing Being, or elfe there has been *a knowing Being from Eternity.* If it be faid, there was a time when that Eternal Being had no Knowledge; I reply, that then it is impoffible there fhould have ever been any Knowledge. It being as impoffible that things wholly void of Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, fhould produce a knowing Being, as it is that a Triangle fhould make itfelf three Angles, bigger than two right ones.

§. 6. Thus from the confideration of ourfelves, and what we infallibly find in our own conftitutions, our reafon leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, that *there is an eternal, moft powerful, and Knowing Being*, which, whether any one will call God, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this *idea*, duly confidered, will be deduced all thofe other *Attributes* we ought to aferibe to this *Eternal Being.*

From what has been faid, it is plain to me, we have a more certain knowledge of the Exiftence of

a *God*, than of any thing our ſenſes have not immediately diſcovered to us. Nay, I preſume I may ſay, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is any thing elſe without us. When I I ſay, we know, I *mean*, there is ſuch a Knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miſs, if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to ſeveral other Enquiries.

§. 7. It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures to conclude, that *ſomething has exiſted from Eternity*; let us next ſee what *kind of Thing* that muſt be. There are but two ſorts of Beings in the world, that man knows or conceives: 1*ſt*. Such as are purely material, without ſenſe or perception, as the clippings of our beards, and parings of our nails. 2*dly*, Senſible perceiving Beings; ſuch as we find ourſelves to be. Theſe two ſorts we ſhall hereafter call *Cogitative* and *Incogitative* Beings: Which to our preſent purpoſe are better than *material* and *immaterial*.

§. 8. If then there muſt be ſomething *Eternal*, it is very obvious to Reaſon, that it muſt neceſſarily be a *Cogitative* Being; becauſe it is as impoſſible to conceive that ever bare *Incogitative* Matter ſhould produce a *thinking* intelligent Being, as that nothing ſhould of itſelf produce Matter. Let us ſuppoſe any parcel of matter *Eternal*, we ſhall find it in itſelf unable to produce any thing. Let us ſuppoſe its parts firmly at reſt

together: If there were no other Being in the world, must it not eternally remain so, a dead unactive lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself, or produce any thing? *Matter* then by its own strength cannot produce in itself, so much as *Motion*. The motion it has, must also be from Eternity, or else added to Matter by some other Being, more powerful than Matter. But let us suppose Motion eternal too, yet Matter, *Incogitative Matter* and *Motion* could never produce *Thought: Knowledge* will still be as far beyond the power of *motion* and *matter* to produce, as matter is beyond the power of *Nothing* to produce. Divide *matter* into as minute parts as you will, vary the figure and motion of it, as much as you please, it will operate no otherwise upon other Bodies of proportionable bulk, than it did before this division. The minuteſt particles of Matter, knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the greater do, and that is all they can do, so that if we will suppose *Nothing Eternal, Matter can never begin to be.* If we suppose *bare Matter* without Motion *Eternal, Motion can never begin to be.* If we suppose only *Matter* and Motion *Eternal, Thought can never begin to be:* For it is impossible to conceive, that Matter, either with or without Motion, could have originally in and from itself, Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then Sense, Perception, and Knowledge,

must

muſt be a Property eternally inſeparable from *Matter*, and every particle of it. Since therefore whatſoever is the firſt eternal being muſt neceſſarily be *Cogitative*: And whatſoever is firſt of all things, muſt neceſſarily contain in it, and actually have, at leaſt, all the perfections that can ever after exiſt, it neceſſarily follows, that the *Firſt Eternal Being cannot be Matter.*

§. 9. If therefore it be evident that ſomething neceſſarily muſt exiſt from Eternity, it is alſo as evident that, that *Something muſt neceſſarily be a cogitative Being.* For it is as impoſſible that *incogitative Matter* ſhould produce a *cogitative Being*, as that nothing, or the negation of all Being, ſhould produce a poſitive Being or Matter.

§. 10. This diſcovery of the *neceſſary Exiſtence of an eternal Mind*, does ſufficiently lead us into the Knowledge of God. For it will hence follow, that all other knowing Beings, that have a beginning, muſt depend on him, and have no other ways of Knowledge or extent of Power, than what he gives them: And therefore if he made thoſe, he made alſo the leſs excellent pieces of this Univerſe, all *inanimate Bodies*, whereby his *Omniſcience*, *Power*, and *Providence* will be eſtabliſhed; and from thence all his other attributes neceſſarily follow.

CHAP. XI.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

§. 1.

THE Knowledge of our own Being we have by *Intuition:* The Existence of a God, *Reason* clearly makes known to us, as has been shown: The *Knowledge of the Existence* of any other thing, we can have only by Sensation; for there being no necessary Connexion of *real Existence* with any *idea* a man hath in his memory; nor of any other Existence, but that of God, with the Existence of any particular man; no particular man can know the *Existence* of any other Being, but only, when by actually operating upon him, it makes itself be perceived by him. The having the *idea* of any thing in our mind, no more proves the Existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream, make thereby a true history. It is therefore the actual receiving of *ideas* from without, that gives us notice of the Existence of other things, and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us, which causes that *idea* in us, though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it; for it takes not from the *Certainty* of our Senses, and the

idea

ideas we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced.

§. 2. *This Notice we have by our Senſes of the exiſting of things without us*, though it be not altogether ſo certain as *Intuition* and *Demonſtration*, *deſerves the name of Knowledge*, if we perſuade ourſelves that our faculties act and inform us right, concerning the Exiſtence of thoſe objects that affect them. But beſides the aſſurance we have from our *Senſes* themſelves, that they do not err in the Information they give us of the Exiſtence of things without us, we have other concurrent Reaſons, As,

§. 3. *Firſt*, It is plain thoſe Perceptions are produced in us, by exterior Cauſes affecting our ſenſes, becauſe *thoſe that want the Organs of any ſenſe*, *never can have the ideas belonging to that ſenſe* produced in their minds. This is too evident to be doubted, and therefore we cannot but be aſſured, that they come in by the Organs of that Senſe, and no other way.

§. 4. *Secondly*, Becauſe *we find ſometimes that we cannot avoid the having thoſe ideas produced in our minds*; when my eyes are ſhut, I can at pleaſure recal to my mind the *ideas* of *Light* or the *Sun*, which former Senſations had lodged in my memory; but if I turn my eyes towards the *Sun*, I cannot avoid the *ideas* which the *Light* or the *Sun* then produces in me: Which ſhows a manifeſt difference between thoſe *ideas* laid

laid up the memory, and such as force themselves upon us, and we cannot avoid having. And therefore it must needs be some *exterior* cause, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those *ideas* in my mind, whether I will or no.

Besides, there is no body who doth not perceive the difference in himself, between actually looking upon the *Sun*, and contemplating the *idea* he has of it in his memory; and therefore he hath certain Knowledge, that they are not both memory or fancy; but that actual Seeing has a cause without.

§. 5. *Thirdly*, Add to this, *that many ideas are produced in us with pain, which we afterwards remember without the least offence.* Thus the pain of *Heat* or *Cold*, when the *idea* of it is received in our minds, gives us no disturbance; which when felt was very troublesome; and we remember the pain of *Hunger*, *Thirst*, *Head Ache*, &c. without any pain at all; which would either never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but *ideas* floating in our minds, and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real Existence of things affecting us from abroad.

§. 6. *Fourthly*, Our senses in many cases bear witness to the truth of each others report, concerning the Existence of sensible things without us: He that doubts when he sees a *Fire*, whether it be *real*, may,

if

if he pleaſe, feel it too; and, by the exquiſite pain, he will be convinced, that it is not a bare *idea* or *phantom*.

§. 7. If after all this, any one will be ſo *ſceptical*, as to diſtruſt his ſenſes, and to queſtion the Exiſtence of all things, or our Knowledge of any thing; let him conſider that *the Certainty* of things exiſting in *rerum natura*, when we have *the teſtimony of our ſenſes* for it, is not only *as great* as our frame can attain to, but *as our condition needs*. For our *faculties* being not ſuited to the full Extent of Being, nor a clear comprehenſive knowledge of all things, but to the preſervation of us, in whom they are, and accommodated to the uſe of life; they ſerve our purpoſe well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of thoſe things, that are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that ſees a *Candle* burning, and has experimented the force of the flame, by putting his finger in it, will little doubt, that this is ſomething exiſting without him, which does him harm and puts him to pain, which is aſſurance enough; when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by, than what is as certain as his actions themſelves: So that this evidence is as great as we can deſire, being as certain to us as our pleaſure or pain, that is, *Happineſs* or *Miſery*, beyond which we have no concernment either of Knowing, or Being.

§. 8.

§. 8. In fine, when our ſenſes do actually convey into our Underſtandings any *idea*, we are aſſured that there is ſomething at that time *really Exiſting* without us. But *this Knowledge extends only as far as the preſent teſtimony of our ſenſes*, employed about particular Objects, that do then affect them, *and no farther*. My ſeeing a *Man* a minute ſince, is no certain argument of his *preſent* Exiſtence; 'ſince there is no 'neceſſary connexion of his exiſtence a minute ſince, 'with his exiſtence now.'

§. 9. As when our ſenſes are actually employed about any Object, we know that it does exiſt; ſo *by our memory* we may be aſſured, that heretofore things that affected our *ſenſes*, *have exiſted*: And thus *we have the Knowledge of the paſt Exiſtence* of ſeveral things; whereof our *ſenſes* having informed us, our memories ſtill retain the *ideas*: And of this we are paſt all doubt, ſo long as we remember well.

§. 10. As to the Exiſtence of ſpirits, our having *ideas* of them, does not make us know, that any ſuch things do exiſt without us; or that there are any *finite ſpirits*; or any other ſpiritual beings but the Eternal God. We have ground from *Revelation*, and ſeveral other reaſons, to believe with aſſurance, that there are ſuch Creatures: But our ſenſes not being able to diſcover them, we want the means of knowing their particular Exiſtence; for we can no more

know

know that there *finite ſpirits* really exiſting, by the *idea* we have of ſuch beings, than by the *ideas* any one has of *Fairies* or *Centaurs*, he can come to know that things anſwering thoſe *ideas*, do really exiſt.

§. 11. Hence we may gather, that there are *two ſorts* of Propoſitions, *One concerning the Exiſtence* of any thing anſwerable to ſuch an *idea*; as that of an *Elephant*, *Phœnix*, *Motion*, or *Angel*, *viz.* Whether ſuch a thing does any where exiſt: And this Knowledge is only of *Particulars*, and not to be had of any thing without us, but only of God, any other way than by our *ſenſes*.

§. 12. *Another ſort* of Propoſition is, wherein is expreſſed the agreement or diſagreement of our *abſtract ideas*, and their dependence one on another. And theſe may be *univerſal* and certain: So having the *idea* of *God*, and my *ſelf*, of *Fear* and *Obedience*, I cannot but be ſure that *God is to be feared and obeyed by me*; and this Propoſition will be certain concerning *Man* in general; if I have made an *abſtract idea* of ſuch a *ſpecies*, whereof I am one particular. But ſuch a Propoſition, how certain ſoever, proves not to me the Exiſtence of men in the world; but will be true of all ſuch Creatures, whenever they do exiſt: Which *Certainty* of ſuch general Propoſitions, depends on the agreement or diſagreement diſcoverable in thoſe *abſtract ideas*.

§. 13. In the former case, our Knowledge is the consequence of the *Existence of things*, producing *ideas* in our minds by our senses: In the latter, the consequence of the *ideas* that are in our *minds*, and producing these general Propositions, many whereof are called *Eternæ veritates*; and all of them indeed are so, not from being written all, or any of them in the minds of all men, or that they were any of them Propositions in any one's mind, till he having got the *abstract ideas*, joined or separated them by affirmation or negation: But wheresoever we can suppose such a Creature as *Man* is, endowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such *ideas* as we have; we must conclude, he must needs, when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his *ideas*, know the truth of certain Propositions, that will arise from the agreement or disagreement he will perceive in his own *ideas*. Such Propositions being once made about *abstract ideas*, so as to be true, they will, whenever they can be supposed to be made again, at any time past, or to come, by a mind having those *ideas*, always be true. For names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same *ideas*; and the same *ideas* having immutably the same habitudes one to another; Propositions concerning any *abstract ideas*, that are once true, must needs be *eternal Verities*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

§. 1.

IT being the received opinion amongſt men of letters that *maxims are the foundations of all Knowledge*, and that Sciences are each of them built upon certain *Præcognita*, from whence the Underſtanding was to take its riſe, and by which it was to conduct itſelf in its inquiries in the matters belonging to that *ſcience*, the beaten road of the ſchools has been to lay down in the beginning one or more general Propoſitions, called *Principles*, as foundations whereon to build the Knowledge, that was to be had of that ſubject.

§. 2. That which gave occaſion to this way of proceeding, was, I ſuppoſe, the good ſucceſs it ſeemed to have in *Mathematicks*, which, of all other ſciences, have the greateſt certainty, clearneſs, and evidence, in them But if we conſider it, we ſhall find that the great *advancement* and certainty of *real Knowledge* men arrived to in theſe *ſciences*, was not owing to the influence of theſe Principles, but *to the clear diſtinct and compleat ideas* their thoughts were

employed about; and the relation of *Equality* and *Excefs*, fo clear between fome of them, that they had an *intuitive Knowledge*; and by that a way to difcover it in others: And this without the help of thofe *maxims*. For I afk, Is it not poffible for a lad to know that his whole body is bigger than his little finger, but by virtue of this Axiom, *the whole is bigger than the part*; nor be aflured of it, till he has learned that *maxim?* Let any one confider from what has been elfewhere faid, which is known firft and cleareft by moft people, the *particular* inftance, or the *general* rule; and which it is that gives life and birth to the other. Thefe *general rules* are but the comparing our more general and *abftract ideas*, which *ideas* are made by the mind, and have names given them, for the eafier difpatch in its reafonings: But Knowledge began in the mind, and was founded on *Particulars*, though afterwards perhaps no notice be taken thereof: It being natural for the mind, to lay up thofe general notions, and make the proper ufe of them, which is to difburden the memory of the cumberfome load of Particulars.

§. 3. *The way to improve in Knowledge*, is not to fwallow Principles, with an Implicit Faith, and without Examination, which would be apt to mislead men, inftead of guiding them into truth; but to *get and fix*

in our minds, clear and compleat ideas, as far as they are to be had, *and annex to them proper* and *conſtant* names: And thus barely by conſidering our *ideas*, and *comparing them together*, obſerving their agreement or diſagreement, their habitude and relations, we ſhall get more true and clear Knowledge by the conduct of this one *Rule*, than by taking up *Principles*, and thereby putting our minds into the diſpoſal of others.

§. 4. 'Falſe or doubtful poſitions, relied upon as 'unqueſtionable Maxims, keep thoſe in the dark 'from truth, who build on them. Such are uſually 'the *Prejudices* imbibed from education, party, reve-'rence, faſhion, intereſt, *&c.* This is the mote 'which every one ſees in his brother's eye, but never 'regards the beam in his own. To thoſe who are 'willing to get rid of this great hinderance of Know-'ledge, to theſe who would ſhake off this great and 'dangerous impoſtor *Prejudice*, who dreſſes up falſe-'hood in the likeneſs of truth, I ſhall offer this one 'mark whereby *Prejudice* may be known. He that 'is ſtrongly of any opinion, muſt ſuppoſe that his 'perſuaſion is built upon good grounds; and that his 'aſſent is no greater than what the evidence of the 'truth he holds forces him to. Now if, after all his 'profeſſion, he cannot bear any oppoſition to his 'opinion, if he cannot ſo much as give a patient 'hearing to the arguments on the other ſide, he 'plainly

'plainly confeſſes that it is *Prejudice* governs him; 'and it is not the evidence of truth, but ſome lazy 'anticipation, ſome cloyed preſumption, that he 'deſires to reſt undiſturbed in *.

§. 5. 'He that would acquit himſelf in this caſe 'as a lover of truth, muſt do two things that are not 'very common nor very eaſy; *Firſt, He muſt not be 'in love with any opinion*, or wiſh it to be true, *until 'he knows it to be ſo:* For nothing that is falſe can 'deſerve our good wiſhes, nor a deſire that it ſhould 'have the force of truth; and yet nothing is more 'frequent than this. *Secondly*, He muſt do that 'which he will find himſelf very averſe to, as judg-'ing the thing unneceſſary, or himſelf incapable of 'doing it. *He muſt try whether his principles be cer-'tainly true or not*, and how far he may ſafely rely 'upon them. The inability I here ſpeak of, is not 'any natural defect that makes men incapable of ex-'amining their principles. To ſuch, rules of con-'ducting their underſtandings are uſeleſs, and that 'is the caſe of very few. The great number is of 'theſe whom the ill habit of never exerting their 'thoughts has diſabled: The powers of their minds 'are ſtarved by diſuſe, and have loſt that ſtrength 'which nature fitted them to receive from exerciſe.

* Locke's Conduct of the Underſtanding, §. 10.

'In

'In these two things, *viz.* an *equal indifferency for* 'all truth; I mean the receiving it in the love of it 'as truth; and in the *examination of our principles*, 'and not receiving any for such, till we are fully 'convinced of their solidity, truth and certainty, 'consists that *freedom* of the understanding, which is 'necessary to a rational creature; and without which 'it is Conceit, Fancy, any thing rather than an Un-'derstanding. And these two articles ought to be 'particularly inculcated in education; the business 'whereof, in respect of Knowledge, is not to perfect 'a learner in all or any one of the Sciences, but to give 'his mind that *freedom*, that disposition, and these 'habits, that may enable him to attain any part of 'knowledge he shall apply himself to, or stand in 'need of in the future course of his life *.'

§. 6. *We must* therefore, if we will proceed as *Reason* advises, *adapt our methods of Inquiry, to the nature of the ideas we examine*, and the truth we search after. *General* and *certain Truths*, are only founded in the habitudes and relations of *abstract ideas*. Therefore a sagacious methodical application of our thoughts for the finding out these Relations, is the only way to discover all that can with Truth and Certainty be put into general Propositions. By what steps we are to

* Locke's Conduct of the Understanding, §. 11. & 12.

proceed

proceed in theſe, is to be learned in the ſchools of the *Mathematicians*, who from very plain and eaſy beginnings, by gentle degrees, and a continued chain of Reaſonings, proceed to the diſcovery and demonſtration of *Truths*, that appear at firſt ſight beyond human Capacity. This, I think I may ſay, that if other *ideas* that are *real* as well as *nominal* Eſſences of their *ſpecies*, were purſued in the way familiar to *Mathematicians*, they would carry our thoughts farther and with greater Evidence and Clearneſs, than poſſibly we are apt to imagine. This gave me the Confidence to advance that Conjecture, which I ſuggeſt, *Chapter* the Third, *viz.* that *Morality is capable of Demonſtration*, as well as *Mathematicks*: For *moral ideas* being real Eſſences, that have a diſcoverable Connexion and Agreement one with another, ſo far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations, ſo far we ſhall be poſſeſſed of *real* and *general Truths*.

§. 7. In our Knowledge of *Subſtances*, we are to proceed after a quite different method: The bare Contemplation of their *abſtract ideas* (which are but *nominal* Eſſences) will carry us but a very little way, in the ſearch of Truth and Certainty. Here *Experience* muſt teach us what *Reaſon* cannot: And it is by trying alone, that we can certainly know, what other Qualities coexiſt with thoſe of our *complex idea*; (for inſtance) Whether that *Yellow, heavy fuſible* Body,

I call *Gold*, be *malleable*, or no; which Experience (however it prove in that particular body we examine) makes us not certain that it is so in all, or any other *yellow*, *heavy*, *fusible* Bodies, but that which we have tried; because it is no consequence one way or the other from our *complex idea*: The necessity or inconsistence of *Malleability*, has no visible Connexion with the combination of that *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fusibility* in any Body. What I have here said of the *nominal* Essence of *Gold*, supposed to consist of a Body of such a determinate *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fusibility*, will hold true, if other Qualities be added to it. Our reasonings from those *ideas* will carry us but a little way in the certain Discovery of the other *Properties*, in those Masses of Matter wherein all those are to be found. As far as our Experience reaches, we may have certain knowledge, and no farther.

§. 8. I deny not, but a man accustomed to rational and regular Experiments, shall be able to see farther into the nature of Bodies, and their unknown Properties, than one that is a stranger to them. But this is but *Judgment* and *Opinion*, not *Knowledge* and *Certainty*. This makes me suspect that *Natural Philosophy* is not capable of being made a *science*: From Experiments and historical Observations we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life: But beyond

this, I fear our *Talents* reach not; nor are our faculties, as I guess, able to advance.

§. 9. From whence it is obvious to conclude, that since our faculties are not fitted to penetrate the *real Essences* of Bodies, but yet plainly to discover to us the *Being* of a *God*, and the *Knowledge* of *ourselves*; enough to give us a clear Discovery of our *Duty*, and great Concernment; it will become us, as rational Creatures, to employ our Faculties about what they are most adapted to, and follow the Direction of Nature, where it seems to point us out the way. For it is rational to conclude, that our proper Employment lies in those Inquiries, and that sort of Knowledge which is most suited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it our greatest interest, that is, *the condition of our eternal State*: And therefore it is, I think, that *morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general* (who are both concerned and fitted to search out their *Summum Bonum*) as several *Arts* conversant about the several parts of nature, are the lot and private talent of particular men, for the common use of human life, and their own particular Subsistence in this World.

§. 10. The *ways to enlarge our Knowledge*, as far as we are capable, seem to me to be *these two*: The *First*, is to get and settle in our minds, as far as we can, clear, distinct, and constant *ideas* of those things

we would consider and know. For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our *ideas*; where they are either imperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear Knowledge. The *other* is the art of finding out the *intermediate ideas*, which may show us the Agreement or Repugnancy of other *ideas*, which cannot be immediately compared.

§. 11. That these *two* (and not the relying on *maxims*, and drawing consequences from some general Propositions) are the right method of improving our Knowledge, in the *ideas* of other *modes*, besides those of Quantity, the Consideration of *mathematical* Knowledge will easily inform us. Where, *First*, we shall find that he that has not clear and perfect *ideas* of those *Angles* or *Figures*, of which he desires to know any thing, is utterly thereby incapable of any Knowledge about them. Suppose a man not to have an exact *idea* of a *right Angle*, *Scalenum*, or *Trapezium*, and it is clear, that he will in vain seek any Demonstration about them. And *farther* it is evident, that it was not the influence of *maxims* or *principles*, that has led the masters of this *Science* into those wonderful Discoveries they have made. Let a man of good parts know all the *maxims* of *Mathematicks* never so well, and contemplate their Extent and Consequences as much as he pleases, he will by their assistance, I

ſuppoſe, ſcarce ever come to know, that the ſquare of the *Hypothenuſe, in a right angled Triangle, is equal to the ſquares of the two other ſides.* This, and other *mathematical* Truths have been diſcovered by the Thoughts, otherwiſe applied. The mind had other objects, other views before it, far different from thoſe *maxims* which men well enough acquainted with thoſe received *Axioms*, but ignorant of their method, who firſt made theſe Demonſtrations, can never ſufficiently admire.

CHAP. XIII.

Some further Conſiderations concerning Knowledge.

§. 1.

OUR *Knowledge*, as in other things, ſo in this, has a great Conformity with our *ſight*, that it is neither *wholly neceſſary, nor wholly voluntary.* Men that have ſenſes cannot chuſe but receive ſome *ideas* by them; and if they have memory, they cannot but retain ſome of them; and if they have any diſtinguiſhing Faculty, cannot but perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of ſome of them, one with another. As he that has Eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but ſee ſome Objects, and perceive a difference

in them; yet he may chuſe whether he will turn his Eyes towards an Object, curiouſly ſurvey it, and obſerve accurately all that is viſible in it. But what he does ſee, he cannot ſee otherwiſe than he does: It depends not on his *Will*, to ſee that *Black* which appears *Yellow*. Juſt thus it is with our *Underſtanding*: All that is voluntary in our Knowledge, is the *employing* or *withholding any of our Faculties* from this or that ſort of *Objects*; and a more or leſs accurate Survey of them: But they being employed, *our Will hath no power to determine the Knowledge of the mind*, one way or other. That is done only by the *Objects* themſelves, as far as they are clearly diſcovered.

§. 2. Thus he that has got the *ideas* of *Numbers*, and hath taken the pains to compare *One*, *Two* and *Three* to *Six*, cannot chuſe but know that they are equal. He alſo that hath the *idea* of an intelligent, but weak and frail *Being*, made by, and depending on another, who is *Eternal*, *Omnipotent*, perfectly *wiſe* and *good*, will as certainly know, that *man* is to honour, fear, and obey *God*, as that the Sun ſhines when he ſees it. But yet theſe Truths, being never ſo certain, never ſo clear, he may be ignorant of either or both of them, who will not take the pains to employ his Faculties as he ſhould, to inform himſelf about them.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

§. 1.

THE *Understanding Faculties* being given to man, not barely for Speculation, but also for the Conduct of his Life; a man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the Certainty of *true Knowledge*. He that will not *eat* till he has Demonstration that it will nourish him; nor *stir*, till he is infallibly assured of success in his business, will have little else to do but *sit still* and *perish*.

§. 2. Therefore as *God* hath set some things in broad *Day-light*; as he has given us some certain Knowledge, though limited to a few things, in comparison, (probably as a taste of what *intellectual* creatures are capable of, to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better State) so in the greatest part of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the *Twilight*, as I may so say, of *Probability*, suitable to that state of *Mediocrity* and *Probationership*, he has been pleased to place us in here.

§. 3. The Faculty which *God* has given *man* to enlighten him, next to certain Knowledge, is *Judgment*,

ment, whereby the mind takes its *idea* to agree or disagree, without perceiving a demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs. The mind exercises this Judgment, sometimes out of *Necessity*, where demonstrative Proofs, and certain Knowledge are not to be had; and sometimes out of *Laziness*, Unskilfulness, or Haste, even where they are to be had.

§. 4. This Faculty of the Mind when it is exercised immediately about things, is called *Judgment*; when about truths delivered in words, is most commonly called *Assent*, or *Dissent*. Thus the mind has *two Faculties* conversant about Truth and Falsehood: *1st*, *Knowledge*, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the Agreement or Disagreement of any *ideas*. *2dly*, *Judgment*, which is the putting *ideas* together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain Agreement or Disagreement is not *perceived*, but *presumed* to be so. And if it so unites or separates them, as in reality things are, it is *right Judgment*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Of Probability.

§. 1.

PROBABILITY is nothing but the appearance of the Agreement or Disagreement of two *ideas*, by the Intervention of Proofs, whose Connexion is not constant, and immutable; or is not perceived to be so; but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the Proposition to be *true* or *false*, rather than the contrary.

§. 2. Of *Probability* there are degrees from the neighbourhood of *Certainty* and *Demonstration*, quite down to *Improbability* and *Unlikeliness*, even to the confines of *Impossibility*: And also degrees of *Assent* from certain Knowledge and what is next it, *full Assurance and Confidence, quite down to Conjecture, Doubt, Distrust*, and *Disbelief*.

§. 3. That Proposition then is *probable*, for which there are arguments or proofs to make it pass, or be received for *true*. The Entertainment the mind gives to this sort of Propositions, is called *Belief*, *Assent*, or *Opinion*. *Probability* then being to supply the defect of our Knowledge, is always conversant about

Propo-

Propositions, whereof we have no *Certainty*, but only some *Inducements* to receive them for true.

§. 4. The *Grounds* of it are in short *these two* following.

First, The *Conformity* of any thing with our own Knowledge, Experience, or Observation.

Secondly, The *Testimony* of others, vouching their Observation and Experience. In the *Testimony* of others, is to be considered; *1st*, The Number; *2dly*, The Integrity; *3dly*, The Skill of the Witnesses; *4thly*, The Design of the Author, if it be a Testimony cited out of a Book; *5thly*, The Consistency of the Parts and Circumstances of the Relation; *6thly*, Contrary Testimonies.

§. 5. *The mind before it rationally assents* or *dissents* to any probable Proposition, *ought to examine all the grounds of Probability*, and see how they make, more or less, *for or against it*; and upon, a due balancing of the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or less firm *Assent*, according to the Preponderancy of the greater *Grounds* of *Probability*, on one side or the other.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Assent.

§. 1.

THE *Grounds of Probability* laid down in the foregoing *Chapter*, as they are the foundations on which our *Assent* is built, so are they also the measure whereby its several *Degrees* are (or ought) to be *regulated*. Only we are to take notice, that no grounds of Probability operate any farther on the mind, which searches after Truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear; at least in the first Judgment, or Search that the mind makes. It is indeed in many cases impossible, and in most very hard, even for those who have admirable memories, to retain all the Proofs, which, upon a due Examination, made them embrace that side of the question. It suffices that they have once, with care and fairness, sifted the matter as far as they could; and having once found on which side the *Probability* appeared to them, they lay up the Conclusion in their memories, as a *Truth* they have discovered; and for the future remain satisfied with the Testimony of their memories, that this is the Opinion, that by the Proofs they have once seen of

it,

it, deserves such a *Degree* of their *Assent* as they afford it.

§. 2. It is unavoidable then that the memory be relied on in this case, and that *men be persuaded of several Opinions, whereof the Proofs are not actually in their thoughts*, nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recal: Without this the greatest part of men, must be either *Scepticks*, or change every moment, when any one offers them arguments, which, for want of memory, they are not presently able to answer.

§. 3. It must be owned that mens *sticking* to *past Judgments*, is often the cause of great *Obstinacy* in Error and Mistake. But the fault is not, that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined. Who almost is there that hath the Leisure, Patience, and Means to collect together, all the Proofs concerning most of the Opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that he has a clear and full view, and that there is no more to be alledged for his better Information? And yet we are forced to determine ourselves on one side or other: The conduct of our Lives, and the management of our great Concerns, will not bear Delay. For those depend for the most part on the determination of our Judgment in points wherein we

are not capable of certain Knowledge, and wherein it is neceſſary for us to embrace one ſide or the other.

§. 4. The Propoſitions we receive upon inducements of *Probability*, are of *two ſorts: Firſt*, Concerning ſome particular Exiſtence, or matter of *Fact*, which falling under Obſervation, is capable of *human Teſtimony*. *Secondly*, Concerning things, which being beyond the diſcovery of our *Senſes*, are not capable of human Teſtimony.

§. 5. Concerning the firſt of theſe, *viz. Particular matter of fact.*

Firſt, Where any particular thing, conſonant to the conſtant Obſervation of ourſelves and others in the like caſe, comes atteſted with the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, we receive it as eaſily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain Knowledge. Thus, if all *Engliſhmen* who have occaſion to mention it, ſhould report, that it *froze* in *England* laſt Winter, or the like, I think a man would as little doubt of it, as that *Seven and Four are Eleven.*

The *firſt* and *higheſt* Degree of *Probability* then is, when the general conſent of all men, in all ages, as far as can be known, concurs with a man's own conſtant Experience in the like caſes, to confirm the truth of any particular matter of Fact, atteſted by fair

Witneſſes;

Witneſſes: Such are the ſtated *Conſtitutions* and *Properties* of Bodies, and the regular Proceedings of *Cauſes* and *Effects* in the ordinary courſe of *Nature*; this we call an *Argument* from the nature of things themſelves. For what we and others always obſerve to be after the ſame manner, we conclude with Reaſon, to be the effects of ſteady and regular *Cauſes*, though they come not within the reach of our Knowledge. As that Fire warmed a man, or made *Lead fluid*; that *Iron* ſunk in water, ſwam in quick ſilver. A relation affirming any ſuch thing to have been, or a predication that it will happen again in the ſame manner, is received without doubt or heſitation: And our *Belief* thus grounded, riſes to *Aſſurance*.

§ 6. *Secondly*, The next degree of *Probability*, is when, by my own Experience, and the agreement of all others, that mention it, a *thing* is found to be for the moſt part ſo; and that the particular inſtance of it is atteſted by many and undoubted *witneſſes*. Thus *Hiſtory* giving us ſuch an account of men in all ages, and my own Experience confirming it, that moſt men prefer their own private Advantage, to the publick. If all Hiſtorians that writ of *Tiberius*, ſay that he did ſo, it is extremely probable: And in this caſe, our *Aſſent* riſes to a degree which we may call *Confidence*.

§. 7. *Thirdly*, In matters happening indifferently, as that a *Bird* ſhould fly this or that way: When any particular

particular matter of Fact comes attested by the concurrent Testimony of unsuspected *Witnesses*, there our *Assent* is also unavoidable. Thus, that there is in *Italy* such a city as *Rome*; that about One thousand and seven hundred years ago, there lived such a man in it as *Julius Cæsar*, &c. A man can as little doubt of this, and the like, as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance, whereof he himself is a witness.

§. 8. *Probability*, on these grounds, carries so much Evidence with it, that it leaves as little liberty to believe or disbelieve, as Demonstration does, whether we will know or be ignorant. But the Difficulty is, when Testimonies contradict common Experience, and the Reports of Witnesses clash with the ordinary course of Nature, or with one another. Here diligence, attention, and exactness is required to form a *right Judgment*, and to proportion the *Assent* to the Evidence and *Probability* of the thing, which rises and falls, according as the two foundations of Credibility favour, or contradict it. These are liable to such variety of contrary Observations, Circumstances, Reports, Tempers, Designs, Oversights, &c. of Reporters, that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degrees wherein men give their *Assent*. This in general may be said, that as the *Proofs*, upon due Examination, shall to any one appear

in

in a greater, or less degree, to preponderate on either side, so they are fitted to produce in the mind, such different Entertainments, as are called *Belief*, *Conjecture*, *Guess*, *Doubt*, *Wavering*, *Distrust*, *Disbelief*, &c.

§. 9. 'I think it may not be amiss to take notice 'of a rule observed in the law of *England*, which is, 'that though the attested copy of a record be good 'proof, yet the copy of a copy never so well attested, 'and by never so credible witnesses, will not be 'admitted as a proof in judicature. This practice, 'if it be allowable in the decisions of right and 'wrong, carries this observation along with it,' *viz.* That any Testimony, the farther off it is removed from the original truth, the less force it has: And in *traditional truths, each remove weakens the force of the Proof.* There is a *Rule* quite contrary to this, advanced by some men, who look on *Opinions* to gain force by growing *older.* Upon this ground, Propositions evidently false or doubtful in their first beginning, come by an inverted *Rule* of *Probability*, to pass for *authentick* Truths; and those which deserved little Credit from the mouths of their first Relators, are thought to grow *venerable* by Age, and are urged as undeniable.

§. 10. But certain it is, that no *Probability can rise above its first Original.* What has no other evidence than the single Testimony of *one Witness*, must

must ſtand or fall by his *only* Teſtimony, though afterwards cited by Hundreds of others; and is ſo far from receiving any ſtrength thereby, that it becomes the weaker. Becauſe Paſſion, Intereſt, Inadvertency, Miſtake of his Meaning, and a thouſand odd Reaſons, which capricious mens minds are acted by, may make one man quote another's words or meaning wrong. This is certain, that what in one age was affirmed upon ſlight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future ages by being often repeated.

§. 11. *The ſecond ſort of Probability*, is concerning things *not falling under the reach of our ſenſes, and therefore not capable of Teſtimony:* And ſuch are,

§. 12. *Firſt*, The Exiſtence, Nature, and Operations of *finite immaterial* Beings without us, as *Spirits*, *Angels*, &c. or the Exiſtence of *material* Beings, ſuch as for their ſmallneſs or remoteneſs, our *Senſes* cannot take notice of: As whether there be any *Plants*, *Animals*, &c. in the *Planets*, and other manſions of the vaſt Univerſe.

§. 13. *Secondly*, Concerning the manner of Operation in moſt parts of the works of *Nature*; wherein, though we ſee the ſenſible *Effects*, yet their Cauſes are unknown, and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced. We ſee *Animals* are generated, nouriſhed, and move; the *Loadſtone* draws *Iron*, &c. but the cauſes that operate, and the manner they

they are produced in, we can only guess, and probably conjecture. In these matters *Analogy* is the only help we have; and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of *Probability*. Thus observing, that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently upon one another, produces *Heat*, and very often *Fire*; we have reason to think that what we call *Heat* and *Fire* consists, in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning Matter. This sort of *Probability*, which is the best conduct of rational Experiments, and the rise of *Hypotheses*, has also its use and influence. And a wary reasoning from *Analogy* leads us often into the discovery of *Truths*, and useful *Deductions*, which would otherwise lie concealed.

§. 14. Though the common Experience, and the ordinary course of things, have a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give or refuse credit, to any thing proposed to their belief; yet there is one case wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the *Assent* to a fair Testimony given of it. For where such supernatural *Events* are suitable to ends aimed at by him, who has the power to change the course of Nature; there under such circumstances they may be the fitter to procure belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary observation. This is the proper case of *miracles*, which, well attested, do not only find credit themselves, but give it also to other *truths*,

§. 15. There are Propositions that challenge the highest degree of our *Assent* upon bare Testimony, whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common Experience, and the ordinary course of things or no: The reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such *an one*, as cannot deceive nor be deceived; and that is *God* himself. This carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is called by a peculiar name, *Revelation*, and our *assent* to it, *Faith*; which has as much Certainty in it, as our Knowledge itself: and we may as well doubt of our own *Being*, as we can, whether any *Revelation* from *God* be *true*. So that *Faith* is a settled and sure Principle of *Assent* and *Assurance*, and leaves no Manner of Room for Doubt or Hesitation; only we must be sure, that it be a divine *Revelation*, and that we understand it right; else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of *Enthusiasm*, and all the error of wrong Principles, if we have *Faith* and *Assurance* in what is not *divine Revelation*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Reaſon.

§. 1.

THE word *Reaſon*, in *Engliſh, has different Significations.* Sometimes it is taken for *true* and *clear Principles:* Sometimes for *clear* and *fair Deductions* from thoſe Principles: Sometimes for the *Cauſe*, and particularly for the *final Cauſe*; but the Conſideration I ſhall have of it here, is, as it ſtands for a *Faculty*, whereby *Man is ſuppoſed to be diſtinguiſhed from Beaſts*; and wherein it is evident, he much ſurpaſſes them.

§. 2. Reaſon is neceſſary, both for the enlargement of our Knowledge, and regulating our Aſſent: For it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is neceſſary and aſſiſting to all our other intellectual Faculties; and, indeed, contains *two* of them, *viz. Firſt, Sagacity*, whereby it finds intermediate *ideas*. *Secondly, Illation*, whereby it ſo orders and diſpoſes of them, as to diſcover what connexion there is in each link of the Chain, whereby the extremes are held together, and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the Truth ſought for; which is that we call

Illation or *Inference*: And consists in nothing, but the Perception of the Connexion there is between the *ideas*, in each step of the Deduction, whereby the mind comes to see, either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two *ideas*, as in *Demonstration*, in which it arrives at Knowledge: or their probable Connexion, on which it gives or withholds its *Assent*, as in *Opinion*.

§. 3. *Sense* and *Intuition* reach but a little way: The greatest part of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions and intermediate *ideas*. In those cases where we must take Propositions for true, without being certain of their being so, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the grounds of their *Probability*: In both cases, the faculty which finds out the means, and rightly applies them to discover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we call *Reason*. So that in Reason we may consider these *four Degrees*; *1st*, The discovering and finding out of Proofs. *2dly*, The regular and methodical Disposition of them, and laying them in such order, as their Connexion may be plainly perceived. *3dly*, The perceiving their Connexion. *4thly*, The making a right Conclusion.

§. 4. There is one thing more which I shall desire to be considered concerning *Reason*, and that is, whether *Syllogism*, as is generally thought, be the proper instrument

ſtrument of it; and the uſefulleſt way of exerciſing this faculty. The Cauſes I have to doubt of it, are theſe.

§ 5. *Firſt*, Becauſe *Syllogiſm* ſerves our *Reaſon* but in one only of the forementioned parts of it, and that is to ſhow the Connexion of the Proofs of any one Inſtance, and no more: But in this it is of no great uſe, ſince the mind can perceive ſuch Connexion, where it really is, as eaſily, nay, perhaps better without it. We may obſerve that there are many men that reaſon exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a *Syllogiſm*: And I believe ſcarce any one makes *Syllogiſms* in reaſoning within himſelf. Indeed, ſometimes they may ſerve to diſcover a fallacy, hid in a *rhetorical* Flouriſh; or by ſtripping an abſurdity of the cover of Wit and good Language, ſhow it in its naked Deformity. But the Weakneſs or Fallacy of ſuch a looſe Diſcourſe it ſhows, by the artificial form it is put into, only to thoſe who have thoroughly ſtudied *Mode* and *Figure*, and have ſo examined the many ways, that three Propoſitions may be put together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what grounds it is that they do ſo. But they who have not ſo far looked into thoſe forms, are not ſure by virtue of *Syllogiſm* that the Concluſion certainly follows from the Premiſes. The mind is not taught to reaſon by

theſe

these *Rules*; it has a native faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of its *ideas*, and can range them right, without any such perplexing *Repetitions*.

§. 6. And to show the weakness of an argument, there needs no more but to strip it of the superfluous *ideas*, which, blended and confounded with those on which the Inference depends, seem to show a Connexion where there is none, or at least do hinder the Discovery of the want of it; and then to lay the naked *ideas* on which the force of the Argumentation depends in their due order; in which position the mind taking a view of them, sees what Connexion they have, and so is able to judge of the Inference without any need of Syllogism at all.

§. 7. *Secondly*, Because Syllogisms are not less liable to Fallacies than the plainer ways of Argumentation: And for this I appeal to common Observation, which has always found these artificial methods of Reasoning more adapted to catch and entangle the mind, than to instruct and inform the Understanding. And if it be certain that Fallacy can be couched in Syllogisms, as it cannot be denied, it must be something else, and not Syllogism, that must discover them. But if men skilled in, and used to Syllogisms, find them assisting to their Reason, in the Discovery of Truth, I think they ought to make use of them. All that I aim at is, that they should not ascribe more to these

Forms

Forms than belongs to them; and think that men have no use, or not so full a use of their reasoning faculty without them.

§. 8. But however it be in Knowledge, I think it is of far less or no use at all in *Probabilities*: For the *Assent* there being to be determined by the Preponderancy, after a due weighing of all the Proofs on both sides, nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that, as *Syllogism*; which running away with one assumed *Probability*, pursues that till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration.

§. 9. But let it help us (as perhaps may be said) *in convincing men of their errors or mistakes*; yet still it fails our reason in that part, which, if not its highest perfection, is yet certainly its hardest task; and that which we most need its help in, and that is, *The finding out of Proofs, and making new Discoveries*. This way of Reasoning discovers no new Proofs, but is the art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already. A man knows first, and then he is able to prove *syllogistically*; so that *Syllogism* comes after Knowledge; and then a man has little or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out those *ideas* that show the Connexion of distant ones, that our stock of Knowledge is increased; and that useful arts and sciences are advanced.

§. 10.

§. 10. 'It is fit, before I leave this subject, to 'take notice of one manifest mistake in the rules of 'Syllogism, *viz.* That no syllogistical reasoning can 'be right and conclusive, but what has, at least, one 'general proposition in it. As if we could not *reason* 'about *particulars*. Whereas, in truth, the imme-'diate object of all our reasoning, is nothing but 'particulars. Every man's reasoning is only about 'the *ideas* existing in his own mind, which are 'truly, every one of them particular existences; and 'our reasoning about other things, is only as they 'correspond with those our particular *ideas*.'

§. 11. *Reason*, though of a very large extent fails us in several Instances: As, 1*st*, *Where our ideas fail*. 2*dly*, It is often at a loss, *because of the Obscurity, Confusion, or Imperfection of the ideas it is employed about*. Thus having no perfect *idea* of the least Extension of *matter*, nor of *Infinity*, we are at a loss about the divisibility of *Matter*. 3*dly*, Our *Reason* is often at a stand, *because it perceives not those ideas which would serve to shew the certain or probable agreement or disagreement of any two other ideas*. 4*thly*, Our *Reason* is often engaged in absurdities and difficulties, *by proceeding upon false principles*, which being followed, lead men into Contradictions to themselves, and Inconsistency in their own Thoughts. 5*thly*, *Dubious words*, and uncertain signs *often puzzle men's Reason*, and *bring them to a Nonplus*.

§. 12.

§. 12. Though the deducing one Propoſition from another be a great part of Reaſon, and that which it is uſually employed about: Yet the principal act of Ratiocination is the finding the agreement or diſagreement of two *ideas*, one with another, by the intervention of a third. As a man, by a yard, finds two houſes to be of the ſame length, which could not be brought together to meaſure their Equality by *juxta poſition*. Words have their conſequences as the ſigns of ſuch *ideas*: And things agree, or diſagree, as really they are; but we obſerve it only by our *ideas*.

§. 13. In Reaſoning men ordinarily uſe *four* ſorts of *Arguments*.

The *Firſt*, is to allege the Opinions of men, whoſe parts, learning, eminency, power, or ſome other cauſe, has gained a name, and ſettled their Reputation in the common eſteem with ſome kind of Authority. This may be called *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*.

§. 14. *Secondly*, Another way is, to require the Adverſary to admit what they allege as a Proof, or to aſſign a better. This I call *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*.

§. 15. A *Third* way, is to preſs a man with conſequences drawn from his own Principles or Conceſſions. This is already known under the name of *Argumentum ad hominem*.

§. 16. *Fourthly*, the using of Proofs drawn from any of the foundations of Knowledge or Probability. This I call *Argumentum, ad Judicium*. This alone of all the four, brings true Instruction with it, and advances us in our way to Knowledge. For *1st*, It argues not another man's Opinion to be right, because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of Conviction, will not contradict him. *2dly*, It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know not a better. *3dly*, Nor does it follow, that another man is in the right way, because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. This may dispose me perhaps for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it; that must come from *Proofs* and *Arguments*, and Light arising from the Nature of Things themselves; not from my Shame-facedness, Ignorance, or Error.

§. 17. By what has been said of *Reason*, we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of things, into those that are *according to*, *above*, and *contrary to Reason*. *1st*, *According to Reason*, are such Propositions, whose truth we can discover, by examining and tracing those *ideas* we have from *Sensation* and *Reflection*, and by natural deduction find to be true or probable. *2dly*, *Above Reason*, are such Propositions, whose *Truth* or *Probability* we cannot by *Reason* derive

derive from those Principles. *3dly, Contrary to Reason*, are such Propositions as are inconsistent with, or irreconcileable to, our clear and distinct *ideas*. Thus the *Existence of one God*, is according to *Reason*: The *Existence of more than one God*, contrary to *Reason*? The *Resurrection of the Body* after death, above *Reason*. *Above Reason*, may be also taken in a double sense, *viz. above Probability*, or, *above Certainty*. In that large sense also, *Contrary to Reason*, is I suppose, sometimes taken.

§. 18. There is another use of the word *Reason*, wherein it is *opposed to Faith*; which, though authorised by common use, yet is it in itself a very improper way of speaking: For *Faith* is nothing but a firm *Assent* of the mind; which if it be regulated as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good *Reason*, and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes without having any Reason for Believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks *Truth* as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Mistake and Error. But since *Reason* and *Faith* are by some men opposed, we will so consider them in the following *Chapter*.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces.

§. 1.

REASON, as contradistinguished to *Faith*, I take to be the discovery of the *Certainty* or *Probability* of such Propositions or Truths which the mind arrives at by deductions made from such *ideas*, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties, *viz.* by *Sensation* or *Reflection*.

Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any Proposition, upon the credit of the proposer, as coming immediately from *God*; which we call *Revelation*: Concerning which we must observe,

§. 2. *First*, That *no man inspired by God, can by any Revelation communicate to others, any new* simple ideas, which they had not before from *Sensation* or *Reflection*: Because words, by their immediate operation on us, cannot cause other *ideas*, but of their natural sounds, and as *signs* of latent *ideas* they can only recal to our Thoughts those *ideas*, which to us they have been wont to be signs of; but cannot introduce any new, and formerly unknown *simple ideas*. The same holds in all other *signs*, which cannot signify to us

things,

things, of which we have never before had any *idea* at all. For our *simple ideas* we muſt depend wholly on our natural faculties, and can by no means receive them from *traditional Revelation*; I ſay *traditional*, in diſtinction to *original Revelation*. By the *one*, I mean that impreſſion which is made immediately by *God* on the mind of any man, to which we cannot ſet any bounds. And by the *other*, thoſe impreſſions delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another.

§. 3. *Secondly*, I ſay, *that the ſame Truths may be diſcovered by Revelation, which are diſcoverable to us by Reaſon*; but in ſuch there is little need or uſe of *Revelation*; God having furniſhed us with natural means to arrive at the Knowledge of them: And Truths diſcovered by our natural faculties, are more certain, than when conveyed to us by *traditional Revelation*. For the Knowledge we have, that this *Revelation* came at firſt from *God*, can never be ſo ſure as the Knowledge we have from the clear and diſtinct Perception of the agreement and diſagreement of our own *ideas*. This alſo holds in matters of fact, knowable by our ſenſes: As the *hiſtory* of the *Deluge* is conveyed to us by Writings, which had their original from Revelation; and yet no body, I think, will ſay he has as certain and clear Knowledge of the *Flood*, as *Noah* that ſaw it, or that he himſelf would

would have had, had he then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater Assurance, than that of his *Senses*, that it is writ in the Book, supposed to be writ by *Moses* inspired. But he has not so great an Assurance that *Moses* writ that Book, as if he had seen *Moses* write it; so that the Assurance of its being a *Revelation*, is still less than the Assurance of his *Senses*.

§. 4. *Revelation* cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of *Reason*. For since no evidence of our faculties, by which we receive such a *Revelation*, can exceed, if equal, the Certainty of our *intuitive* Knowledge; we can never receive for a Truth any thing that is *directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge*. Thus the *ideas of one body* and *one place* do so clearly agree, that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms *the same body to be in two distinct places at once*; however, it should pretend to the authority of a *divine Revelation*: Since the evidence, *1st*, That we deceive not ourselves in ascribing it to *God*: *Secondly*, That we understand it right, can never be so great as the evidence of our own *intuitive* Knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for *the same body to be in two places at once*.

In Propositions therefore, contrary to our distinct and clear *ideas*, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of *Faith*. For *Faith* can never convince us of any thing that contradicts our Knowledge, Because, though

though Faith be founded upon the Teſtimony of *God*, who cannot lie, yet we cannot have an Aſſurance of the Truth of its being a *divine Revelation*, greater than our Knowledge. For if the mind of man can never have a clearer evidence of any thing to be a *divine Revelation*, than it has of the principles of its own Reaſon: it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its Reaſon, to give place to a Propoſition, whoſe *Revelation* has not a greater evidence than thoſe principles have.

In all things therefore where we have clear evidence from our *ideas*, and the principles of Knowledge above-mentioned, *Reaſon* is the proper Judge; and *Revelation* cannot in ſuch caſes invalidate its decrees; *nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident ſentence of Reaſon, to quit it for the contrary Opinion, under a pretence that it is Matter of Faith*, which can have no authority againſt the plain and clear dictates of *Reaſon*. But,

§. 5. *Thirdly*, There being many things of which we have but imperfect notions, or none at all; and other things, of whoſe paſt, preſent, or future Exiſtence, by the natural uſe of our faculties, we can have no Knowledge at all: Theſe being beyond the *diſcovery of our faculties, and above Reaſon*, when revealed, become the *proper Matter of Faith*. Thus that part of the angels rebelled againſt *God*; that the bodies

bodies of men shall rise and live again, and the like, are purely *Matters of Faith*, with which *Reason* has directly nothing to do.

First, then, Whatever Proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind, by its natural faculties and notions cannot judge, that is purely *Matter of Faith*, and *above Reason*.

§. 6. *Secondly*, All Propositions, whereof the mind by its natural faculties, can come to determine and judge from natural acquired *ideas*, are *Matter of Reason*; but with this difference; that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and so is persuaded of their Truth only upon probable grounds: In such, I say, an *evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent* even against *Probability*. Because the mind, not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know, is bound to give up its *Assent* to such a Testimony, which it is satisfied comes from one, who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it still belongs to *Reason* to judge of the Truth of its being a *Revelation*, and of the Signification of the Words wherein it is delivered.

§. 7. Thus far the dominion of *Faith* reaches; and that without any violence to *Reason*, which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted and improved by new discoveries of Truth, coming from the *eternal Fountain* of all Knowledge. Whatever *God* hath revealed:

revealed is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of *Faith*: But whether it be a divine *Revelation* or no, *Reason* muſt judge; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater Evidence, to embrace what is leſs evident, nor prefer leſs Certainty to the greater. There can be no Evidence, that any traditional *Revelation* is of divine original, in the words we receive it; and the ſenſe we underſtand it, ſo clear and ſo certain, as that of the Principles of *Reaſon*: And therefore, *Nothing that is contrary to the clear and ſelf-evident dictates of* Reaſon, *has a right to be urged or aſſented to, as a matter of Faith, wherein* Reaſon *has nothing to do.* Whatſoever is divine *Revelation*, ought to over-rule all our Opinions, Prejudices, and Intereſts, and hath a right to be received with a full *Aſſent*. Such a Submiſſion as this, of our Reaſon to Faith, takes not away the Landmarks of Knowledge: This ſhakes not the foundations of Reaſon, but leaves us that uſe of our faculties, for which they were given us.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Enthusiasm.

§. 1.

He that would seriously set upon the search of Truth, ought in the first place to prepare his mind with a Love of it. For he that loves it not, will not take much pains to get it, nor be much concerned when he misses it. There is no body who does not profess himself a lover of truth, and that would not take it amiss to be thought otherwise of. And yet for all this, one may truly say, there are very few lovers of truth for Truth's sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a man may know whether he be so in earnest, is worth Enquiry: And I think there is this one unerring mark of it, *viz.* The not entertaining any Proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of Assent, it is plain, receives not Truth in the Love of it. For the evidence that any Proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the proofs a man has of it, whatever degrees of Assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that Evidence, it is plain all that surplusage of Assurance is owing to some other affection,

affection, and not to the love of Truth. Whatsoever credit we give to any proposition more than it receives from the principles and proofs it supports itself upon, is owing to our inclinations that way, and is so far a derogation from the Love of Truth as such: Which, as it can receive no evidence from our Passions or Interests, so it should receive no tincture from them.

§. 2. The assuming an Authority of dictating to others, and a forwardness to prescribe to their opinions, is a constant concomitant of this bias and corruption of our Judgments. For how can it be otherwise, but that he should be ready to impose on others Belief, who has already imposed on his own?

§. 3. Upon this occasion I shall consider a third ground of Assent, which with some men has the same Authority as either *Faith* or *Reason*, I mean *Enthusiasm*; which, laying by Reason, would set up Revelation without it. Whereby in effect it takes away both Reason and Revelation, and substitutes in the room of it, the ungrounded fancies of a man's own brain, and assumes them for a foundation both of Opinion and Conduct.

§. 4. Immediate Revelation being a much easier way for men to establish their Opinions, and regulate their Conduct, than the tedious labour of strict Reasoning, it is no wonder that some have been very apt to pretend to it, especially in such of their Actions

and Opinions as they cannot account for by the ordinary methods of Knowledge, and principles of Reason. Hence we see that in all ages, men, in whom Melancholy has mixed with Devotion, or whose Conceit of themselves has raised them into an Opinion of greater familiarity with God than is allowed others, have often flattered themselves with a persuasion of an immediate Intercourse with the Deity, and frequent Communications from the divine Spirit.

§. 5. Their minds being thus prepared, whatever groundless Opinion comes to settle itself strongly upon their fancies, is an Illumination from the Spirit of God; and whatsoever odd action they find in themselves a strong Inclination to do, that Impulse is concluded to be a Call or Direction from Heaven, and must be obeyed. This I take to be properly *Enthusiasm*, which though rising from the Conceit of a warmed or overweening Brain, works, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men, than either Reason or Revelation, or both together; men being most forwardly obedient to the Impulses they receive from themselves. Strong Conceit, like a new Principle, carries all easily with it, when got above Common Sense, and freed from all Restraint of Reason, and check of Reflection, it is heightened into a divine Authority, in concurrence with our own Temper and Inclination.

§. 6.

§. 6. When men are once got into this way of immediate Revelation, of Illumination without Search, and of Certainty without Proof, it is a hard matter to get them out of it. Reason is loſt upon them; they are above it: They ſee the *Light* infuſed into their Underſtandings, and cannot be miſtaken; it is clear and viſible there, like the light of bright Sun-ſhine, ſhows itſelf, and needs no other Proof, but its own Evidence: They *feel* the hand of God moving them within, and the Impulſes of the Spirit, and cannot be miſtaken in what they feel.

§. 7. This is the way of talking of theſe men: They are ſure becauſe they are ſure: And their perſuaſions are *right*, only becauſe they are *ſtrong* in them. For when what they ſay is ſtripped of the metaphor of ſeeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to. Theſe men have, they ſay, clear light, and they ſee; they have an awakened ſenſe, and they feel: This cannot, they are ſure, be diſputed them. But here let me aſk: This *ſeeing* is it the perception of the Truth of the Propoſition, or of this, that it is a Revelation from God? This *feeling* is it a Perception of an Inclination to do ſomething, or of the Spirit of God moving that Inclination? Theſe are two very different Perceptions, and muſt be carefully diſtinguiſhed. I may perceive the Truth of a Propoſition, and yet not perceive that it is an immediate Revelation

from

from God. Nay, I may perceive I came not by it in a natural way, without perceiving that it is a Revelation from God. Because there be *Spirits*, which, without being divinely commissioned, may excite those *ideas* in me, and make their Connexion perceived. So that the Knowledge of any Proposition coming into my mind, I know not how, is not a Perception that it is from God. But however it be called Light and Seeing; I suppose it is at most but Belief and Assurance. For where a Proposition is known to be true, Revelation is needless. If therefore it be a Proposition which they are persuaded, but do not know to be true, it is not seeing but believing. What I see, I know to be so by the Evidence of the thing itself: What I believe, I take to be so upon the Testimony of another: But this Testimony I must know to be given, or else what ground have I of believing? I must see that it is God that reveals this to me, or else I see nothing. If I know not this, how great soever my Assurance is, it is groundless: Whatever Light I pretend to, it is but *Enthusiasm*.

§. 8. In all that is of divine Revelation, there is need of no other Proof, but that it is from God: For he can neither deceive nor be deceived. But how shall it be known that any Proposition in our minds is a Truth revealed to us by God? Here it is that *Enthusiasm* fails of the Evidence it pretends to. For men

thus

thus poſſeſſed boaſt of a Light, whereby they ſay they are brought into the Knowlege of this or that Truth. But if they know it to be a Truth, they muſt know it to be ſo, either by its own ſelf-evidence or by the rational Proofs that make it out to be ſo. If they know it to be a Truth either of theſe two ways, they in vain ſuppoſe it to be a Revelation. For thus all Truths, of what kind ſoever, that men uninſpired are enlightened with, come into their minds. If they ſay they know it to be true, becauſe it is a Revelation from God, the reaſon is good: But then it will be demanded, how they know it to be a Revelation from God? If they ſay by the Light it brings with it, I beſeech them to conſider, whether this be any more, than that it is a Revelation becauſe they ſtrongly believe it to be true. For all the Light they ſpeak of, is but a ſtrong perſuaſion of their own minds that it is a Truth, which is a very unſafe ground to proceed on, either in our tenets or actions.

§. 9. True Light in the mind is nothing elſe but the *Evidence* of the Truth of any Propoſition: And if it be not ſelf-evident, all the Light it can have is from Clearneſs of thoſe Proofs upon which it is received. To talk of any other Light in the Underſtanding, is to put ourſelves in the dark, or in the power of the Prince of Darkneſs. For if ſtrength of perſuaſion be the Light which muſt guide us, how

can

shall any one distinguish between the Delusions of *Satan*, and the Inspirations of the *Holy Ghost?*

§. 10. He therefore that will not give up himself to Delusion and Error, must bring this guide of his *Light within* to the trial. God when he makes the Prophet, does not unmake the Man. He leaves his faculties in their natural state, to enable him to judge of his Inspirations, whether they be of divine Original or no. If he would have us assent to the Truth of any Proposition, he either evidences that Truth by the usual methods of natural Reason, or else makes it known to be a truth which he would have us assent to by his Authority; and convinces us that it is from him, by some marks, which Reason cannot be mistaken in. Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in every thing. I do not mean that we must consult Reason, and examine whether a Proposition revealed from God can be made out by natural Principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: But consult it we must, and by it examine, whether it be a Revelation from God or no: And if Reason finds it to be revealed from God, Reason then declares for it, as much as for any other Truth, and makes it one of her Dictates. Every conceit that thoroughly warms our fancies must pass for an Inspiration, if there be nothing but the strength of our persuasions whereby to judge of them: If Reason must not examine their

Truth

Truth by something extrinsical to the persuasions themselves, Inspirations and Delusions, Truth and Falsehood, will have the same measure, and will not be possible to be distinguished.

§. 11. Thus we see the holy men of God, who had Revelations from God, had something else besides that internal Light of Assurance in their own minds, to testify to them that it was from God. They had outward signs to convince them of the Author of those Revelations. And when they were to convince others, they had a power given them to justify the truth of their commission from Heaven; and by visible signs to assert the divine Authority of the message they were sent with. *Moses* saw the Bush burn without being consumed, and heard a voice out of it. God, by another miracle of his rod turned into a Serpent, assured him likewise of a power to testify his mission, by the same Miracle repeated before them to whom he was sent. This, and the like Instances to be found among the Prophets of old, are enough to show, that they thought not an inward seeing, or persuasion of their own minds, a sufficient Evidence without any other proof, that it was from God, though the *Scripture* does not every where mention their demanding or having such proofs.

§. 12. I do not deny that God can, or doth sometimes enlighten mens minds in the apprehending of

certain Truths, or excite them to good actions by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary signs accompanying it. But in such cases too we have Reason and the Scripture, unerring rules, to know whether it be from God or no. Where the Truth embraced is consonant to the Revelation in the written Word of God; or the Action conformable to the Dictates of Right Reason, or Holy Writ, we run no risk in entertaining it as such; because, though perhaps it be not an immediate Revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that Revelation which he has given us of Truth. Where Reason or Scripture is express for any Opinion or Action, we may receive it as of divine Authority; But it is not the strength of our own persuasions which can by itself give it that stamp. The bent of our own minds may favour it as much as we please; that may show it to be a fondling of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an *Offspring* of Heaven, and of divine Original.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

Of wrong Assent or Errour.

§. 1.

ERROUR is a Mistake of our Judgment, giving *Assent* to that which is not true. The reasons whereof may be reduced to these *four*: First, *Want of Proofs*. Secondly, *Want of Ability to use them*. Thirdly, *Want of Will to use them*. Fourthly, *Wrong Measures of Probability*.

§ 2. First, *Want of Proofs*: by which I do not mean only the want of those Proofs which are not to be had, but also of those Proofs which are in being, or might be procured. The greatest part of mankind want the conveniences and opportunities of making Experiments and Observations themselves, or of collecting the Testimonies of others, being enslaved to the necessity of their mean Condition, whose lives are worn out only in the Provisions for living. These men are, by the Constitution of human Affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of those Proofs, on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those Opinions. For having much to do to get the means of living, they are not in a Condition

to look after those of learned and laborious Enquiries.

§. 3. It is true, that *God* has furnished men with faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them leisure. No man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living, as to have no spare time at all to think on his *Soul*, and inform himself in matters of Religion, were men as intent on this, as they are on things of lower concernment. There are none so enslaved to the necessity of life, who might not find many vacancies, that might be husbanded to this advantage of their Knowledge.

'Besides those already mentioned, there are others, 'whose largeness of fortune would plentifully enough 'supply books and other requisites for discovering of 'Truth, but they are *cooped* in close *by the laws* of 'their countries, and the strict guards of those whose 'interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest knowing 'more, they should believe the less in them. This 'is generally the case of all those who live in places 'where care is taken to propagate Truth without 'Knowledge, and more are forced, at a venture, to 'be of the religion of their country, and must there-'fore swallow down opinions, as silly people do 'empirick's pills, without knowing what they are 'made of, or how they will work.'

§. 4.

§. 4. Secondly, *Want of Ability* to uſe them. There be many who cannot carry a Train of Conſequences in their heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Teſtimonies. Theſe cannot diſcern that ſide on which the ſtrongeſt Proofs lie; nor follow that which in itſelf is the moſt probable Opinion. It is certain, that there is a wide difference in men's Underſtandings, Apprehenſions, and Reaſonings, to a very great Latitude, ſo that one may, without doing Injury to mankind, affirm, that there is a greater diſtance between ſome *men* and *others*, in this reſpect, than between ſome *men* and ſome *beaſts*: But how this comes about is a Speculation, though of great Conſequence, yet not neceſſary to our preſent Purpoſe.

§. 5. *Thirdly*, For *Want of Will* to uſe them. Some, though they have opportunities and leiſure enough, and want neither parts nor learning, nor other helps, are yet never the better for them, and never come to the Knowledge of ſeveral Truths that lie within their reach; either upon the account of their hot purſuit of Pleaſure, conſtant drudgery in Buſineſs, Lazineſs and Oſcitancy in general, or a particular averſion for Books and Study: And ſome out of fear that an impartial Inquiry would not favour thoſe Opinions, which beſt ſuit their Prejudices, Lives, Deſigns, Intereſts, &c. as many men forbear to caſt

cast up their Accounts, who have reason to fear that their Affairs are in no very good Posture.

How men, whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their Understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot tell: But methinks they have a low Opinion of their *Souls*, who lay out all their Incomes in Provisions for the Body, and employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps of Knowledge. I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future State, and their Concernment in it, which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes: Nor shall I take notice what a shame it is to the greatest Contemners of Knowledge, to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know. But this, at least, is worth the Consideration of those who call themselves *Gentlemen*; that however they may think Credit, Respect, and Authority, the concomitants of their Birth and Fortune; yet they will find all these still carried away from them by men of lower Condition, who surpass them in Knowledge. They who are blind, will always be led by those that see, or else fall into the Ditch: And he is certainly the most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his Understanding.

§. 6. Fourthly, *Wrong Measures of Probability*; which are,

First,

First, *Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken for Principles.* Propositions looked on as Principles, have so great an influence upon our Opinions, that it is usually by them we judge of Truth, and what is inconsistent with them is so far from passing for *probable* with us, that it will not be allowed *possible*. The Reverence borne to these Principles is so great, that the Testimony, not only of other men, but the Evidence of our own Senses are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these established Rules. The great Obstinacy that is to be found in men, firmly believing quite contrary Opinions, though many times equally absurd, in the various Religions of mankind, are as evident a proof, as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of Reasoning from received traditional principles: So that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Senses, and give their own Experience the Lie, rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with these sacred Tenets.

§. 7. Secondly, *Received Hypotheses.* The difference between these and the former, is, that those who proceed by these, will admit of matter of fact, and agree with Dissenters in that, but differ in assigning of Reasons, and explaining the manner of Operation. These are not at that open defiance with their *Senses* as the former: They can endure to hearken to their

their Information a little more patiently; but will by no means admit of their Reports in the Explanation of things; nor be prevailed on by *Probabilities*, which would convince them, that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are.

§. 8. Thirdly, *Predominant Passions or Inclinations.* Let never so much *Probability* hang on one side of a *covetous* man's Reasoning, and *money* on the other, it is easy to foresee which will prevail. Though men cannot always openly gainsay, or resist the force of manifest *Probabilities*, that make against them, yet yield they not to the Argument. Not but that it is the Nature of the Understanding, constantly to close with the more probable side: But yet a man hath power to suspend and restrain its Enquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory Examination. Until that be done, there will be always these *two ways left of evading the most apparent Probabilities.*

§. 9. *First*, That the Arguments being brought in *Words, there may be Fallacy latent in them*; and the consequences being perhaps many in train, may be some of them incoherent. There are few discourses so short and clear, to which men may not, with satisfaction enough to themselves raise this doubt, and from whose Conviction they may not without reproach of Disingenuity or Unreasonableness set themselves free.

§. 10.

§. 10. *Secondly*, Manifeſt *Probabilities* may be evaded upon this Suggeſtion, that *I know not yet all that may be ſaid on the contrary ſide*; And therefore, though a man be beaten, it is not neceſſary he ſhould yield, not knowing what Forces there are in reſerve behind. 'This is a refuge againſt conviction, ſo 'open and ſo wide, that it is hard to determine, when 'a man is quite out of the verge of it. But yet 'there is ſome end of it; and a man having carefully 'enquired into all the grounds of probability, may 'in moſt caſes come to acknowledge, upon the whole 'matter, on which ſide the probability reſts: Wherein 'the proofs are ſo cogent and clear, as to make the 'fact atteſted highly probable; neither is there ſuf-'ficient ground to ſuſpect, that there is either fallacy 'of words, nor equally valid proofs, yet undiſcover-'ed, latent on the other ſide: Nor, *laſtly*, can there 'be any ſuppoſition that there is as fair teſtimony 'againſt, as for the *matter of fact* atteſted. In all 'ſuch caſes, I think it is not in any rational man's 'power to refuſe his aſſent; in other leſs clear caſes, 'I think it is in a man's power to *ſuſpend* his aſſent; 'and, perhaps, content himſelf with the proofs he 'has, if they favour the opinion that ſuits with his 'inclination or intereſt, and ſo ſtop from farther 'ſearch. But that a man ſhould afford his aſſent to 'that ſide, on which the leſs probability appears to

' him, seems to me utterly impracticable, and as im-
' possible, as it is to believe the same thing probable
' and improbable at the same time.'

§. 11. Fourthly, *Authority*, or the *giving up our Assent to the common received Opinions*, either of our Friends or Party, Neighbourhood or Country. How many men have no other ground for their Tenets, than the supposed Honesty or Learning, or Number of those of the same Profession? as if honest or bookish men could not err; or Truth were to be established by the Vote of the Multitude. Yet this with most men serves the Turn. All men are liable to Errour, and most men are in many points by *Passion* or *Interest* under temptation to it. This is certain, that there is not an Opinion so absurd, which a man may not receive upon this Ground. There is no Errour to be named, which has not had its Professors. And a man shall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right Way, wherever he has the Footsteps of others to follow.

§. 12. But, notwithstanding the great Noise that is made in the World about Errours and Opinions, I must do Mankind that right as to say, there are not *so many men in Errours and wrong Opinions as is commonly supposed:* Not that I think they embrace the Truth, but indeed, because, concerning those Doctrines they keep such a Stir about, they have no

Thought

Thought no Opinion at all. For if any one should a little catechiſe the greateſt part of the *Partiſans* of moſt of the Sects in the World, he would not find concerning thoſe Matters, they are ſo zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own: Much leſs would he have Reaſon to think, that they took them upon the Examination of Arguments, and Appearance of Probability. They are reſolved to ſtick to a Party, that Education or Intereſt has engaged them in; and there, like the common Soldiers of an Army, ſhow their Courage and Warmth, as their Leaders direct, without ever examining, or ſo much as knowing the Cauſe they contend for.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Diviſion of the Sciences.

§. 1.

ALL that can fall within the compaſs of Human Underſtanding, being either, *1ſt*, The Nature of Things, their Relations, and their Manner of Operation; or, *2dly*, That which *Man* himſelf ought to do as a rational and voluntary Agent, for the attainment of any End, eſpecially *Happineſs*; or, *3dly*, The ways and Means whereby the Knowledge of both

of these are attained and communicated: I think *Science* may be properly divided into these *three Sorts*.

§. 2. *First*, The Knowledge of Things, their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations, whether material or immaterial: This, in a little more enlarged sense of the Word, I call Φυσικὴ, or *Natural Philosophy*. The end of this is bare *speculative Truth*, and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such, falls under this Branch: Whether it be God himself, *Angels*, *Spirits*, *Bodies*, or any of their Affections, as *Number*, *Figure*, &c.

§. 3. *Secondly*, Πρακτικὴ, the Skill of right applying our own Powers and Actions for the attainment of things good and useful. The most considerable under this head is *Ethicks*, which is the seeking out those Rules and Measures of human Actions, which lead to *Happiness*, and the Means to practise them. The end of this is not bare *Speculation*; but *Right*, and a Conduct suitable thereto.

§. 4. *Thirdly*, Σημειωτικὴ, or the *Doctrine of Signs*: the most usual being *Words*, it is aptly enough termed *Logick*: The business whereof is to consider the Nature of *Signs*, which the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its Knowledge to others. Things are represented to the mind by *ideas*: And men's *ideas* are communicated to one another by *articulate Sounds*, or *Words*. The Consideration

tion then of *ideas* and words, as the great Inſtruments of Knowledge, makes no deſpicable part of their Contemplation, who would take a view of human Knowledge in the whole Extent of it.

§ 5. This ſeems to me the *firſt and moſt general, as well as natural Diviſion* of the Objects of our Underſtanding. For a man can employ his thoughts about nothing, but either the Contemplation of *Things* themſelves for the Diſcovery of truth, or about the *Things* in his own power, which are his *Actions*, for the attainment of his own Ends; or the *Signs* the mind makes uſe of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them, for its clearer Information. All which *Three*, viz. *Things* as they are in themſelves Knowable: *Actions*, as they depend on us in order to Happineſs, and the right uſe of *Signs*, in order to Knowledge, being *Toto Cœlo* different, they ſeemed to me to be the three great Provinces of the *Intellectual* World, wholly, ſeparate, and diſtinct one from another.

THE END.

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
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